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Essays in Corporate Governance
Abstract
In the first chapter (â??Governance by Litigationâ??) I study the role of shareholder litigation rights in
corporate governance. To empirically identify the effects of shareholder lawsuits, I use the staggered
adoption of universal demand (UD) laws in 23 states between 1989 and 2005. These laws impose a
significant obstacle to lawsuits against directors and officers for breach of fiduciary duty. UD laws are
associated with increased use of governance provisions (e.g., classified boards) that entrench managers
or otherwise limit shareholder voice. I also document fewer institutional blockholders, changes to
financial policies and CEO compensation, and impaired performance for firms subject to UD. Overall, my
findings cast doubt on the notion that shareholder lawsuits primarily benefit attorneys rather than
corporations or their shareholders
In the second chapter (â??Passive Investors, Not Passive Ownersâ?? with Todd Gormley and Donald
Keim) we examine whether and by which mechanisms passive investors influence firmsâ?? governance
structures. Our empirical strategy exploits variation in passive institutional ownership that results from
stocks being assigned to either the Russell 1000 or 2000 index. Our findings suggest that passive
investors play a key role in influencing firmsâ?? governance choices; ownership by passive institutions is
associated with more independent directors, the removal of poison pills and restrictions on
shareholdersâ?? ability to call special meetings, and fewer dual class share structures. Passive investors
appear to exert influence through their large voting blocsâ??passive ownership is associated with less
support for management proposals and more support for shareholder-initiated governance proposals.
Consistent with the observed differences in governance having a positive influence on firm value, we find
that passive ownership is also associated with improvements in firmsâ?? longer-term performance.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Ian R. Appel
Todd A. Gormley
Michael R. Roberts

In the first chapter (“Governance by Litigation”) I study the role of shareholder
litigation rights in corporate governance.

To empirically identify the effects of

shareholder lawsuits, I use the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws in 23
states between 1989 and 2005. These laws impose a significant obstacle to lawsuits
against directors and officers for breach of fiduciary duty. UD laws are associated with
increased use of governance provisions (e.g., classified boards) that entrench managers or
otherwise limit shareholder voice. I also document fewer institutional blockholders,
changes to financial policies and CEO compensation, and impaired performance for firms
subject to UD. Overall, my findings cast doubt on the notion that shareholder lawsuits
primarily benefit attorneys rather than corporations or their shareholders
In the second chapter (“Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners” with Todd
Gormley and Donald Keim) we examine whether and by which mechanisms passive
investors influence firms’ governance structures. Our empirical strategy exploits variation
in passive institutional ownership that results from stocks being assigned to either the
Russell 1000 or 2000 index. Our findings suggest that passive investors play a key role in
influencing firms’ governance choices; ownership by passive institutions is associated
with more independent directors, the removal of poison pills and restrictions on
shareholders’ ability to call special meetings, and fewer dual class share structures.
iii

Passive investors appear to exert influence through their large voting blocs—passive
ownership is associated with less support for management proposals and more support for
shareholder-initiated governance proposals. Consistent with the observed differences in
governance having a positive influence on firm value, we find that passive ownership is
also associated with improvements in firms’ longer-term performance.
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CHAPTER 1: GOVERNANCE BY LITIGATION

I. Introduction
A rich literature in financial economics studies inefficiencies arising from the
separation of ownership and control. Factors that help to resolve agency problems include
managerial labor markets (Fama (1980)), legal protections (La Porta et al. (1998)), and
the market for corporate control (Grossman and Hart (1980)). However, shareholders
generally exert little influence over these aspects of corporate governance. Rather, they
are primarily confined to three fundamental rights associated with equity ownership:
voice, exit, and litigation. While the voice and exit have recently received considerable
attention in the literature (Edmans (2014)), the role of litigation in corporate governance
remains unclear. In this paper, I study the effects of shareholder litigation rights on
governance and other corporate policies.
I focus on a particular type of shareholder lawsuit, known as a derivative action,
which alleges a breach of fiduciary duty by directors or officers.1 Corporate law in the
U.S. requires fiduciaries to exhibit prudent judgment (the duty of care) and refrain from
self-serving conduct (the duty of loyalty). Derivative lawsuits serve as an ex post
enforcement mechanism for these duties. Between 2000 and 2009, over 13% of firms in
my sample were involved with derivative litigation. Yet, there are several reasons why
the effects of these lawsuits on firms may be minimal, if not negative. First, shareholders
may be able to adequately exert governance through alternative mechanisms, making
litigation rights redundant. In addition, the “business judgment rule” largely shields

1

These lawsuits are called “derivative” because shareholders sue directors or officers on behalf of the
corporation. Further institutional background is provided in the next section.
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managers from liability for corporate decisions. Even when not protected by this legal
doctrine, directors and officers face a very small chance of personal liability due to the
pervasive use of exculpatory charter provisions, indemnification contracts, and directors
and officers (D&O) insurance (Black et al. (2006)). Finally, financial recoveries from
derivative lawsuits tend to be low while legal fees are often high. In fact, some critics
maintain that the primary beneficiaries of litigation are lawyers rather than corporations
or shareholders (Romano (1991)).
Others argue derivative lawsuits confer benefits that potentially outweigh their
costs. First, most settlements include reform of corporate governance practices. In fact,
such reforms are often the primary goal of litigation (Erickson (2010)). For example, a
2008 settlement from a derivative lawsuit against the directors of Schering-Plough
implemented annual director elections and removed supermajority voting requirements,
while a 2005 settlement involving OM Group featured the termination of the CEO and
appointment of two shareholder-nominated directors. In addition to settlements,
derivative lawsuits may confer the benefit of future deterrence by imposing nonpecuniary costs (e.g., reputational penalties) on directors and officers.2 Such costs may, in
turn, discourage certain behaviors by managers.
Quantitatively assessing the effects of derivative litigation poses a significant
challenge. One possible empirical strategy is to match firms facing litigation to a control
group. This approach suffers from two main drawbacks. First, lawsuits are not randomly
assigned. While a matching strategy minimizes ex ante observable differences between
groups, breaches of fiduciary duties are also inextricably linked to unobservable
2

Brochet and Srinivasan (2014), Ferris et al. (2007), Fich and Shivdasani (2007), Karpoff et al. (2008)
provide empirical evidence of indirect costs associated with litigation. Helland (2006) finds contrasting
results.
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characteristics of managers (e.g., value of private benefits, sensitivity to reputational risk,
etc.). Second, and perhaps more importantly, the matching strategy limits analysis to the
realization of a lawsuit and cannot account for variation attributable to the deterrence
function of litigation.
In this paper, I empirically identify the effects of litigation using variation
generated by universal demand (UD) laws at the state of incorporation level. These laws
impose a significant hurdle to derivative lawsuits. Specifically, UD laws require
shareholders to seek board approval prior to initiating derivative litigation. The board
rarely grants this approval, however, because lawsuits typically name the directors
themselves as defendants. I use UD laws as the “treatment” in a difference-in-differences
framework. The main specification includes firm, industry-year, and state-of-locationyear fixed effects to control for time-invariant heterogeneity across firms and timevarying differences across industries (e.g., demand shocks) and headquarter locations
(e.g., local economic conditions). This identification strategy addresses the two main
shortcomings of the matching strategy. First, because UD laws are adopted at the state of
incorporation level, they are largely unrelated to the characteristics of individual firms.
Second, UD laws decrease the threat of future litigation and therefore account for
deterrence effects.
I first show UD laws affect the incidence of derivative litigation. To do so, I
assemble a database of over 900 derivative lawsuits involving public corporations using
SEC filings and other sources. I find UD laws are associated with a decrease in derivative
litigation of approximately 0.7 percentage points, a drop of over one third relative to the
sample mean. The magnitude of this effect is consistent with anecdotal evidence on the
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effect of UD laws discussed in the next section. However, I argue this estimate is, if
anything, a lower bound on the change to the threat of future litigation.
Next, I turn attention to the effect of UD laws on the governance structures of
firms. I use the entrenchment index (Bebchuk et al. (2009)) as the primary governance
outcome. I find UD laws are associated with about a 10% increase in the entrenchment
index, indicating increased use of antitakeover provisions relative to the control group.
The change in governance structures is largely driven by increased use of poison pills,
supermajority voting requirements, and classified boards. I obtain qualitatively similar
results for the GIM index (Gompers et al. (2003)), which considers a wider array of
governance provisions. UD laws are also associated with a drop in the presence of large
institutional blockholders. Additional evidence points to this being a consequence of the
increased use of antitakeover provisions.
I also consider the effect of litigation on different corporate policies that are
potentially sensitive to agency conflicts. First, UD laws are associated with a shift in the
composition of CEO pay that reduces sensitivity to firm performance. Specifically, the
ratio of cash compensation to total compensation increases by approximately 6%.
However, this is offset by a decline in equity-linked compensation, leaving total pay
unchanged. Second, I document a decline in share repurchases following the adoption of
UD. While this result may support the idea that managers retain cash to engage in
“empire building,” there is no change to measures of firm size or investment. Rather, I
find lower debt issuance and book leverage, consistent with managers either attempting
to reduce firm risk or otherwise lessen the disciplining effects of debt.

4

Finally, I show UD laws are associated with weaker accounting performance.
Specifically, ROA declines by approximately 0.8 percentage points for firms subject to
UD. Consistent with the idea that shareholder voice and exit may substitute for litigation
rights, I find the drop in profitability is driven by firms with low institutional ownership.
The effect is also stronger for small firms, which may have weaker external governance
mechanisms (e.g., monitoring by regulators) and firms with high cash flows, which may
be more prone to agency conflicts (Jensen (1986)).
The interpretation of the results rests on the assumption that the adoption of UD
laws is independent of unobserved variables that influence corporate policies and
outcomes. Political economy factors are of particular concern in this regard. For instance,
it may be the case that firms incorporated in a particular state lobbied for the statutes in
response to heightened risk of litigation. To address this concern, I restrict the sample of
treated firms to Pennsylvania, where UD was implemented by the state supreme court in
Cuker v. Mikalauskas (1997). The effects of lobbying are likely muted for this sample of
firms since UD was not enacted by legislators as a matter of public policy, but by the
courts for the sake of consistency with judicial precedent. This test yields results similar
to the main analysis.
This paper builds on the literature that studies the effects of shareholder litigation.
The bulk of this literature focuses on class action lawsuits (e.g., DuCharme et al. (2004);
Hanley and Hoberg (2012); Hopkins (2014); Arena and Julio (2014); Lowry and Shu
(2002)). Derivative litigation is the specific focus of Ferris et al. (2007). A related line of
literature considers the effects of fiduciary duties and director liability on firm policies
and stock returns (e.g., Becker and Strömberg (2012); Donelson and Yust (2014);
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Grinstein and Rossi (2014)). I contribute to this literature by offering a novel
identification strategy to study litigation that accounts for its deterrence effects. My
results suggest such effects influence multiple dimensions of corporate behavior and
ultimately impair performance.
I also offer new insights into the broader literature on corporate governance. A
voluminous literature studies the relation between governance indices and different
corporate policies and outcomes (e.g., Bebchuk et al. (2009); Chava et al. (2009);
Cremers and Nair (2005); Gompers et al. (2003)). Other papers study factors that lead to
firms implementing anti-takeover provisions in the first place (e.g., Schoar and
Washington (2011); Field and Karpoff (2002)). I complement these papers by showing
that the threat of litigation can also shape the governance structures of firms by
restraining the adoption of provisions that entrench managers or otherwise limit
shareholder voice.
Finally, this paper is related to previous work on the effects of state antitakeover
laws. In their seminal paper, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) argue business
combination (BC) laws reveal managerial preferences to “enjoy the quiet life.” Other
papers have analyzed the effect of BC laws on innovation (Atanassov (2013)), use of debt
(Francis et al. (2010); Garvey and Hanka (1999)), executive compensation (Bertrand and
Mullainathan (1999)), diversifying acquisitions (Gormley and Matsa (2014b)), payout
policy (Francis et al. (2011)), and differential effects based on industry competition
(Giroud and Mueller (2010)). This paper provides a new environment to study the nature
of agency conflicts that arise from shocks to corporate governance. I show that while

6

shareholder litigation rights are a distinct governance mechanism from the takeover
market, they have a similar ability to restrain certain behaviors by managers.

II. Institutional background
A. Derivative lawsuits
From a legal perspective, a corporation is a creature of statute that exists
independently of its shareholders. Thus, if directors or officers breach their fiduciary
duties, the corporate entity itself can initiate litigation. A derivative lawsuit entails
shareholders suing directors and officers on behalf of the corporation to address such
actions. By way of example, suppose a manager wastes corporate assets by overpaying
for an acquisition after failing to perform adequate due diligence. The primary recipient
of harm from this action is the corporation because it (not the shareholders) was the
owner of the wasted assets. Shareholders may be injured as well (e.g., by a lower stock
price), but this injury is indirect in nature since it results from damage to the corporation.
Therefore, in order to seek redress for this breach of fiduciary duty, shareholders can sue
the manager derivatively on the corporation’s behalf.3
Derivative lawsuits address a wide range of transgressions by directors and
officers. In a sample of lawsuits filed between 1982 and 1999, Ferris et al. (2007) find the
most common allegations pertain to the duty of care (41%), the duty of loyalty (26%),
mishandling corporate information (16%), and issues related to M&A (7%).The authors

3

Allegations made in In re Hewlett Packard Shareholder Derivative Litigation related to HP’s $10.3
billion acquisition of Autonomy match this general fact pattern. See:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-19/hp-said-to-be-in-settlement-talks-over-autonomylawsuits.html.
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note this is not necessarily representative of the composition of lawsuits in more recent
years.4 Appendix B provides specific examples of derivative lawsuits from SEC filings.
Any financial recovery from a derivative lawsuit is paid to the corporate treasury;
shareholders do not directly receive a payment. Firms typically provide directors and
officers with D&O insurance policies that (in most cases) cover payouts related to
shareholder litigation. Settlements are therefore circular in nature: they are paid on behalf
of the directors and officers by the corporation's insurance policy back to the corporation.
The benefit of such a settlement is potentially offset by higher future premiums. In
addition, most states allow firms to adopt charter provisions that limit (or eliminate
entirely) financial penalties for transgressions related to the duty of care. Thus, lawsuits
alleging (gross) negligence by directors or officers are unlikely to result in a meaningful
financial recovery.
Governance reform is also a key aspect of derivative lawsuit settlements. Erickson
(2010) finds that over 80% of settlements include changes to governance practices, about
half of which consist solely of governance reform without a cash payment to the
corporation. Ferris et al. (2007) also document changes to the structure of boards (e.g.,
higher outside representation) following derivative lawsuits. In theory, such reforms may
mitigate agency conflicts and outweigh the costs associated with litigation. It is unclear if
this is the case in practice; Romano (1991) argues governance settlements are largely
“cosmetic” in nature and simply serve as justification for large legal fees.
While derivative lawsuits address harm to the corporate entity, class action
lawsuits address direct harm to shareholders. Specifically, these lawsuits allege a

4

Specifically, the “high water mark” for duty of care allegations came in the wake of the Smith v. Van
Gorkom decision by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1985.

8

violation of rights associated with equity ownership. For example, interference with the
shareholder franchise constitutes direct harm to shareholders and would likely be grounds
for class action litigation. Class actions often involve only a subset of all shareholders
(e.g., those who purchased shares during some period) and are a response to a sudden
drop in stock price. In contrast to derivative lawsuits, any financial recovery is paid to
shareholders since they are the primary recipient of harm. Allegations related to
acquisitions and federal securities laws are usually brought as class action lawsuits,
though shareholders can (and often do) initiate parallel derivative claims. While there is a
“gray” area between class action and derivative lawsuits, plaintiffs almost always prefer
the former. This stems from the fact that derivative lawsuits involve a number of
procedural hurdles, the most important of which (the “demand requirement”) I discuss
below.

B. Initiating a derivative claim
The “fundamental tenet” of corporate law holds that the board of directors
manages the business and affairs of a corporation (Swanson (1992)). Under normal
circumstances, the board alone has the power to initiate litigation on behalf of the
corporation. Thus, prior to commencing a derivative action, shareholders must first
demand that the board take corrective action (through litigation or other means) to
address the alleged wrongdoing. This is known as the “demand requirement.”5 The board
can, in turn, either accept or refuse the shareholder demand. However, this decision often
poses a conflict of interest for directors. Specifically, derivative lawsuits usually name
5

While derivative lawsuits can be filed in both state and federal courts, the Supreme Court has ruled that
the demand requirement for cases filed in federal court is determined by a firm's state of incorporation
(Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services (1991)).
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some (if not all) members of the board as defendants, so directors “almost inevitably”
decide against proceeding with litigation (Swanson (1992)). While shareholders take
control of the lawsuit if the board of directors wrongly refuses demand, courts generally
review this decision under the deferential business judgment rule and rarely overturn the
board's decision.
The futility exception to the demand requirement allows shareholders to usurp the
board’s power and initiate a derivative action without the approval of directors if the
board cannot fairly evaluate the demand. The circumstances under which courts deem
demand to be futile vary between states. Delaware courts use a two-prong test, articulated
in Aronson v. Lewis (1984), requiring shareholders to allege “particularized facts” that
cast a reasonable doubt on the directors being disinterested and independent or the
challenged transaction being a valid exercise of business judgment. The fact that
plaintiffs are not entitled to discovery at this point in the proceedings hinders these
efforts. However, courts permit discovery once plaintiffs establish standing through
demand futility. This, in turn, compels most boards to consider settling the claim.
Shareholders almost always prefer to argue demand futility rather than make a demand
because of courts’ reluctance to overturn demand refusal.
Critics note several shortcomings of the demand futility doctrine. First, corporate
law provides mechanisms to help conflicted boards maintain objectivity. For example,
boards can appoint special litigation committees (SLCs) consisting of independent and
disinterested directors to evaluate demand requests and determine whether litigation
behooves the corporation. Second, the demand requirement allows boards to take
corrective action rather than immediately proceed with litigation. The exhaustion of intra-

10

corporate remedies therefore serves as a “safeguard against strike suits” (Aronson v.
Lewis (1984)). Finally, the futility exception propagates inefficiency from the perspective
of judicial economy. Due to its ambiguous nature, demand futility engenders “gobs of
litigation” (Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services (1991)). Most of this litigation focuses
on the issue of demand futility rather than the alleged breach of fiduciary duty by
directors or officers of the corporation (Swanson (1992)).

C. UD laws
In response to criticisms over the demand futility doctrine, 23 states have
implemented UD: the earliest were Georgia and Michigan in 1989, and the two most
recent were Rhode Island and South Dakota in 2005. Table 1 reports the full list of states
of incorporation along with corresponding effective year and statute reference. Most of
these states adopted the UD concept from a proposal offered by the American Bar
Association (ABA) in the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), a model set of
corporate laws followed (at least in part) by many states. The MBCA requires
shareholders to make demand in every case unless irreparable harm to the corporation
would ensue. If demand is refused by the board, courts can only review whether this
decision constituted valid business judgment (Pinto and Branson (2013)).6 Kinney (1994)
notes “the effect of the MBCA approach is that if a majority of the board or committee is
independent - and the corporation is likely to have ensured that it is - then the court will
dismiss the derivative suit.” Thus, commentators widely regard UD as a significant
6

The American Law Institute (ALI) proposed a different UD standard. Specifically, the judicial standard
(and deference afforded to the decision of directors) depends on the nature of allegations. Pinto and
Branson (2013) state this approach is less pro-defendant than the MBCA rule, yet still stricter than the
approaches used in Delaware and other states without UD. In addition, the language in Florida's statute
differs from the MBCA but has similar implications.
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obstacle to derivative litigation. In a case study of 3 states that adopted UD, Davis (2008)
concludes that the provision weakens the deterrence function of derivative litigation.
Others use stronger language. For instance, some declared UD would “probably make
derivative litigation impossible to maintain in all cases” (NY Times, 11/29/93), while
others called it “a death knell” for derivative lawsuits (ABA Journal, March 1994).
In this context, the restriction of shareholder litigation rights is largely a
nonpartisan issue: of the 23 states with UD, ten had Democratic majorities in both houses
of the legislature at the time of adoption, seven had Republican majorities in both houses,
four had a mixed legislature, and one (Nebraska) has a nonpartisan legislature. In the
final state (Pennsylvania), UD was implemented by the state supreme court. One
potential concern for this analysis is confounding policies that may be correlated with UD
laws. The relatively uniform distribution of legislator ideologies allays such concerns.
However, firms and other interest groups did lobby for the laws as a means to curb
frivolous litigation. For instance, New York Governor Mario Cuomo only supported UD
“after getting a personal lobbying pitch from Jack Welch, Chairman of General Electric.”
But, members of the New York State Assembly “put off action on the bill…after
consumer advocate Ralph Nader attacked the measure” (ABA Journal, March 1994).
These anecdotes suggest the passage of UD laws may be endogenously related to
lobbying efforts by firms or other interest groups. Throughout the paper, I take a number
of steps to address this issue.
Davis (2008) provides evidence that UD laws affect conduct (self-dealing) that
could be targeted by derivative litigation. Specifically, in a sample of 77 corporations,
median CEO compensation increased 22% and related party transactions increased 19%
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in the two years following the enactment of universal demand laws relative to the prior
two years. Examples of transactions documented in this study include the following:
Opening a corporate office in Pakistan, the residence of the company’s chairman
and controlling shareholder (Burke Mills Inc.); the $4.5 million sale of a company
to an entity controlled by the chairman of the board (Cash America International);
regularly housing management trainees and other employees at hotels co-owned
by the CEO (Food Lion Corp.); cash advances to the controlling shareholder and a
diverse range of business dealing with his son in law (Ingles Markets, Inc.); and
$200,000 in payments for using a controlling shareholder’s aircraft. (Davis
(2008))
The author notes these transactions are not necessarily improper and perhaps even benefit
the respective corporations. However, the findings suggest UD laws have a discernible
effect on aspects of managerial behavior that may be deterred by derivative litigation.

III. Hypothesis development and methodology
A. Hypothesis development
From a theoretical perspective, the role of shareholder litigation rights in
corporate governance is unclear. One possibility is that alternative governance
mechanisms serve as substitutes for derivative litigation, muting (if not eliminating
entirely) its effects. For example, recent papers show blockholders can exert governance
through both “voice” and “exit” (Edmans (2014)). This line of literature argues direct
intervention (e.g., a proxy fight) and the credible threat of selling shares are important
mechanisms for disciplining managers. However, engaging in voice and exit can be
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costly. For example, Gantchev (2013) estimates the costs of a campaign ending in a
proxy fight to be over $10 million. In addition, selling a large bloc of shares may entail
significant transaction costs. Theories of voice and exit are also predicated on the
presence of at least one large shareholder in the first place, and their effectiveness may be
limited if ownership is more dispersed. If these mechanisms are either too costly or
otherwise ineffective, litigation may be a viable recourse for shareholders to enforce
fiduciary duties. This idea is further supported by the fact that plaintiffs’ attorneys
generally work on a contingent fee basis, thereby limiting the costs borne by shareholders
and reducing free-rider problems that may otherwise discourage direct intervention.
Firms are also subject to various external governance forces that may substitute
for derivative lawsuits’ role in enforcing fiduciary duties. A particularly important
mechanism for the purpose of this paper is oversight by outside entities. In the U.S., the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Department of Justice (DOJ), stock
exchanges, and the press all play a role in policing the behavior of managers. The
penalties imposed by these organizations may serve as a substitute for private litigation.
However, there are reasons to suspect that this substitution effect is imperfect.
Specifically, the incentives and abilities of external organizations to monitor managerial
behavior are likely lower than that of shareholders. This is particularly true for smaller
firms, which are less likely to be closely monitored by the press and regulators (Davis
(2008)).
If alternative mechanisms are not perfect substitutes, derivative lawsuits may help
to enforce fiduciary duties and thereby affect different dimensions of corporate behavior.
Many of these behaviors (e.g., shirking by managers) are not directly observable.

14

However, one dimension that is observable is the governance structures of firms.
Derivative lawsuit settlements largely center on governance reforms, so one may
naturally expect litigation to be associated with future changes to governance. However,
litigation may also affect governance through indirect channels. Specifically, derivative
lawsuits may serve a deterrence function if they impose non-pecuniary costs (e.g.,
reputational penalties) on directors and officers. This function potentially operates
through two different channels. First, because governance reform is often one of the main
goals of derivative litigation, shareholders may be less likely to initiate litigation (all else
equal) if a firm already has “best practice” governance policies in place. This may lead
managers (especially those facing a high risk of litigation) to implement such policies in
an attempt to preempt lawsuits over unrelated matters.7 Second, while the corporate codes
of every state permit the use of defensive governance provisions, directors are not
afforded unlimited discretion in their use. If governance provisions are deployed with the
primary goal of entrenching directors and officers rather than defending the corporation's
interests, shareholders may have cause to initiate litigation.8 Thus, the use of these
provisions may be discouraged if heightened litigation risk is costly for directors or
officers.

7

Anecdotal evidence supports this claim. For instance, in the 2008 “What Directors Think” survey from
Corporate Board Member and PricewaterhouseCoopers 56% of directors of public companies state they
think good corporate governance affects the likelihood they will be named in litigation, and 66% believe it
affects the odds they will be exonerated. In contrast, just 27% of directors think good corporate governance
has an effect on stock price.
8
Mathias et al. (2014) note a common “entrenchment-type claim involves an attack on the adoption or
refusal to modify 'poison-pill' plans or director retention plans that make it difficult for a hostile takeover
attempt to succeed, or other defensive actions taken by the board of directors…The relief sought in these
types of cases is the nullification or modification of the challenged takeover defense mechanism.” See
Crandon Capital Partners (derivatively on behalf of Willamette Industries) v. Shelk (2005) for an example
of such allegations.
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Changes to the governance structures of firms may influence other dimensions of
corporate behavior. For example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999) argue that managers
have some discretion over their wages, and the compensation of uncontrolled managers
will increase beyond competitive levels. In addition, a number of theories posit that
managers prefer to reduce payouts to shareholders so as to increase cash at their disposal
(e.g., Easterbrook (1984); Jensen (1986); Zwiebel (1996)). The motives for reducing
payouts could result from several different agency conflicts. For example, managers may
want to undertake unproductive investments from which they derive personal benefit
(i.e., engage in “empire building”), decrease the risk associated with their undiversified
human capital, or to lessen the disciplining effects of debt.
While the direct and deterrence effects of derivative lawsuits may help to align
the incentives of shareholders and managers, it is not necessarily the case that they
improve corporate performance. This stems from the fact that litigation imposes direct
costs on firms (e.g., D&O insurance premiums, legal fees, distraction to managers). In
addition, lawsuits may impose indirect costs such as deterring managers from pursuing
risky ventures that increase litigation risk. Thus, the effect of shareholder litigation rights
on firm performance is ultimately an empirical question. In any case, the role of
alternative governance mechanisms discussed above suggests that the benefits of
derivative lawsuits may be most apparent for firms in which voice and exit are weaker
mechanisms or which are subject to less scrutiny from outside entities.
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B. Empirical methodology
I use UD laws as a quasi-natural experiment to study the effects of derivative
lawsuits. The difference-in-differences specification is given as follows:
ݕ௦௧ = ߚܷܦ௦௧ + ߠ + ߛ௧ + ߜ௧ + ݑ௦௧
The dependent variables for firm i in industry j, state of location k, state of incorporation
s, and year t are denoted by ݕ௦௧ .
ܷܦ௦௧ is an indicator for whether a firm is incorporated in a state that has a UD
law at time t. The coefficient on the indicator (ߚ) is the difference-in-differences estimate
(i.e., the average effect of UD laws for the treated group relative to the control). I include
firm (ߠ ), industry-year (ߛ௧ ), and state-of-location-year (ߜ௧ ) fixed effects in the main
specification to control unobserved heterogeneity that is time-invariant (at the firm level)
and time varying (at the industry and state-of-location level). The treatment group in this
experimental design consists of firm incorporated in states with UD laws. Because the
“events” are staggered over time in this setting, the control group consists of both firms in
states that never have UD laws as well as firms incorporated in states that eventually
adopt UD. For example, when firms in North Carolina are treated in 1995, firms in
Pennsylvania (treated in 1997) serve as a control. This structure helps to reduces noise
and biases that may be present when drawing inferences from a single event (Roberts and
Whited (2010)).
As a falsification test, I examine whether UD laws have an “effect” prior to their
implementation. I use the following specification to examine dynamic coefficient trends:
ݕ௦௧ = ߚଵ ܷ(ܦ−1)௦௧ + ߚଶ ܷ(ܦ0)௦௧ + ߚଷ ܷ(ܦ+1)௦௧
+ߚସ ܷ(ܦ2+)௦௧ + ߠ + ߛ௧ + ߜ௧ + ݑ௦௧
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Here ܷ(ܦ−1)௦௧ is an indicator for one year prior to the effective year, ܷ(ܦ0)௦௧ is an
indicator for the effective year, etc. If UD laws have a causal effect on different firm
policies and outcomes, the effect should occur following the implementation of the law,
not before. In other words, the coefficient on ܷ(ܦ−1)௦௧ should be statistically
indistinguishable from zero and the effect should be driven by later years.9
I do not include industry adjusted variables in the above specifications because
such controls lead to inconsistent estimates (Gormley and Matsa (2014)). Rather, I use
fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity within firms and
time-varying heterogeneity across industries (e.g., demand shocks) and headquarters
location (e.g., local economic conditions, political economy factors). Industry-year fixed
effects are constructed using 3-digit SIC codes. For convenience, I refer to state-oflocation-year fixed effects simply by state-year. It is important to note that it is not
possible to include state-of-incorporation-year fixed effects in the above specifications as
this would be perfectly collinear with ܷܦ௦௧ .
I report multiple specifications for the main results, including firm fixed effects
with year fixed effects and firm fixed effects with industry-year fixed effects. The small
sample sizes for some robustness tests in this paper make using higher dimensional fixed
effects impractical. I do not control for firm level characteristics (e.g., accounting
variables) in the regressions. Such controls may be affected by UD laws, and including
them would result in an inconsistent estimate of treatment effect. However, in unreported
analysis I find qualitatively similar results when standard firm-level controls are included

9

It should be noted that, in most cases, the effective year is the same as the enactment year for UD laws.
However, in a few cases the enactment year comes after the effective year. In these cases, UD laws may
affect firm behavior prior to implementation. However, the results reported in Section 4 suggest this is not a
significant concern for my analysis.
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in the specification. Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), I use robust standard
errors clustered at the state of incorporation level.

IV. Data and summary statistics
A. Main sample and construction of independent variable
The sample consists of firms in the Compustat-CRSP merged database between
1985 and 2009. I omit financials (SIC 6000 – 6999), utilities (SIC 4900 – 4999), and
public administration/non-classifiable firms (SIC 9000 – 9999). I drop firms with missing
or zero values for sales or market capitalization. In addition, I limit the sample to firms
with greater than $20 million in assets to mitigate the effects of small firms on outcome
variables normalized by total assets. The final sample consists of 79,049 firm-year
observations. I use Compustat-CRSP to construct a number of variables related to
corporate policies and outcomes. These measures are defined in Table A.1. All
accounting variables are winsorized at the 1/99% levels.
The main explanatory variable in this paper is an indicator for whether a firm is
incorporated in a state that has a UD law. However, using the incorporation state reported
by Compustat introduces measurement error into the empirical design because only the
most recent state of incorporation is reported. Thus, firms will be incorrectly classified
into the “treatment” group if they recently re-incorporated to a state with UD from one
without. The measurement error induced by this misclassification will not result in biased
or inconsistent estimates as long as it is not correlated with the explanatory variables.
However, this assumption may not hold if some firms endogenously choose to reincorporate to states that offer a higher level of protection from shareholder litigation. To
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address this problem, I use the historical state of incorporation as determined by Gormley
and Matsa (2014b) to construct the independent variable. The historical state of
incorporation is identified using data from Cohen (2012), SEC Analytics, and a legacy
version of Compustat. I use the current state of incorporation for post-2006 observations
not covered by this dataset. While I do not find strong evidence of UD laws influencing
re-incorporation decisions, I drop observations for firms that change states of
incorporation to account for the possibility that heightened protection from litigation may
influence this decision for some firms. This has little effect on the main results; consistent
with previous findings (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003); Gormley and Matsa
(2014b)), the current state of incorporation differs from the historical state of
incorporation for fewer than 5 percent of firm-year observations in my sample.

B. Litigation variables
An important aspect of this paper is measuring the incidence of derivative
litigation. One institutional factor that complicates this task is the fact that such actions
can be initiated in both state and federal courts. Although there are centralized databases
for cases filed in federal court, this is not the case for state courts. Furthermore, electronic
databases for individual state courts often do not extend far back into the sample (e.g.,
Delaware Chancery filings can be searched from 2000 onwards). One potential solution
offered by the literature is to use legal databases to search for cases that resulted in a
written judicial opinion. However, this potentially imposes a bias as some courts (most
notably, federal courts and the Delaware Chancery) issue more written opinions than
others (Armour et al. (2012)).
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I assemble a database of derivative lawsuits using two sources: Audit Analytics
and SEC filings. The Audit Analytics litigation database contains derivative lawsuits filed
in federal courts after 2000. I require lawsuits to be classified as both “derivative” and
“stockholder suits” to be included in my final sample. After merging with the main
sample, this yields a total of over 300 derivative lawsuits filed in federal courts for firms
in my sample. Approximately two-thirds of these cases are between 2005 and 2007,
consistent with the observation by Erickson (2010) that derivative lawsuits pertaining to
option backdating during this period were often filed in federal courts.
There are two shortcomings of relying solely on Audit Analytics to measure
derivative litigation. First, the sample starts in 2000, after the majority of states
implemented UD. This is problematic since the difference-in-differences methodology
used in this paper requires both “pre-treatment” and “post-treatment” periods. Second,
Audit Analytics is limited to cases brought in federal courts and significantly
underestimates the prevalence of derivative lawsuits. To address these shortcomings, I
perform a keyword search of SEC filings using the WRDS SEC Analytics Suite starting
in 1994 to identify annual reports, quarterly reports, proxy statements that discuss
derivative litigation. Specifically, I search for the terms “derivative lawsuit”, “derivative
action”, “derivative litigation”, and “derivative suit.” I then read each document to find
the date litigation was filed on behalf of the firm and to exclude uses of these terms in
contexts besides the filing of a lawsuit. Firms provide varying degrees of additional
information about derivative cases in SEC filings. While some detail specific allegations
and settlement agreements, others only vaguely reference allegations and do not provide
details on case outcomes. For this reason, I do not attempt systematically collect
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additional information on the allegations or outcomes of individual cases. Firms often use
ambiguous terms (e.g., “shareholder lawsuit”) rather than specify the exact nature of the
claim in SEC filings. I do not include these instances in the sample. Combining with the
Audit Analytics sample yields a total sample of over 900 derivative lawsuits involving
firms in my sample.
Data on class action suits are from the Stanford Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse, which includes records for all class action lawsuits filed by shareholders
after 1995. I use this database to construct an indicator variable that equals one when a
class action lawsuit is filed against a firm.

C. Governance variables
Measuring corporate governance is another challenging aspect of this paper. The
influence afforded to shareholders to control managerial decisions is based on a
confluence of internal and external factors and cannot be fully captured by a single
measure. The use of antitakeover provisions is one dimension of corporate governance
that is both quantifiable and indicative of an agency conflict. Thus, following the
governance literature, I use the GIM (Gompers et al. (2003)) and entrenchment (Bebchuk
et al. (2009)) indices as measures of corporate governance. The GIM index consists of 24
governance provisions, while the entrenchment index consists of a subset of six
provisions most frequently targeted by nonbinding shareholder resolutions. The data are
obtained from Riskmetrics (ISS). Due to methodological changes in the updated version
of database, I restrict attention to the legacy version, which (approximately) covers S&P
1500 firms in alternating years between 1990 and 2006. Following standard practice in
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the literature, I fill in missing entries with the previous observation to facilitate the
analysis of dynamic coefficient trends.
Previous papers (e.g., Bhagat et al. (2008); Klausner (2013)) express skepticism
regarding whether some governance provisions have a meaningful impact on managerial
entrenchment. For instance, Klausner (2013) argues that several governance provisions
contained in the GIM index either have no effect on managerial entrenchment or do so
only under very limited circumstances. However, by construction, the entrenchment
index contains the provisions which “have systematically drawn substantial opposition
from institutional investors” (Bebchuk et al. (2009)). Adopting these provisions is
therefore costly for managers and indicative of an agency conflict. For this reason, I use
the entrenchment index as the primary measure of corporate governance in this study,
though I show the GIM index yields qualitatively similar results.
The entrenchment index consists of indicators for six governance provisions that
shareholders most frequently target through non-binding shareholder resolutions. Two of
these provisions – poison pills and golden parachutes – are regarded as defenses against
hostile takeovers. Poison pills allow shareholders to purchase shares at a discount if the
holdings of a blockholder exceed a specified threshold. Golden parachutes provide
payouts to management in the event of a change in control. The board of directors can
normally implement these governance provisions without shareholder approval. The
other four provisions set limits on shareholder voting rights. First, classified boards have
varying term lengths for directors. This provision may entrench directors since a dissident
shareholder cannot gain control of the board in a single election. Second, supermajority
voting for mergers moves the threshold of shareholder votes to approve a merger above
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the normal 50%. Similarly, limits on shareholder amendments to the bylaws and charter
require shareholder votes to exceed a threshold above 50% to change these corporate
documents. The provisions related to shareholder voting rights are often stipulated in the
corporate charter, thus requiring a shareholder vote to amend.

D. Other outcomes
Institutional ownership data are firm from the Thomson Reuters 13F stock
ownership summary. Specifically, this database provides the percentage of outstanding
shares owned by institutional investors and the holdings of the largest institutional
investor. I drop observations for which the total institutional ownership is greater than
one. I create a blockholder indicator that equals one if the holdings of the largest
institutional owner exceed 10% of shares outstanding. In addition, I create an indicator
for blockholder entry that equals 1 if a firm does not have a blockholder at time t-1 but
does at time t. The indicator for blockholder exit is analogous. I restrict the sample for
blockholder entry and exit to five years after the adoption of UD laws for treated firms
because, over long periods, blockholder entry rates will necessarily influence blockholder
exit. However, this is less of a concern over a shorter time frame.
CEO compensation data is from Execucomp. The data are available annually for
S&P 1500 firms starting in 1992. I identify CEOs in Execucomp using a combination of
the “ceoann” variable and the provided start/end years for firm CEOs. If “ceoann” and
start/end years identify multiple CEOs for a given firm-year observation, I defer to the
Execucomp classification. I calculate CEO cash compensation as the sum of salary,
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bonus,

long-term

incentive pay (LTIP),

and

other compensation

(e.g.,

tax

reimbursements, severance payments, etc.).10

E. Summary statistics
Summary statistics for the main outcomes are reported in Table 2. Panel A
provides the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, and 25th/50th/75th
percentile values. Of particular interest in this table is the prevalence of derivative
litigation. Derivative lawsuits are filed in approximately 1.9% of all firm-year
observations. The incidence of class action lawsuits is higher on average (2.8%). There is
some overlap between the filing of derivative and class action suits; 36% of firms subject
to a derivative lawsuit are also subject to a class action lawsuit in the same year. This
statistic is consistent with the idea that there is often a “gray” area between derivative and
class action lawsuits, and certain forms of corporate malfeasance may engender both
forms of litigation.
Figure 1 plots the fraction of firms subject to derivative and class action lawsuits
between 1996 and 2009. The higher frequency of class action lawsuits is primarily driven
by a flurry of securities lawsuits in 2001. In that year alone, class action suits were filed
against almost 8% of the firms in my sample. In contrast, derivative lawsuits peaked at
approximately 5% of the sample in 2006, with over 150 derivative actions relating to
options backdating practices (Armour et al. (2012)). Class action lawsuits do not see a

10

Due to a methodological change in Execucomp, I follow the standard practice of setting options equal to
“option_awards_blk_value” pre-2006 and “option_awards_fv” post-2006. Similarly, stock awards are
given by “rstkgrnt” pre-2006 and “stock_awards_fv” post-2006. The variables related to cash compensation
do not change across time periods.
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corresponding increase stemming from backdating allegations. Rather, the figure
indicates a nadir in class action litigation in 2006.
Panel B compares the pre-treatment values for firms incorporated in UD states
(“eventually treated”) and those incorporated elsewhere (“never treated”). Specifically,
the panel reports the mean value for each group for the first three years data are available
during the sample. Any firm-year observations treated before or during this period (as is
the case when the data do not span the entire period of analysis) are excluded. The first
column restricts the sample to firms incorporated in states that do not have UD at any
point during the sample. Column (2) restricts the sample to firms incorporated in states
that have UD at some point during the sample. Column (3) reports the p-value from the
paired t-test comparing these values, adjusted for clustering at the state of incorporation
level. Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis. Overall, firms in the two groups are
similar along a number of observable dimensions prior to treatment. In particular, both
treated and control firms are subject to similar levels of class action and derivative
lawsuits. The firms in both groups also have similar governance structures prior to
treatment; the mean value of the entrenchment and GIM indices are not statistically
different (p-values for the paired t-test are 0.22 and 0.84, respectively). The mean values
for the blockholder indicator, CEO compensation, and accounting variables (ROA, capex,
log(PP&E), net debt issuance etc.) are also similar across both groups. Overall, these
statistics suggest the treated and control firms are similar along a number of observable
dimensions prior to UD laws. In the robustness section, I perform additional tests to
assuage concerns regarding unobservable differences between the groups that could pose
a challenge for empirical inference.
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IV. Results
A. Litigation
Anecdotal evidence suggests UD presents a significant obstacle to derivative
litigation and may discourage the use of this legal mechanism. The difference-indifferences results reported in Table 3 confirm this intuition. The dependent variable in
this table is an indicator for derivative litigation. This variable is available starting in
1994 (the first year electronic SEC filings are available), so the sample of treated firms
consists of those incorporated in states treated after this year. The specification in column
(1) includes firm and year fixed effects. Column (2) uses firm and industry-year fixed
effects. Finally, column (3) reports results for the specification that includes firm, stateyear, and industry-year fixed effects. The estimated coefficients range from -0.68 to -0.76
percentage points and are statistically significant at the 5% level or lower. In terms of
economic magnitude, UD laws are associated with a decline in derivative lawsuits of
approximately one third relative to the sample mean. Column (4) reports the coefficient
trend. The coefficients for ܷ(ܦ−1) and ܷ(ܦ0) are statistically indistinguishable from
zero. Consistent with a causal interpretation of the results, the estimates one and two or
more years after the effective date are negative and statistically significant at the 10% and
1% levels, respectively.
In some respects, these estimates may serve as a lower bound on the threat of
derivative litigation. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many lawsuits initiated in UD
states are either dismissed for failure to make a demand if the plaintiffs argue demand
futility, or refused by the board if a demand is made. Some commentators speculate that
judges may be more lenient in allowing other forms of shareholder litigation because of
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this. However, in unreported results, I do not find evidence of such an effect.
Specifically, I use an indicator for class action litigation as the dependent variable for the
main specification with firm, industry-year, and state-year fixed effects. The coefficient
of -0.001 (standard error=0.005) is neither statistically nor economically significant. This
is consistent with the idea that shareholders prefer to launch class action lawsuits if this is
a viable alternative, so restrictions on shareholder derivative litigation have little
relevance for class actions.

B. Governance structures
i. Indices
Table 4 report the effect of UD on the entrenchment index. The estimated
coefficients range from approximately 0.22 to 0.29, implying an increase (i.e., higher use
of antitakeover provisions) of over 10% relative to the sample mean. Column (4) reports
the dynamic coefficient trend. The bulk of the effect occurs in the year following the
effective date. However, the timing of this increase should be viewed with caution
because governance data from Riskmetrics is only available for alternating years; the
increase in the entrenchment index may (at least partially) have occurred during the
effective year. Figure 2 shows the coefficient trend for 4 years before and after treatment.
Each point in this figure can be interpreted relative to year zero (the omitted year). While
the “parallel trends” assumption cannot be proven, this figure suggests the documented
results are not driven by an upward trend in the variable in the years before UD.
Table A.2 reports results for the GIM index. The coefficients range from 0.32 to
0.48, implying an increase of about 4% relative to the sample mean. Consistent with the
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notion that the GIM index contains some provisions subject to less opposition from
shareholders, the estimates reported in this table are statistically noisier, and the
specification in column (3) is not significant at conventional levels. The smaller
economic magnitude of this effect also may partially stem from the inclusion of some
variables in the GIM index that are not plausibly affected by UD (e.g., previously enacted
state laws).
Table 5 reports estimates for the individual governance provisions in the
entrenchment index, as well as for the use of blank check stock. The results indicate
significantly higher use of poison pills (11 percentage points) following the adoption of a
UD law. This result is significant at the 10% level, and accounts for over a third of the
increase in the entrenchment index. In column (2), I also find an increase in the use of
blank check stock, a variable not included in the entrenchment index. The presence of
these shares allows boards to implement a poison pill without shareholder approval, and
is arguably a more meaningful outcome than the actual presence of a pill (Cremers and
Nair (2005)). The results for classified boards and supermajority voting requirements are
also positive and statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. Although
economically significant (6 percentage points), the estimated increase in golden
parachutes is statistically noisy. Interestingly, the point estimates for provisions that limit
shareholders' ability to change the corporate bylaws or charter are negative, though both
are not statistically significant. The increased use of some provisions (e.g., classified
boards) may seem inconsistent with the fact that they require ratification from
shareholders and cannot be adopted unilaterally by the board. It is important to
remember, however, that the changes are interpreted relative to the control group and
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may reflect a lower likelihood of removing a provision rather than actively implementing
it. Consistent with this, in unreported analysis I find that the change in classified boards is
driven a drop in declassifications rather than an increase in the implementation of new
classified boards for firms incorporated in UD states. The effect is particularly strong for
the second half of the sample, which coincides with the period when shareholders began
to push firms to implement annual elections for directors.
As discussed in Section 2, UD laws may affect the use of antitakeover provisions
through two channels. First, the drop in the prevalence of litigation may lead to fewer
settlements containing governance reforms. Second, weakened deterrence effects may
lead managers to deploy governance provisions for the purpose of entrenchment or
otherwise limiting shareholder voice. While it is not clear how to empirically disentangle
these effects, evidence suggests the findings can at least partially be attributed to the
deterrence function of litigation. Specifically, Figure 2 shows that there is an abrupt jump
in the use of antitakeover provisions in the first 2 years of UD. However, because
derivative lawsuits are relatively rare (about 2% of firm-year observations) and not all
suits end with settlements containing governance reforms, it is unlikely that the observed
effect can be entirely attributed to the lower incidence of derivative litigation after the
adoption of UD.
ii. Blockholders
Next, I turn attention to the effect of UD laws on the presence of large
blockholders, an important component of corporate governance due to their incentives to
monitor and ability to exert governance through voice and exit. The direction of the effect
of UD on blockholders is ambiguous. On the one hand, derivative lawsuits help to

30

mitigate free-rider problems that traditionally arise with shareholder interventions
because attorneys usually take these cases on a contingency fee basis. Thus, restrictions
on shareholder litigation rights may increase incentives to monitor and form large blocks.
On the other hand, the use antitakeover provisions documented above may directly affect
the ability of shareholders to accumulate large blocks, or otherwise discourage the
formation of large stakes by making an eventual takeover more costly.
The dependent variable in Panel A of Table 6 is an indicator for the presence of
an institutional blockholder owning more than 10% of outstanding shares. UD laws are
associated with a decline in blockholders of approximately 4 percentage points. Column
(4) shows the dynamic coefficient trend. The coefficient for one year prior to the
effective year is small and not statistically different from zero, but the coefficients
corresponding to ܷ(ܦ0) and ܷ(ܦ+1) are economically large (approximately 7
percentage points) and statistically significant at the 1% level. The point estimate for
ܷ(ܦ2+) is smaller in magnitude but remains statistically significant at the 5% level.
From a theoretical standpoint, however, the 10% threshold used to define blockholders is
arbitrary. Thus, in Table A.3 I examine the effect for alternative variables pertaining to
institutional ownership. The dependent variable in columns (1) - (3) is the size of the
largest shareholder (as a percentage of shares outstanding). The estimates suggest a drop
of about 0.5 percentage points, or 6% relative to the sample mean. However, columns (4)
– (6) report no change in total institutional ownership, suggesting the effect is
concentrated amongst large shareholders.
The decrease in blockholders could plausibly result from an increase in exit or a
decrease in entry. Specifically, the elevated use of antitakeover provisions documented
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above may make future takeovers more costly for blockholders owning “toe-holds” in
firms and lead to an increase in exit. This effect may also discourage blockholder entry
by reducing the option value of a potential takeover. Further, the use of poison pills may
mechanically affect blockholder entry by effectively barring the formation of new stakes
above a specified level. Panel B of Table 6 sheds light on whether this result stems from
blockholder entry or exit. The dependent variable in columns (1) - (3) and (4) - (6) are
indicators for blockholder entry and blockholder exit, respectively. I restrict observations
to 5 years after the implementation of UD laws for treated firms because, in the long-run,
changes in blockholder entry will mechanically affect blockholder exit. The results
indicate the drop in blockholders is driven by a decrease in blockholder entry. This,
combined with the fact that there is no change in institutional ownership, suggests a
potential link to the use of poison pills. Specifically, Bebchuk and Jackson (2012) report
that most poison pills have thresholds of 10% or 15% and effectively bar the formation of
new blocks above these levels but have no effect on smaller blocks. Thus, the results
suggest the deployment of antitakeover provisions may affect the ownership structures of
firms.
In sum, UD laws are associated with changes to two important dimensions of
corporate governance. First, I document an increase in the use of antitakeover provisions
that are generally opposed by shareholders. In addition, I find UD laws are associated
with a decrease in large blockholders. Given that incentives to monitor are increasing in
block size, this suggests weaker oversight by at least some shareholders.
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C. Corporate policies and performance
i. CEO compensation
I next consider the effect of UD laws on CEO compensation. Previous papers
(e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999, 2003)) document an effect of governance shocks
on the level of CEO compensation. In contrast to this, I find a change in the composition
of pay but not the level. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 7, where the
dependent variable is the ratio of cash compensation (defined as the sum of salary, bonus,
long-term incentive pay, and other pay) to total compensation. Because Execucomp starts
coverage in 1992, the treated sample consists of firms incorporated in states that
implement UD after this year. I find that UD laws are associated with an increase of 2.53.9 percentage points in cash compensation, or about 6% relative to the sample mean.
The estimates are significant at the 5% level or lower for specifications (2) and (3), but
not statistically significant at conventional levels for the first specification (p=11%). This
increase is offset by a decline in equity-based compensation, and the level of total pay is
unchanged. Panel B reports the estimates for the individual components of pay
normalized by total compensation. While these point estimates are statistically noisy,
they paint a consistent picture. In particular, the coefficients for different types of cash
compensation are all positive, while those for stock based and options based
compensation are negative, with the effect on options statistically significant at the 10%
level.
Previous research indicates that cash-based compensation, even forms nominally
linked to firm performance (e.g., bonuses), exhibits less sensitivity to changes in
shareholder wealth than equity-based compensation (e.g., Murphy (1999)). Thus, the
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results suggest boards implement weaker incentives for CEOs following the adoption of
UD laws. While I cannot disentangle whether this results stems directly from lower risk
of litigation or increased use of antitakeover provisions, this finding is consistent with the
view that weaker governance arrangements provide leeway for executives to influence
aspects of their own pay. Specifically, risk averse CEOs prefer higher cash compensation
because their human capital is tied to firms (Bebchuk and Fried (2003)). Thus, the results
are consistent with worsening agency conflicts associated with UD laws.
ii. Financial policies
An extensive literature also studies the effects of agency conflicts on payout
policy (e.g., Easterbrook (1984); Jensen (1986); Zwiebel (1996)). These theories posit
that managers want to reduce payouts to shareholders in order to increase cash at their
disposal. Evidence of behavior consistent with this is presented in Table 8. The
dependent variables are share repurchases (defined as total share purchases minus
changes in preferred stock) and cash dividends. Both variables are normalized by total
assets. The effect on repurchases is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level
for the specifications in columns (1) and (2), respectively. The point estimate for the
specification including industry-year and state-year effects is smaller in magnitude and
statistically noisier (p=16%). The estimates (approximately -0.003) are economically
large relative to the sample mean (0.014), and economically small relatively to the
sample standard deviation of (0.041). This stems from the fact that share repurchases are
zero for over half of the firm-year observations in the sample. The point estimates for
cash dividends in columns (3) - (6) are an order of magnitude smaller and statistically
indistinguishable from zero.
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The above results are consistent with theories that view payout policy in light of
agency conflicts. However, it is not theoretically clear what managers will do with these
funds. Table 9 reports the effects of UD laws on firm size, investment, and financial
policies to shed light on this question. The estimate for PP&E is statistically
indistinguishable from zero, suggesting universal demand is not associated with an
increase in firm size. Similarly, column (2) indicates there is not an increase in
investment associated with UD. Column (3) reports the effect on cash holdings
normalized by total assets. The coefficient is positive though not statistically significant
at conventional levels (p=16%). Column (4) indicates a drop in net debt issuance of
approximately half of a percentage point. While this result is statistically significant at the
5% level, in unreported analysis I find that the estimate is statistically noisier for
alternative specifications that exclude state-year fixed effects. Column (5) shows a drop
in leverage of approximately 4% relative to the sample mean. There are several potential
economic explanations for the decrease in debt issuance and leverage. For example, the
results may reflect a revealed preference of managers to decrease risk associated with
their undiversified human capital or lessen the disciplining effects of debt.
iii. Profitability
Finally, I analyze the effect of universal demand laws on accounting performance.
One justification for UD is that frivolous litigation wastes corporate assets (e.g., funds for
legal expenses, the attention of directors, etc.) and potentially discourages risky ventures
that may increase litigation risk. If this is the case, UD laws may be associated with
improved performance. However, the deterrence effects of litigation may also mitigate
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agency conflicts and ultimately lead to a positive effect on performance. My findings are
consistent with the latter view.
Table 10 reports the effect of UD laws on return on assets. UD laws are associated
with a decline in ROA of about 0.08 percentage points. The effect is statistically
significant at the 10% level or lower for each of the specifications. The magnitude of this
estimate is similar to that found by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) for BC laws.
Column (4) reports the coefficient trends. Consistent with a causal interpretation, the
coefficient for ܷ(ܦ−1) is statistically indistinguishable from zero while the coefficients
for ܷ(ܦ+1) and ܷ(ܦ2+) are larger in magnitude, and the coefficient for ܷ(ܦ2+) is
statistically significant at the 10% level.
Next, I investigate heterogeneous effects on ROA. Specifically, I test whether the
effect is driven by firms with weaker alternative governance mechanisms or those that are
particularly prone to agency conflicts. However, such analysis is complicated by the fact
that variables such as institutional ownership, firm size, and cash flow may be affected by
UD laws (at least for some subsets of firms). Thus, interacting the measures directly with
the UD indicator may result in inconsistent estimates of the treatment effect. Hence, I
follow Gormley and Matsa (2011) and slightly alter the basic methodology to
accommodate the use of pre-measured values in a triple difference framework with
staggered events (i.e., I use values based on the year before treatment). Specifically, for
each “event” I construct a cohort consisting of the observations for firms treated in that
year and all other untreated observations in the sample. By way of example, consider the
2004 cohort. The treatment group consists of firms incorporated in Massachusetts, the
only treated state in that year. I exclude all other previously treated observations from
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other states to form the control group. I generate the final sample by pooling the cohorts
associated with each event. I then run the main specification on different subsets of the
sample based on the pre-treatment value of the variables of interest. As before, the
regressions include includes firm, industry-year, and state-year fixed effects with robust
standard errors clustered at the state of incorporation. Each cohort consists of
observations from 5 years before and after the adoption of the UD law. I limit the
analysis to cohorts with over 300 treated firm-year observations in the full sample to
avoid unnecessary bias from cohorts with few treated observations.11
Table 11 reports the results of this analysis. The top half of column (1) shows the
point estimate of the effect on firm performance is slightly positive (though statistically
indistinguishable from zero) for firms with above the median institutional ownership in
the year prior to treatment. However, the effect is negative and significant at the 10%
level for firms with below median institutional ownership. This result suggest that the
ability of institutional investors to monitors managers and exert governance through
voice and exit can mitigate the negative effects of UD laws on firms. Column (2) reports
similar results when firms are split based on size. In particular, the negative effect on
performance is entirely driven by small firms. This finding is consistent with the idea that
large firms have stronger external monitoring mechanisms (e.g., scrutiny from capital
markets, regulators) which can substitute for the attenuation of shareholder litigation
rights. Finally, column (3) shows the results are driven by firms with high cash flows,
consistent with the idea that such firms are more prone to agency conflicts (Jensen
(1986)). In each case the difference between groups is statistically significant at the 10%
level.
11

Specifically, I limit the analysis to the cohorts treated in 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1995, 1997, and 2004.
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VI. Robustness
A. Political economy factors
A potential concern with the interpretation of the results is the effect of lobbying.
If firms incorporated in some states stood to benefit comparatively more from universal
demand (e.g., due to threat of litigation), they may have lobbied politicians more
aggressively to pass legislation. Legislators may respond to lobbying if they fear doing
otherwise would impair their ability to secure future campaign contributions from
executives, trade groups, etc. This, in turn, would suggest UD laws are endogenous to
corporate outcomes. State-of-location-by-year fixed effects mitigate these concerns to an
extent since they control for common shocks to firms located in a particular state (e.g.,
local economic conditions). To further address this issue, I confine the treated sample to
an environment with weaker incentives to respond to lobbying. Specifically, in
Pennsylvania the ALI formulation of universal demand was implemented by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania (SCOPA) in Cuker v. Mikalauskas (1997). In justifying this
action, the court noted the inherent contradiction between the demand futility doctrine
and the business judgment rule:
Delaware law permits a court in some cases ("demand excused" cases) to apply its
own business judgment in the review process when deciding to honor the
directors' decision to terminate derivative litigation. In our view, this is a defect
which could eviscerate the business judgment rule and contradict a long line of
Pennsylvania precedents (Cuker v. Mikalauskas (1997)).
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This suggests universal demand in Pennsylvania was not a response to public policy
concerns. Rather, courts instituted the rule for the sake of consistency with judicial
precedent.
Although SCOPA justices are elected, they have relatively weak incentives to
pander to corporate interests. This stems from the use of retention elections for justices
on SCOPA as well as two lower appellate courts in in Pennsylvania. Since 1969, the state
has used traditional, partisan elections to fill open seats on these courts. However, once
elected, justices face retention elections (requiring 50% “yes” votes) every 10 years until
reaching the age of mandatory retirement. Retention elections are unopposed and nonpartisan. Goodman and Marks (2006) note the elections in Pennsylvania are traditionally
“foregone conclusions,” and jurists do not run extensive campaigns or seek outside
contributions. In fact, between 1969 and 2005 incumbents succeeded in all retention
elections (Goodman and Marks (2006)).This has arguably changed in recent years due to
the involvement of various interest groups in retention elections. In fact, in 2005 the first
(and only) appellate judge failed to win a retention election. Thus, while legislators
potentially implement policies to court corporate campaign contributions, this was
unlikely the case for SCOPA justices when UD was adopted.
In Table 12, I restrict the sample of treated firms to those incorporated in
Pennsylvania. The control group consists of firms incorporated in states without UD
laws. The specification includes firm and industry-year fixed effects. The magnitude of
the effect on the entrenchment index is slightly larger than the estimate in Table 4 and
significant at the 1% level. The estimates for blockholders, CEO compensation, share
buybacks, and ROA also are also similar in magnitude to the main analysis and
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statistically significant at the 5% level or lower. Overall, this analysis suggests the effects
documented in this paper are not primarily driven by lobbying or other political economy
factors.

B. Additional tests
Additional robustness tests are reported in the appendix. First, following Karpoff
and Wittry (2014), I consider whether other widely studied legal changes confound my
analysis. Specifically, I control for business combination laws, control share acquisition
laws, fair price laws, directors' duties laws, poison pill laws, and the 1995 Unitrin court
decision in Delaware.12 The results are reported in Table A.4. The estimated effects of
UD laws are similar in magnitude to the main analysis and statistically significant at the
10% level or lower. The regression specification used for this test includes firm and
industry-year fixed effects. Including state-year fixed effects yields similar results (both
in magnitude and statistical significance) for the entrenchment index, blockholders, cash
compensation, and ROA. The point estimate for share repurchases remains negative but
is statistically noisier, as is the case with the main analysis. Overall, this test provides
assurance that other widely studied legal changes do not confound my analysis.
Next, I limit the sample of control firms to those incorporated in states that
closely follow the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) but do not have a UD
statute.13 The treated firms are the same as the main analysis. As noted in the background
section, many states that have UD adopted a version of the rule from the MBCA, a model
set of legal rules created by the American Bar Association. This test addresses the
12

See Karpoff and Wittry (2014) for further discussion of these legal changes.
Specifically, control firms are those incorporated in AL, CO, IL. KY, MD, NM, ND, OR, SC, TN, and
WA. The list of these states is from Lyon (2014). The treated firms are the same as the main analysis.
13
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possibility that my findings are driven by a spurious correlation resulting from
incorporation in a state that closely follows the MBCA. A number of large incorporation
states (e.g., Delaware, New York, California) are excluded from this analysis. I include
firm and year fixed effects in the regression specification; higher-dimensional fixed
effects are impractical in this setting due to the relatively small sample size. The results,
reported in Table A.5, serve as further confirmation of the main analysis. Specifically, the
estimates for the entrenchment index, blockholders, CEO cash compensation, and share
repurchases remain statistically significant. The effect of UD on firm profitability is
similar in magnitude to the main analysis (-0.0075), but not significant at traditional
levels (p=12.5%). These results also suggest that the findings are not driven by a
“Delaware effect” because firms incorporated in Delaware are not included in this
analysis. In unreported analysis, I find that the results are also robust to dropping firms
incorporated in any single state that has UD.

VII. Conclusion
Shareholder lawsuits are a controversial issue in both legal and policy circles.
Many academics and corporate insiders bemoan the ubiquity of strike suits and argue
litigation primarily serves to enrich the plaintiffs' bar at the expense of corporations and
shareholders. Others contend litigation conveys benefits through both settlements and its
deterrence function.
In this paper, I use UD laws as a quasi-natural experiment to study the effects of
shareholder litigation rights on corporate behavior. My findings highlight the important
role of litigation in shaping the governance structures of firms. Specifically, I document
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an increase in the use of antitakeover provisions after a state has adopted UD. This
finding likely stems from both a direct effect of fewer settlements as well as weaker
deterrence under UD. In addition, I find that firms have fewer institutional blockholders,
potentially resulting from the use of antitakeover provisions. UD laws are also associated
with changes to compensation and financial policies. Specifically, CEO cash
compensation increases, while share repurchases and book leverage decline. Ultimately, I
find that weaker shareholder litigation rights are associated with a decrease in firm
performance, though alternative governance mechanisms (e.g., institutional ownership)
mute this effect.
The findings of this paper suggest a number of avenues for future work. First,
while I show UD laws are associated with a number of changes to corporate behavior and
outcomes, the welfare implications are not obvious. In addition, a better understanding of
the nature of the agency conflict that leads to these effects may have important
implications for the design of managerial incentives.
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Figure 1
Derivative and Class Action Lawsuit Time Series
This figure shows the fraction of firm-year observations in the sample subject to new derivative
or class action lawsuits between 1996 and 2009. Derivative lawsuit data are from SEC filings
and Audit Analytics. Class action data are from the Stanford Securities Class Action database.
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Figure 2
Entrenchment Index Coefficient Dynamics
This figure shows the coefficient dynamics for the effect of universal demand laws on the
entrenchment index. The regression specification includes firm, industry-year, and state-oflocation-year fixed effects. Each point estimate is relative to the effective year (i.e., year zero).
The dashed lines show the 90% confidence interval.
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Table 1
UD laws
This table lists the states with universal demand laws the corresponding effective year and statute
reference. The final column reports the number of firm-year observations in the sample. Source:
Model Business Corporation Act Annotated (2013) and state statutes/ session laws.

Year

State Citation

1989

GA
MI
FL
WI
MT
VA
UT
NH
MS
NC
AZ
NE
CT
ME
PA
TX
WY
ID
HI
IA
MA
RI
SD

1990
1991
1992

1993
1995
1996
1997

1998
2001
2003
2004
2005

Firm-Year Observations

Ga. Code Ann. § 14-2-742
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 450.1493a
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.07401
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.742
Mont. Code. Ann. § 35-1-543
Va. Code Ann § 13.1-672.1B
Utah Code. Ann. § 16-10a-740(3)
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293-A:7.42
Miss. Code Ann. § 79-4-7.42
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-7-42
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-742
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-2072
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-722
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13-C, § 753
Cuker v. Mikalauskas
Tex. Bus. Org. Code. Ann. 607.07401
Wyo. Stat. § 17-16-742
Idaho Code § 30-1-742
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 414-173
Iowa Code Ann. § 490.742
Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. Ch. 156D, § 7.42
R.I. Gen. Laws. § 7-1.2-710(C)
S.D. Codified Laws 47-1A-742
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1,083
981
1,528
812
17
1,025
322
6
65
679
143
79
338
65
1,921
1,666
48
30
71
215
1,819
113
54
Total = 13,080 (16.6%)

Table 2
Summary statistics
Panel A reports summary statistics for the full sample. All accounting variables (except those in
logs) are normalized by total assets. CEO cash compensation is normalized by total
compensation. Panel B reports ex ante firm characteristics for the first 3 years data are available
prior to UD. Column (1) restricts observations to firms incorporated in states that do not enact
UD during the sample period (i.e., "never treated"). Column (2) restricts observations to firms
incorporated in states that enact UD at some point during the sample period (i.e., "eventually
treated"). Column (3) reports the p-value (adjusted for clustering at the state of incorporation
level) from the paired t-test comparing these values. Standard deviations are reported in
parenthesis.
Panel A

Variable

Obs

Mean

SD

25%

50%

75%

1(Derivative Lawsuit)
1(Class Action Lawsuit)

50190
42938

0.019
0.028

0.137
0.165

0
0

0
0

0
0

Entrenchment Index
GIM Index
Poison Pill
Blank Check Stock
Classified Board
Supermajority Voting
Golden Parachute
Limit Bylaw
Limit Charter

17064
17064
17064
17064
17064
17064
17064
17064
17064

2.091
9.005
0.556
0.861
0.573
0.172
0.586
0.181
0.023

1.327
2.798
0.497
0.346
0.495
0.377
0.493
0.385
0.151

1
7
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

2
9
1
1
1
0
1
0
0

3
11
1
1
1
0
1
0
0

1(Blockholder)
1(Blockholder Entry)
1(Blockholder Exit)
Max Inst. Size (%)
Inst. Ownership (%)

76382
74779
74779
76382
76382

0.273
0.056
0.034
8.465
40.547

0.446
0.23
0.18
6.973
26.436

0
0
0
4.525
17.673

0
0
0
7.335
37.619

1
0
0
10.528
61.547

CEO Cash Comp./Total
Repurchases
Dividends
Log(PP&E)
Capex
Cash
Net Debt Iss.
Book Leverage
ROA

20666
79049
79049
78747
78123
79037
73949
78714
78836

0.558
0.014
0.008
3.883
0.066
0.17
0.012
0.241
0.094

0.311
0.041
0.019
2.105
0.068
0.21
0.099
0.219
0.153

0.287
0
0
2.343
0.023
0.022
-0.019
0.041
0.054

0.529
0
0
3.693
0.045
0.078
0
0.206
0.118

0.853
0.007
0.009
5.295
0.083
0.241
0.027
0.371
0.176
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Panel B

Variable
1(Derivative Lawsuit)
Entrenchment Index
GIM Index
Blockholder
Inst. Ownership (%)
CEO Cash Comp.
Repurchases
ROA
Capex
Log(PP&E)
Cash
Net Debt Iss.

Untreated

Eventually Treated

Difference p-value

0.013
(0.079)
1.946
(1.391)
9.012
(2.938)
0.148
(0.309)
29.541
(18.981)
0.707
(0.214)
0.012
(0.026)
0.117
(0.104)
0.075
(0.061)
3.870
(1.901)
0.120
(0.139)
0.018
(0.082)

0.008
(0.072)
2.196
(1.456)
9.225
(3.291)
0.179
(0.332)
28.837
(18.001)
0.727
(0.211)
0.012
(0.027)
0.123
(0.100)
0.076
(0.059)
3.714
(1.734)
0.107
(0.125)
0.016
(0.066)

0.212
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0.224
0.839
0.167
0.648
0.353
0.9433
0.524
0.886
0.36
0.127
0.696

Table 3
Effect of UD laws and occurrence of derivative lawsuits
The dependent variable is an indicator for if a derivative litigation is initiated in a given year.
Lawsuit data are from Audit Analytics and SEC filings. The sample runs from 1994 to 2009. UD
equals one if a firm is incorporated in a state that has a universal demand requirement. The fixed
effects included in each specification are noted in the table. Industry-year fixed effects use 3digit SIC, and state-year fixed effects use headquarters location. Column (4) reports the
coefficient trend. All coefficients are estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis)
are clustered at the state of incorporation level. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

1(Derivative Lawsuit)
(1)
(2)
(3)
UD

-0.00703***
(0.00208)

-.00762*** -0.00682**
(0.00237)
(0.00332)

UD(-1)

-0.00768
(0.00560)
0.000329
(0.00501)
-.0114*
(0.00611)
-.0121***
(0.00403)

UD(0)
UD(+1)
UD(2+)

Firm FE
Year FE
State-Year FE
Industry-Year FE
Observations
R-squared

(4)

yes
yes
no
no

yes
no
no
yes

yes
no
yes
yes

yes
no
yes
yes

50,190
0.156

50,190
0.221

50,190
0.236

50,190
0.236
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Table 4
Effect of UD laws on the entrenchment index
This table reports the effect of universal demand (UD) laws on the entrenchment index (Bebchuk,
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009)). Governance data are from Riskmetrics, and the sample runs from
1990 to 2006. UD equals one if a firm is incorporated in a state that has a universal demand
requirement. The fixed effects included in each specification are noted in the table. Industry-year
fixed effects use 3-digit SIC, and state-year fixed effects use headquarters location. Column (4)
reports the coefficient trend. All coefficients are estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors (in
parenthesis) are clustered at the state of incorporation level. ** and *** denote statistical
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

(1)
UD

0.215***
(0.0648)

Entrenchment Index
(2)
(3)
0.289***
(0.0906)

0.242**
(0.118)

UD(-1)

-0.0532
(0.0535)
-0.0363
(0.0504)
0.235**
(0.109)
0.368**
(0.161)

UD(0)
UD(+1)
UD(2+)

Firm FE
Year FE
State-Year FE
Industry-Year FE
Observations
R-squared

(4)

yes
yes
no
no

yes
no
no
yes

yes
no
yes
yes

yes
no
yes
yes

17,064
0.889

17,064
0.914

17,064
0.923

17,064
0.923
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Table 5
Effect of UD laws on individual governance provisions
The dependent variables are the six provisions contained in the entrenchment index, as well as an indicator for blank check preferred stock.
Governance data are from Riskmetrics, and the sample runs from 1990 to 2006. UD equals one if a firm is incorporated in a state that has a
universal demand requirement. Each specification includes firm, industry-year, and state-of-location-year fixed effects. Industry-year fixed effects
use 3-digit SIC, and state-year fixed effects use headquarters location. All coefficients are estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors (in
parenthesis) are clustered at the state of incorporation level. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.

UD

Firm FE
State-Year FE
Industry-Year FE
Observations
R-squared

Poison
Pill
(1)

Blank Check
Stock
(2)

Classified
Board
(3)

Supermajority
Voting
(4)

Golden
Parachute
(5)

Bylaw
Limits
(6)

Charter
Limits
(7)

0.107*
(0.0589)

0.0689**
(0.0273)

0.0454*
(0.0225)

0.0425**
(0.0207)

0.0591
(0.0601)

-0.00766
(0.0170)

-0.00472
(0.00699)

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

17,064
0.860

17,064
0.911

17,064
0.948

17,064
0.934

17,064
0.806

17,064
0.932

17,064
0.928

54

Table 6
Effect of UD laws on institutional blockholders
The dependent variable in Panel A is an indicator for a 10\% institutional blockholder. The
dependent variable in columns (1) – (3) of Panel B is an indicator for blockholder entry in the 5
year period after treatment. The indicator for blockholder exit in columns (4) – (6) is defined
analogously. Blockholder data are from Thomson. UD equals one if a firm is incorporated in a
state that has a universal demand requirement. The fixed effects included in each specification are
noted in the table. Industry-year fixed effects use 3-digit SIC, and state-year fixed effects use
headquarters location. All coefficients are estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors (in
parenthesis) are clustered at the state of incorporation level. ** and *** denote statistical
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A

UD

(1)

1(Blockholder)
(2)
(3)

-0.0367**
(0.0142)

-0.0398** -0.0464***
(0.0150)
(0.0155)

UD(-1)

-0.0192
(0.0214)
-0.0672***
(0.0228)
-0.0786***
(0.0261)
-0.0375**
(0.0179)

UD(0)
UD(+1)
UD(2+)

Firm FE
Year FE
State-Year FE
Industry-Year FE
Observations
R-squared

(4)

yes
yes
no
no

yes
no
no
yes

yes
no
yes
yes

yes
no
yes
yes

76,382
0.383

76,382
0.441

76,382
0.454

76,382
0.454
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Panel B

(1)
UD

Firm FE
Year FE
State-Year FE
Industry-Year FE
Observations
R-squared

1(Blockholder Entry)
(2)
(3)

(4)

1(Blockholder Exit)
(5)
(6)

-0.0122**
(0.00498)

-0.0128**
(0.00555)

-0.0160***
(0.00551)

0.00421
(0.00527)

0.000629
(0.00598)

-0.00665
(0.00528)

yes
yes
no
no

yes
no
no
yes

yes
no
yes
yes

yes
yes
no
no

yes
no
no
yes

yes
no
yes
yes

74,779
0.078

74,779
0.150

74,779
0.168

74,779
0.087

74,779
0.169

74,779
0.185
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Table 7
Effect of UD laws on CEO compensation
The dependent variable in Panel A is the ratio of cash compensation to total compensation for
CEOs. The dependent variables in Panel B are the individual components of pay (normalized by
total compensation). Compensation data are from Execucomp, and the sample runs from 1992 to
2009. UD equals one if a firm is incorporated in a state that has a universal demand requirement.
The fixed effects included in each specification are noted in the table. Industry-year fixed effects
use 3-digit SIC, and state-year fixed effects use headquarters location. All coefficients are
estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the state of
incorporation level. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.

(1)
UD

0.0296**
(0.0140)

CEO Cash Comp. / Total
(2)
(3)
0.0283**
(0.0136)

0.0394***
(0.0138)

UD(-1)

-0.0159
(0.0204)
0.0272
(0.0333)
0.00815
(0.0275)
0.0431**
(0.0173)

UD(0)
UD(+1)
UD(2+)

Firm FE
Year FE
State-Year FE
Industry-Year FE
Observations
R-squared

(4)

yes
yes
no
no

yes
no
no
yes

yes
no
yes
yes

yes
no
yes
yes

20,666
0.466

20,666
0.542

20,666
0.567

20,666
0.567
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Table 8
Effect of UD laws on payout policy
The dependent variable in columns (1) – (3) is share repurchases. The dependent variable in
columns (4) – (6) is cash dividends. Both variables are normalized by total assets. UD equals one
if a firm is incorporated in a state that has a universal demand requirement. The fixed effects
included in each specification are noted in the table. Industry-year fixed effects use 3-digit SIC,
and state-year fixed effects use headquarters location. All coefficients are estimated by OLS.
Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the state of incorporation level. ** denotes
statistical significance at the 5% level.

(1)
UD

Firm FE
Year FE
State-Year FE
Industry-Year FE
Observations
R-squared

Repurchases
(2)

(3)

-0.00324** -0.00308** -0.00231
(0.00131) (0.00116) (0.00164)

Cash Dividends
(4)
(5)

(6)

-0.000252 0.000332 0.000620
(0.000453) (0.000635) (0.000546)

yes
yes
no
no

yes
no
no
yes

yes
no
yes
yes

yes
yes
no
no

yes
no
no
yes

yes
no
yes
yes

79,049
0.253

79,049
0.321

79,049
0.336

79,049
0.625

79,049
0.670

79,049
0.680
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Table 9
Effect of UD laws on firm size, investment, and financial policy
All variables except log(PP&E) are normalized by total assets. UD equals one if a firm is
incorporated in a state that has a universal demand requirement. Each specification includes firm,
industry-year, and state-of-location-year fixed effects, where industry-year fixed effects use 3digit SIC, and state-year fixed effects use headquarters location. All coefficients are estimated by
OLS. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the state of incorporation level. *
and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.

log(PP&E)
(1)
UD

Firm FE
State-Year FE
Industry-Year FE
Observations
R-squared

-0.00624
(0.0235)

Capex
(2)

Cash
(3)

0.000738 0.00597
(0.00207) (0.00419)

Debt Issuance Leverage
(4)
(5)
-0.00551**
(0.00271)

-0.0112*
(0.00665)

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

78,747
0.938

78,123
0.691

79037
0.814

73,949
0.296

78,714
0.753
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Table 10
Effect of UD laws on firm performance
The dependent variable is return on assets (ROA). UD equals one if a firm is incorporated in a
state that has a universal demand requirement. The coefficient for this variable is the differencein-differences estimate. The fixed effects included in each specification are noted in the table.
Industry-year fixed effects use 3-digit SIC, and state-year fixed effects use headquarters location.
All coefficients are estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the
state of incorporation level. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels,
respectively.

ROA

UD

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.00772**
(0.00306)

-0.00741*
(0.00371)

-0.00822*
(0.00441)

UD(-1)

-0.00172
(0.00594)
-0.0054
(0.00500)
-0.0091
(0.00692)
-.00890*
(0.00500)

UD(0)
UD(+1)
UD(2+)

Firm FE
Year FE
State-Year FE
Industry-Year FE
Observations
R-squared

(4)

yes
yes
no
no

yes
no
no
yes

yes
no
yes
yes

yes
no
yes
yes

78,836
0.689

78,836
0.729

78,836
0.735

78,836
0.735
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Table 11
Heterogeneous effects on ROA
This table reports the effect of universal demand laws on ROA for different subsets of firms using
the triple differences methodology of Gormley and Matsa (2011). The first column restricts the
sample to firms with above/below the median level of institutional ownership the year prior to a
UD law. The second column restricts the sample to firms with above/below the median level of
assets, and the third restricts the sample to above/below the median level of cash flow normalized
by total assets. UD equals one if a firm is incorporated in a state that has a universal demand
requirement. All specifications include firm, industry-year, and state-year fixed effects.
Industry-year fixed effects use 3-digit SIC, while state-year fixed effects use headquarters
location. Coefficients are estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered
at the state of incorporation level and * and ** denote statistical significance and the 10% and 5%
levels, respectively.

ROA
(2)

(1)

UD

Observations
R-squared

UD

Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Industry-Year FE
State-Year FE

(3)

High Inst. Ownership

Large Firms

Low Cash Flow

0.000469
(0.00522)

0.00263
(0.00327)

-0.000645
(0.00851)

89,112
0.703

91,286
0.695

80,156
0.679

Low Inst. Ownership

Small Firms

High Cash Flow

-0.0115*
(0.00671)

-0.0112*
(0.00617)

-0.0100**
(0.00497)

76,023
0.708

76,518
0.714

87,457
0.608

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes
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Table 12
Pennsylvania analysis
This table restricts the sample of treated firms to Pennsylvania, where universal demand was
implemented by the state supreme court in 1997. UD equals one if a firm is incorporated in PA
after the adoption of universal demand. The dependent variables are defined in previous tables.
Each specification includes firm and industry-year fixed effects. Coefficients are estimated by
OLS. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the state of incorporation level. **
and *** denote statistical significance at the and 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

UD

Firm FE
Industry-Year FE
Observations
R-squared

E Index
(1)

1(Blockholder)
(2)

Cash Comp.
(3)

Repurchases
(4)

ROA
(5)

0.334***
(0.0322)

-0.0273**
(0.0120)

0.0402***
(0.0131)

-0.00612***
(0.00112)

-0.00520**
(0.00201)

yes
yes

yes
yes

yes
yes

yes
yes

yes
yes

15,785
0.918

65,528
0.455

19,151
0.545

67,890
0.328

67,712
0.736
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Appendix
Derivative Lawsuit Examples
The following excerpts from SEC filings detail allegations and settlements related to
shareholder derivative actions against four different corporations.

A. Broadcom (2011 10-K)
In 2006 a number of purported Broadcom shareholders filed putative shareholder
derivative actions in state and federal court against Broadcom, each of the then members
of our Board of Directors and certain current or former officers, alleging, among other
things, that the defendants improperly dated certain Broadcom employee stock option
grants. In August 2009 Broadcom plaintiffs and certain defendants executed a Stipulation
and Agreement of Partial Settlement in the federal derivative action, which resolved all
claims except those against three individuals: Dr. Henry T. Nicholas, III, our former
President and Chief Executive Officer and former Co-Chairman of the Board, William J.
Ruehle, our former Chief Financial Officer, and Dr. Henry Samueli, our Chief Technical
Officer and member of our Board of Directors.
In March 2011, Broadcom, plaintiffs and the three remaining defendants executed a
Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, or Derivative Settlement, in the federal
derivative action. On May 23, 2011, the District Court entered an order granting final
approval of the Derivative Settlement. Pursuant to the Derivative Settlement, among
other things: (i) Broadcom received a payment from Dr. Nicholas of approximately $27
million, which was recorded as a settlement gain in our consolidated statements of
income; (ii) Broadcom cancelled unexercised Broadcom stock options held by Dr.
Samueli valued at approximately $14 million, using a Black-Scholes analysis based on
the closing price of Broadcom’s Class A common stock on the date the settlement was
deemed final, which amount was recorded as a settlement gain in our consolidated
statements of income...Upon Court approval of the Derivative Settlement, Broadcom paid
plaintiffs’ counsel $25 million of the settlement proceeds for attorneys’ fees, expenses,
and costs, which was recorded as an operating expense in the consolidated statements of
income.

B. Johnson and Johnson (2013 10-K)
Starting in April 2010, a number of shareholder derivative lawsuits were filed in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey against certain current and
former directors and officers of Johnson & Johnson. Johnson & Johnson is named as a
nominal defendant. These actions were consolidated in August 2010 into In re Johnson &
Johnson Derivative Litigation...Collectively, these shareholder derivative actions assert a
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variety of alleged breaches of fiduciary duties, including, among other things, that the
defendants allegedly engaged in, approved of, or failed to remedy or prevent defective
medical devices, improper pharmaceutical rebates, improper off-label marketing of
pharmaceutical and medical device products, violations of current good manufacturing
practice regulations that resulted in product recalls, and that the defendants failed to
disclose the aforementioned alleged misconduct in the Company's filings under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Each complaint seeks a variety of relief, including
monetary damages and corporate governance reforms. Johnson & Johnson moved to
dismiss these actions on the grounds, inter alia, that the plaintiffs failed to make a
demand upon the Board of Directors.

C. News Corp. (2011 8-K)
On February 21, 2011, the Company announced that it planned to acquire Shine Group
Ltd. ("Shine"), a television and movie production company based in the U.K. which
produces, among other television shows, Got to Dance , The Biggest Loser , Master Chef,
and Minute to Win It , for an enterprise value of £415 million, or $670 million (the
"Shine Acquisition"). Shine's investors included Sony Entertainment and British Sky
Broadcasting, as well as majority owner Elisabeth Murdoch, the daughter of Defendant
Rupert Murdoch. The Company's February 21, 2011, announcement also indicated that
Rupert Murdoch expected Elisabeth Murdoch to join the News Corp. board of directors.
[The] consolidated shareholder derivative complaint…contains five claims. Counts I and
II relate to the Shine Acquisition, alleging, among other things, that Defendants breached
their fiduciary duties by agreeing to acquire Shine without considering whether the
transaction served a legitimate corporate objective and permitting the purchase of Shine
at an excessive price. Counts III, IV, and V are Oversight-Related Claims, alleging,
among other things, that Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by not investigating,
between July 2009 and 2011, the hacking claims at News of the World, and as a result,
the Company was harmed.
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Appendix Table 1
Variable definitions
The following table contains the name, source, and definition for the variables in this paper. Further information on the litigation and governance
variables is provided in the text.
Variable Name

Source

Definition

1(Derivative Lawsuit)
1(Class Action)
Entrenchment Index
GIM Index
1(Blockholder)
1(Blockholder Entry)
1(Blockholder Exit)
Max Inst. Ownership (%)
Institutional Ownership %
CEO Cash Comp. / Total
ROA
ROA (net)
ROE
Profit Margin
Dividends
Repurchases
Capex
Net Debt Issuance
Leverage
Cash

Audit Analytics + SEC Filings (see text)
Stanford Securities Class Action Database
Riskmetrics
Riskmetrics
Thomson Reuters 13F Summary
Thomson Reuters 13F Summary
Thomson Reuters 13F Summary
Thomson Reuters 13F Summary
Thomson Reuters 13F Summary
Execucomp
Compustat-CRSP
Compustat-CRSP
Compustat-CRSP
Compustat-CRSP
Compustat-CRSP
Compustat-CRSP
Compustat-CRSP
Compustat-CRSP
Compustat-CRSP
Compustat-CRSP

Equals 1 if derivative lawsuit filed against firm
Equals 1 if shareholder class action lawsuit filed against firm
Index of 6 governance provisions (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009))
Index 24 governance provisions (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003))
Equals 1 if largest institutional investors owns >10% of shares outstanding
Equals 1 if firm does not have 10% blockholder at t-1 and does at t
Equals 1 if firm has 10% blockholder at t-1 and does not at t
Percentage of shares outstanding owned by largest institutional investor
Total ownership by institutional investors
Ratio of cash (salary, bonus, LTIP, other) compensation to total
oibdp/at
ni/at
(oibdp-dvc)/ceq
oibdp/sale
dvc/at
[prstkc-(pstkrv(t)-pstkrv(t-1))]/at
capx/at
(dltis - dltr)/at
(dlc+dltt)/at
che/at
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Appendix Table 2
Effect of UD laws on the GIM index
This table reports the effect of universal demand (UD) laws on the GIM index (Gompers, Ishii,
and Metrick (2003)). Governance data are from Riskmetrics. UD equals one if a firm is
incorporated in a state that has a universal demand requirement. The fixed effects included in
each specification are noted in the table. All coefficients are estimated by OLS. Robust standard
errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the state of incorporation level. ** denotes statistical
significance at the 5% level.

UD

Firm FE
Year FE
State-Year FE
Industry-Year FE
Observations
R-squared

(1)

GIM Index
(2)

(3)

0.380**
(0.175)

0.477**
(0.216)

0.317
(0.245)

yes
yes
no
no

yes
no
no
yes

yes
no
yes
yes

17,064
0.927

17,064
0.944

17,064
0.949
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Appendix Table 3
Effect of UD laws on alternative ownership measures
The dependent variable in columns (1) – (3) is the percentage of shares owned by the largest
institutional investor. The dependent variable in columns (4) – (6) is total institutional ownership.
UD equals one if a firm is incorporated in a state that has a universal demand requirement.
Ownership data are from Thomson. The fixed effects included in each specification are noted in
the table. All coefficients are estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are
clustered at the state of incorporation level. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the
10\%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Max Inst. Size (%)
(1)
(2)
(3)
UD

Firm FE
Year FE
State-Year FE
Industry-Year FE
Observations
R-squared

-0.497* -0.538** -0.488***
(0.269) (0.241) (0.150)

Inst. Ownership (%)
(4)
(5)
(6)
-0.00612 -0.00442
(0.00703) (0.00685)

0.00114
(0.00632)

yes
yes
no
no

yes
no
no
yes

yes
no
yes
yes

yes
yes
no
no

yes
no
no
yes

yes
no
yes
yes

76382
0.547

76382
0.597

76382
0.607

76382
0.779

76382
0.804

76382
0.810
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Appendix Table 4
Controlling for potentially confounding events
The regression results in this table control for potentially confounding events during the sample
period (as identified by Karpoff and Wittry (2014)). In particular, the specification includes
controls for control share acquisition laws, business combination laws, fair price laws, directors'
duties laws, poison pill laws, and the 1995 Unitrin court decision in Delaware. The dependent
variables are defined in previous tables. UD equals one if a firm is incorporated in a state that has
a universal demand requirement. Each specification includes firm and industry-year fixed effects.
Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the state of incorporation level. *, ** and
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

UD

Firm FE
Industry-Year FE
Other Event Controls
Observations
R-squared

E Index
(1)

1(Blockholder)
(2)

Cash Comp.
(3)

Repurchases
(4)

ROA
(5)

0.238***
(0.0776)

-0.0374*
(0.0154)

0.0251*
(0.0138)

-0.00266**
(0.0109)

-0.00793*
(0.0045)

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

17,064
0.915

76,382
0.442

20,666
0.542

79,049
0.322

78,836
0.729
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Appendix Table 5
Limiting sample to MBCA states
This table limits the sample to firms incorporated in states with UD or states that otherwise
substantially follow the Model Business Corporation Act (from Lyons (2014)). Specifically, the
control sample consists of firms incorporated in AL, CO, IL, KY, MD, NM, ND, OR, SC, TN,
and WA. The treatment sample consists of firms incorporated in states that adopt a universal
demand requirement during the sample period (see Table 1). The dependent variables are defined
in previous tables. UD equals one if a firm is incorporated in a state that has a universal demand
requirement. Each specification includes firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors (in
parenthesis) are clustered at the state of incorporation level. *, ** and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

UD

Firm FE
Year FE
Observations
R-squared

E Index
(1)

1(Blockholder)
(2)

Cash Comp.
(3)

Repurchases
(4)

ROA
(5)

0.212***
(0.0706)

-0.0460**
(0.0202)

0.0350*
(0.0188)

-0.00339**
(0.00132)

-0.00754
(0.00478)

yes
yes

yes
yes

yes
yes

yes
yes

yes
yes

2,734
0.896

16,753
0.366

3,156
0.462

17,265
0.252

17,203
0.641
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CHAPTER 2: Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners
(with Todd Gormley and Donald Keim)

“We’re going to hold your stock when you hit your quarterly earnings
target. And we’ll hold it when you don’t. We’re going to hold your stock if
we like you. And if we don’t. We’re going to hold your stock when
everyone else is piling in. And when everyone else is running for the exits.
That is precisely why we care so much about good governance.”
— F. William McNabb III, Chairman and CEO of the Vanguard funds

I. Introduction
While there is considerable evidence that institutional investors influence the
governance and corporate policies of firms (e.g., Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales
(2013); Brav et al. (2008); Hartzell and Starks (2003)), this evidence primarily focuses on
the role of “activists” that accumulate shares and make demands upon managers or
“active” fund managers that exit positions when managers perform poorly. Yet, such
“active” investors represent only a subset of institutional investors. Increasingly, many
institutions are instead “passive” investors that hold diversified portfolios of stocks with
low turnover and do not actively buy or sell shares to influence managerial decisions.14
The investment objective of such institutions is to deliver the returns of a particular
market index (e.g., S&P 500) or “investment style” (e.g., large-cap value) with minimal
fees and expenses.

The rapid growth and large ownership stakes of such passive

14

At the end of October 2014, $3.2 trillion were invested in U.S. equity index funds alone, representing
36% of total U.S. equity mutual fund assets (estimates provided by Vanguard). Moreover, The Wall Street
Journal estimates that the inflows into passively managed funds in 2013 was $336 billion, which is more
than six times the amount of inflows into more traditional mutual funds during the same period. See
http://online.wsj.com/articles/investors-pour-into-vanguard-eschewing-stock-pickers-1408579101.
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investors raises questions about how effectively managers are being monitored. Many
worry that passive investors lack both the motives and mechanisms to monitor their large,
diverse portfolios, and that the increasing market share of such “lazy investors” weakens
firm-level governance and hurts performance (The Economist, 2015). However, others
counter that passive investing does not equate with passive ownership.15 In this paper,
we examine whether passive institutional investors influence firms’ governance
structures, and ultimately, performance.
There are many reasons to suspect that the growth of passive investors weakens
the governance of firms. First, such institutional investors may lack an incentive to
monitor managers. Unlike actively managed funds that attempt to outperform some
benchmark, index funds and other non-index passive funds seek to deliver the
performance of the benchmark, and any improvement in one stock’s performance will
simply increase the performance of both the institution’s portfolio and the underlying
benchmark. Second, such investors may be less able to exert influence over managers.
Specifically, by seeking to minimize deviations from the underlying index weights,
passive institutions lack a traditional lever used by non-passive investors to influence
managers—the ability to accumulate or exit positions. Third, given their diversified
holdings across hundreds of stocks, passive investors may lack the resources necessary to
research and individually monitor each stock in their portfolio.
And yet, there are reasons why passive investors may seek to improve firms’
15
For example, the title of this paper, “Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners,” was the title for an article
written by Glenn Booraem, controller of Vanguard, in April 2013 highlighting the care Vanguard takes
when voting proxies. See https://personal.vanguard.com/us/insights/article/proxy-commentary-042013.
Similar views regarding the distinction between being a passive investor, but active owner, were espoused
by Rakhi Kumar, head of corporate governance at State Street Global Advisors in The Financial Times on
April 6, 2014 in an article titled, “Passive investment, active ownership,” and by David Booth, chairman
and co-founder of Dimensional Fund Advisors, in the New York Times on March 16, 2013 in an article
titled, “Challenging Management (but Not the Market)”.
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governance choices and performance. If fund flows respond to absolute (rather than just
relative) performance, passive managers will have an incentive to improve overall market
performance because fund fees are based on assets under management, which will
increase with both positive fund flows and positive performance (Black (1992)).
Moreover, because passive institutions are less able to divest their positions in poorly
performing stocks, they may place even greater weight than active fund managers on
ensuring effective governance in the firms they own (Romano (1993), p.83). Finally, all
institutional investors have a fiduciary duty to manage their funds and vote their proxies
in the best interest of shareholders.
There are also several mechanisms by which passive investors might exert
influence. First, institutions that manage passive funds often own a sizable proportion of
a firm’s shares, and passive investors are keenly aware of the influence their votes can
wield.16 Managers’ knowledge that these passive investors are not likely to sell their
shares anytime soon may also give the views of passive investors greater weight than
those of active fund managers, which tend to exhibit high turnover rates. Second, the size
and concentration of passive investors’ ownership stakes may facilitate activist investors’
efforts to rally support for their demands (Brav et al. (2008), Bradley et al. (2010)).
Bringing just a few passive institutions on board can lend creditability to an activist
campaign, and activists are known to gauge the support of a firm’s largest passive
institutional investors before pursuing demands from management.17 Finally, if acquiring

16

As noted by Rakhi Kumar, head of corporate governance at State Street Global Advisors, “The option of
exercising our substantial voting rights in opposition to management provides us with sufficient leverage
and ensures our views and client interests are given due consideration” (see Scott (2014)).
17
For example, the activist hedge fund ValueAct was successful in obtaining a board seat on Microsoft
with less than 1% of stock because Microsoft recognized that other institutional investors backed the fund’s
demand. Also, passive investor Dimensional Fund Advisors, using their sizable ownership stake of 6.7%,
helped activist investor Starboard elect three new directors to the board of Regis Corp. in late 2011 (see
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the expertise to be an effective owner exhibits economies of scale, passive institutional
investors may be more effective at monitoring managers than retail investors that directly
hold stocks. While passive institutions may lack the resources necessary to monitor each
stock in their large, diversified portfolios, they may engage in widespread, but low-cost,
monitoring of firms’ compliance with what they consider to be best governance practices
(e.g., Black (1992), Black (1998)).
Identifying the impact of passive investors on firms’ corporate governance and
other policies can be challenging. For example, cross-sectional correlations between
passive investors and governance choices might not reflect a causal relation since
ownership by passive investors might be correlated with factors—such as firms’
investment opportunities or ownership by active investors—that directly affect firms’
choices. Simultaneity bias could also distort these relations. For example, investors in
passive funds may prefer to track indexes that contain a higher proportion of wellmanaged firms, all else equal.
To overcome these challenges and to assess whether passive investors affect
firms’ governance, we exploit variation in ownership by passive investors that occurs
around the cutoff point used to construct two widely-used market benchmarks, the
Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 indexes. The Russell 1000 comprises the largest 1,000
U.S. stocks, in terms of market capitalization, and the Russell 2000 comprises the next
largest 2,000 stocks. Because portfolio weights assigned to each stock within an index are
value-weighted, a stock’s index assignment has a significant impact on the extent of
ownership by index funds and other non-index passive funds that use the Russell indexes
Sommer (2013)). And, in its fight against Agrium, the activist hedge fund Jana Partners first gauged the
support it had from large institutional investors before going public with its demands. See
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/18/new-alliances-in-battle-for-corporate-control/ for more details.
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as benchmarks. For example, the 750th through 1,000th largest stocks will be included in
the Russell 1000 and be given very small portfolio weights within the index because they
represent the smallest firms in their index, while the 1,001st through 1,250th largest stocks
will be included in the Russell 2000 and be given weights that are an order of magnitude
larger because they represent the largest firms in their index. Therefore, for each dollar
invested in a passive fund using the Russell 1000 as a benchmark, very little of it will be
invested in stocks at the bottom of that index; while for each dollar invested in a passive
fund using the Russell 2000 as a benchmark, a large proportion of it will be invested in
stocks at the top of the index.
Because there is a comparable amount of assets benchmarked to each index
(Chang, Hong and Liskovich (2014)), this benchmarking by passive funds leads to a
sharp jump in ownership by passive institutional investors for stocks at the top of the
Russell 2000 relative to stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000. Defining passive
investors as institutions classified as quasi-indexers by Bushee (2001), the two largest of
which are Vanguard and State Street, we find that ownership by passive investors is, on
average, about 2 to 4 percentage points higher for stocks at the top of the Russell 2000
index relative to stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000 index.

The difference

represents about 5%-10% higher ownership by passive investors relative to the sample
average.

Consistent with this difference in institutional ownership being driven by

passive investors, we find no corresponding difference in ownership among more active
institutions. The lack of a difference for the active institutional investors indicates the
larger ownership of stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 by passive institutional investors
coincides with a lower ownership of these stocks by retail investors.
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Exploiting this variation in ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff in an
instrumental variable (IV) estimation, we are able to assess the effect of passive investors
on firms’ governance structures. Specifically, we instrument for ownership by passive
investors with an indicator for being assigned to the Russell 2000 in a given year. Our IV
estimation relies on the assumption that after conditioning on stocks’ market
capitalization, which determines index assignment, inclusion in the Russell 2000 index
does not directly affect our outcomes of interest except through its impact on ownership
by passive investors. This assumption seems reasonable in our setting in that it is unclear
why index inclusion would be directly related to governance and other corporate
outcomes after restricting the sample to stocks near the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff and
after robustly controlling for the factor that determines index inclusion—stocks’ end-ofMay market capitalization.18
The governance outcomes we choose to analyze reflect those that the largest
passive institutional investors explicitly state as being important. While passive
institutions do vary their voting strategy across firms on governance issues (e.g., see
Davis and Han (2007)), a common theme of the proxy voting policies of large, passive
institutional investors is (1) to either withhold support or vote against boards that are not
sufficiently independent, (2) oppose antitakeover provisions that can reduce board
accountability, including poison pills and restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call
special meetings, and (3) oppose unequal voting rights, such as dual class shares (e.g., see

18
Another advantage of our identification strategy is that it does not depend on one’s ability to classify
passive and non-passive institutional investors. Because the IV estimation only uses variation in
institutional ownership that is driven by index assignment, the estimation and its assumptions are not
sensitive to using either total institutional ownership or commonly-used definitions of passive ownership as
the key explanatory variable to be instrumented. The interpretation of the local average treatment effect we
estimate will remain the same. See Sections III.B and IV.B for more details.
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the Appendix for more details on voting guidelines of four prominent passive institutional
investors). We also analyze outcomes that are directly related to the potential
mechanisms by which passive investors may exert influence, such as their support for
management and governance-related shareholder proposals, the types of proposals voted
on, and the likelihood of activist hedge funds making demands upon management.
Using our IV approach, we find that passive investors have a significant impact
on key aspects of firms’ governance structures. First, an increase in ownership by
passive investors is associated with an increase in the share of independent directors on a
board. Relative to the sample average, a 10% increase in ownership by passive investors
is associated with a 9% increase in the share of directors on a firm’s board that are
independent; and this association is even larger before the NYSE and Nasdaq ruled in
2003 that listed firms are required to have a majority of independent directors. Second,
passive ownership is associated with the removal of antitakeover defenses. A one
percentage point increase in ownership by passive investors is associated with 0.5
percentage point increase in the likelihood of removing a poison pill and of reducing
restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call special meetings.

These findings are

economically large given that, on average, only 4% of firms remove a poison pill and
0.7% of firms eliminate restrictions on special meetings each year during our sample
period. Finally, an increase in passive ownership is also associated with firms being less
likely to have dual class shares, a device used to give certain shareholders (e.g., firm
founders) voting control.
Our evidence suggests that a key mechanism by which passive investors exert
their influence is through the power of their large voting blocs. Passive ownership is
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associated with a decline in the share of votes in support of management proposals and an
increase in support for governance-related shareholder proposals. Relative to the sample
average, a 10% increase in ownership by passive investors is associated with about a 4%
decline in support for management proposals and about a 10% increase in support for
governance proposals. These differences in support are not driven by a change in the type
of proposals being voted on; we find little evidence of an association between passive
investors and the composition of management or shareholder proposals.
We find less evidence of an alternative mechanism by which passive investors’
ownership stakes influence governance outcomes—by facilitating the activist efforts of
other investors. We find no evidence of a positive association between ownership by
passive investors and the likelihood of a firm experiencing a hedge fund activism event,
as defined by Brav et al. (2008) and Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010). If anything, we find
suggestive evidence of a decline in hedge fund activism. However, these findings do not
exclude the possibility that passive investors’ ownership stakes increase the threat of
activism by others, and that some of the observed responses are driven by this increased
threat. For example, companies may be responsive to the governance views of passive
investors so as to lessen the likelihood such investors later lend support to an activist
campaign initiated by others.
Contributing to the ongoing debate regarding the performance and value
implications of various governance structures (e.g., Stein (1988), Bhagat and Black
(2002), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003)), we find that an increase in passive ownership is
associated with an improvement in firms’ future performance. We find no evidence of an
association between passive ownership and measures of performance in our main IV
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specification, but if we isolate the longer-term impact of passive ownership by adding
controls for stocks that recently switched indexes, we find evidence that passive
ownership is associated with significant improvements in firms’ return on assets (ROA).
On average, a 10 percent increase in ownership by passive investors is associated with
about a fifth of standard deviation increase in ROA. We also find that ownership by
passive investors is associated with reduced cash holdings, a higher dividend yield, and
suggestive decline in managerial pay, all of which have been associated with
improvements in performance and reductions in agency problems associated with free
cash flows. We do not find much evidence, however, that passive ownership is associated
with differences in firms’ capital structure or investments. Combined, these findings are
consistent with passive investors improving firm value by insisting on basic governancerelated changes, as these require a low level of costly monitoring, while avoiding more
costly interventions to alter firms’ investment or capital structure.
Our findings are robust to various specification choices. For example, varying the
number of stocks we investigate around the cutoff between the two indexes or varying the
functional form we use to control for firms’ end-of-May market cap, which is the key
factor determining stocks’ index assignment each year, does not affect our findings. The
findings are also robust to the definition of market cap we employ. We use the CRSP
monthly file to calculate end-of-May market caps, but the findings are robust if instead
we use the Compustat security monthly file or, when available, Russell’s proprietary
measure of total market cap. The findings are also robust to (1) controlling for firms’
float-adjusted market cap, which is a proprietary measure used by Russell to determine a
stock’s ranking within indexes, (2) controlling for firms’ industry, (3) controlling for
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firms’ stock liquidity, and (4) controlling for whether firms recently switched indexes.
Finally, the findings are robust to using a narrower definition of passive ownership that
only includes the ownership stake of the three largest quasi-index institutions (Barclays
Bank, which owned iShares during our sample period, State Street, and Vanguard) as the
key explanatory variable, and we find no effect of passive ownership in placebo tests that
assume jumps in passive ownership at alternative market cap thresholds (i.e., instead of
the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff).
Overall, our findings contribute to the broad literature that studies the effects of
institutional ownership of common stock.

One strand of this literature analyzes

institutional investors’ impact on various aspects of corporate governance, including
governance indices (Aggarwal et al. (2011), Chung and Zhang (2011)), CEO pay
sensitivity (Hartzell and Starks (2003)), and shareholder proposals (Gillan and Starks
(2000)), while another strand studies the effects of institutional investors on corporate
policies, including leverage (Michaely, Popadak, and Vincent (2014)), dividends
(Grinstein and Michaely (2005)) and R&D (Bushee (1998), Aghion, Van Reenen, and
Zingales (2013)). A number of recent papers also highlight the role of specific types of
institutional investors, such as activist hedge funds (Brav et al. (2008); Klein and Zur
(2009)) and pension funds (Agrawal (2012); Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998)).
We contribute to this literature by focusing on passive institutions—a previously ignored,
but increasingly important, set of institutional investors. Contrary to the presumption that
passive investors lack the willingness and ability to influence firms’ policy choices, our
evidence suggests that passive investors adopt general principles of what constitutes an
effective governance structure, as proposed in Black (1992), and successfully influence
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firms’ governance and other policy choices accordingly.
The results of this paper also provide new insights into the determinants of firms’
governance structures and the mechanisms that allow large shareholders to influence
managerial decisions. Typically, institutional investors, such as blockholders, are thought
to influence governance through a combination of “voice” and “exit” (e.g., Edmans
(2014) and Levit (2013)).19 Voice refers to direct intervention by shareholders through
either formal (e.g., proxy voting) or informal (e.g., letters to the board) channels (Harris
and Raviv (2010); Levit and Malenko (2011); Maug (1998); Shleifer and Vishny (1986)),
while exit refers to the threat or actual selling of shares (Admati and Pfleiderer (2009);
Edmans (2009); Edmans and Manso (2011)). However, because passive funds maintain
portfolio weights that are often closely aligned with the weights in their chosen
benchmark, their ability to influence managers is primarily limited to voice, which is
thought to constrain their ability to influence corporate outcomes. Our paper finds
otherwise; while passive investors are not “active” in the traditional sense, their
significant voting blocs and ability to engage in voice are powerful tools used to shape
the governance structure of firms and influence firm performance and some aspects of
corporate policy.20

19

Several papers (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) also study the use of hostile takeovers and proxy fights
by blockholders. In both cases, the large holdings of these shareholders partially mitigate free rider
problems which arise in a world with atomistic owners (Grossman and Hart, 1980).
20
In this regard, our findings complement those of Iliev and Lowry (forthcoming), who analyze the
determinants of mutual funds’ reliance on proxy advisory service companies like Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS). While not the focus of the paper, Section 4.3 of Iliev and Lowry presents evidence that
index funds are more likely to “actively vote” their shares (as measured by being less likely to follow ISS
vote recommendations on non-binding shareholder proposals) when they have substantial holdings in the
firm. Choi, Fisch, and Kahan (2013) find similar evidence that the voting decisions of Vanguard, and other
large fund families, vary substantially from ISS vote recommendations. Our findings demonstrate that the
active monitoring and voice of passive investors results in actual differences in firms’ governance
structures and corporate policies.
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Finally, our work is related to recent papers that use the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff
to analyze the price effects of additions and deletions from a market index (Chang, Hong,
and Liskovich (2014)), the importance of institutional investors’ portfolio weights for
monitoring incentives (Fich, Harford, and Tran (2015)), and the association between total
institutional ownership and corporate policies like payouts, investment, the composition
of CEO pay, management disclosure, and acquisitions (Boone and White (2014); Crane,
Michenaud, and Weston (2014); Lu (2013); Mullins (2014)). In contrast to these papers,
we use the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff to isolate variation in ownership by passive
investors, and we analyze the impact of such investors on governance outcomes that
passive investors explicitly mention as being important (e.g., independent directors, fewer
takeover defenses, and equal voting rights), and the mechanisms by which passive
investors might influence such governance outcomes (e.g., proxy voting, shareholder
proposals, and facilitating activism by others).21
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sections II and III describe
our data and identification strategy. Section IV describes our findings regarding corporate
governance, while Section V discusses potential mechanisms. Section VI describes our
findings regarding other corporate outcomes. Section VII discusses our specification
choice and robustness tests, and Section VIII concludes.

21

While our identification strategy is similar to that of other papers that use the same Russell 1000/2000
setting, there are methodological differences between our IV estimation, which isolates changes in passive
ownership, and empirical specifications used in previous Russell 1000/2000 papers. We discuss these
differences in Section VII.C.
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II. Sample, data sources, and descriptive statistics
In this paper, we merge stock-level data on institutional ownership and Russell
equity index membership with firm-level governance, proxy voting, accounting, and
executive compensation data. We now briefly describe each data source and our sample.

A. Institutional holdings and Russell 1000/2000 index membership
We use the 13F holdings data to compute institutional holdings in a stock as a
percent of its market capitalization. Any financial institution exercising discretionary
management of investment portfolios over $100 million in qualified securities is required
to report those holdings quarterly to the SEC using Form 13F. Qualified securities
include stocks listed for trading in the U.S., among other securities, and the quarterly
holdings reported in Forms 13F represent the aggregate holdings of an institution (e.g. the
Vanguard family of funds), rather than the holdings of any individual portfolio (e.g., the
Contra fund in the Fidelity family of funds).

These filings are compiled by

Thomson/CDA and available through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). We
calculate the total market cap of each stock using the CRSP monthly file as the sum of
shares outstanding multiplied by price for each class of common stock associated with a
firm (i.e., we sum across all PERMNOs associated with each PERMCO). We exclude
observations where institutional holdings exceed a firm’s market capitalization.22
We use Bushee's (2001) three sub-categories of institutional investors, based on
22

On occasion, an institution will report its holdings late, so that the report date and filing date in the
Thomson data are not the same. As these holdings are not current, we also delete them from our analysis.
We also correct for the two transcribing errors—errors relating to incorrect prices and incorrect split
adjustment factors for the fourth quarter of 1999 and the third quarter of 2000—identified in Blume and
Keim (2014).
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portfolio diversification and turnover, to distinguish between index/passive and active
institutional ownership. Specifically, we use Bushee's three institutional categories: (i)
“quasi-indexers" (low turnover, high diversification – e.g., Vanguard and State Street);
(ii) “transient” (high turnover, high diversification – e.g., Janus Capital Management,
Morgan Stanley); and (iii) “dedicated” (low turnover, low diversification – Berkshire
Hathaway, Wellington (Windsor)).23 To generate variables for institutional ownership
disaggregated into these three types, we compute the percentage of the market
capitalization for stock i owned by quasi-indexers, transient, and dedicated institutions at
the end of September of year t.
Combined, the 13F data and Bushee’s categorization of institutional investors
confirm the growing importance of passive investors. This is seen in Figure 1, which
plots the quarter-end percentage of total U.S. market value held by quasi-indexers from
June 30, 1984 to June 30, 2010. As shown in the top panel of Figure 1, holdings by
passive investors have steadily grown over the last three decades, except for a small dropoff after the 2008 financial crisis.

The growing importance of passive investors is

particularly stark among smaller capitalization stocks. This is seen in the next two panels
of Figure 1 where we plot quasi-index ownership for firms found in the Russell 1000,
which reflects the largest 1,000 firms in terms of market cap, and the Russell 2000, which
reflects the next 2,000 largest firms.

Quasi-indexers owned less than 14% of the

combined value of the stocks in the Russell 2000 index in June 1984, and more than 40%
in June 2010 (down from 48% in March 2008). In contrast, quasi-index ownership in the

23

To avoid changes in the classification of an institution over time, we use Bushee’s “permanent”
classification. As discussed in Section VII.B, our findings are also robust to using alternative methods to
classify
institutions.
See
Bushee’s
website
for
details:
http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html.
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Russell 1000 stocks grew from 29% to just over 46% during the same period.
Because we are interested in whether an increase in ownership by an institution
that tends to offer passive funds, like Vanguard or State Street, is associated with
differences in governance or corporate performance, we define passive ownership at the
institutional level (using the aggregated 13F data and Bushee’s quasi-index classification)
rather than at the fund level.

Proxy voting guidelines, particularly those regarding

governance, are established at the institution level (e.g., see Appendix), and consistent
with this, Rothberg and Lilien (2006), Choi, Fisch, and Kahan (2013), and Rock (2014)
find that voting decisions are made at the family level and that funds within an institution
almost always vote uniformly as a block. Thus, the influence of these passive institutions
is likely to reflect the totality of their holdings rather than the holdings of a given fund;
and while many of the largest passive institutions also offer some actively-managed
funds, our later findings demonstrate that there is no evidence that ownership by activelymanaged funds varies based on a stock’s index assignment.
Our subsequent analysis is restricted to the sample of stocks found in the Russell
1000 and 2000 indexes between 1998 and 2006. We obtain data for the Russell 1000 and
2000 indexes from Russell, and we start the sample at 1998 because this is the first year
Russell provides us with its proprietary, float-adjusted market capitalization, which is
used to determine the rank (i.e., portfolio weight) of each security within an index. We
end the sample prior to 2007, which is when Russell implemented a new methodology to
construct the two indexes such that they no longer necessarily reflect the 1,000 and next
2,000 largest stocks by market capitalization.

Russell also provided us with their

proprietary end-of-May total market capitalization values for each year from 2002 to
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2006. The importance of the end-of-May market capitalizations and of ending the sample
prior to 2007 is described in Section III.

B. Governance, voting, accounting, and compensation data
Governance and voting data are largely obtained from Riskmetrics (ISS), which
provides information on several aspects of corporate governance for firms in the S&P
1500.

Following Riskmetrics’ classification of a director’s independence, which

excludes linked directors (e.g., those with business ties to the firm), we calculate the
percentage of independent directors on the boards of each firm for each year in the
sample from the director dataset. The governance dataset from Riskmetrics is used to
create indicator variables for whether a firm removes restrictions on shareholders’ ability
to call a special meeting or has dual class shares in a given year. The governance
database is available for alternating years in the sample, except for 1998 when there is a
three-year lag. We also construct several variables related to shareholder proposals and
voting. We use the voting results database from Riskmetrics to calculate the average
percentage of shares that vote in support of management proposals at annual meetings
and in support of shareholder-initiated governance proposals for each firm. Because
annual meetings can occur throughout a year, we restrict the sample to those occurring
between reconstitutions of the Russell indexes (i.e., between July of year t and June of
year t+1).
Our data on poison pills are obtained from Shark Repellent (FactSet). Shark
Repellent provides historical information on firms’ most recent poison pill, such as when
the poison pill was renewed, withdrawn, or allowed to expire. We define our variable for
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poison pill removal as an indicator equal to 1 if a firm’s poison pill is either withdrawn or
allowed to expire at time t, and zero otherwise. Because Shark Repellent only reports
information on a firm’s most recent poison pill, our indicator only flags firms that
removed a poison pill during our sample period and did not reinstate a poison pill
subsequently.
Annual accounting data are from Compustat, and we use executive compensation
data from Execucomp. Accounting variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
Definitions for all our key variables are provided in Appendix Table 1.

C. Sample and descriptive statistics
For our main analysis, we restrict our sample to stocks in the 250 and 500
bandwidths around the cutoff, as determined using the end-of-June Russell-assigned
portfolio weights for stocks within each index. This sample spans an economically
important set of midcap and small cap stocks that includes 1,000 of the 1,500 largest (in
terms of market capitalization) U.S. publicly-listed firms.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for firms in these two bandwidths around the
cutoff. The mean and median values of the main outcome variables are similar across
both bandwidths. The average level of institutional ownership (as a percentage of shares
outstanding) is 64%.

Quasi-indexers are the largest type of institutional investors

(approximately 38% of shares outstanding), followed by transient (16%) and dedicated
(9%). Support for management proposals is high (85%), consistent with the notion that
many of the issues addressed by these proposals are routine in nature, while support for
shareholder-initiated governance proposals is considerably lower (36%). Independent
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directors make up over half (65%) of the total number of directors for firms in the
sample. The table also shows that poison pill removals and the lessening of restrictions
on shareholders’ ability to call a special meeting are relatively rare events in our sample,
occurring in just 4% and 0.7% of firm-year observations, respectively. About 12% of
firms have dual class shares. Finally, firms’ ROA averages about 0.03.

III. Empirical framework
Identifying the impact of passive investors on firms’ corporate governance and
other policies can be challenging. For example, cross-sectional correlations between
passive investors, governance, and performance might not reflect a causal relation since
ownership by passive investors might be correlated with factors—such as firms’ access to
capital, investment opportunities, or ownership by active investors—that directly affect
firms’ choices. Failure to control for such factors could introduce an omitted variable bias
that confounds the cross-sectional relations. Simultaneity bias could also distort these
relations; for example, investors in passive funds may prefer to invest in funds that track
indexes that contain firms with more payouts, all else equal.

To overcome these

challenges and to determine the importance of passive investors, we use stocks’
assignment to the top of the Russell 2000 index as an exogenous shock to ownership by
passive investors. We now describe our identification strategy.

A. Russell index construction and passive institutional investors
Passive funds attempt to match the performance of a market index by holding the
basket of representative securities in the particular market index being tracked and
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weighting each security in proportion to its market capitalization weight in the index. The
most visible types of passive funds are index funds, which hold nearly all stocks in the
market index rather than a representative sample.
Two market indexes widely used as benchmarks are the Russell 1000 and Russell
2000 indexes. The Russell 1000 comprises the largest 1000 U.S. stocks, in terms of
market capitalization, while the Russell 2000 comprises the next largest 2000 stocks.
Example index and non-index passive funds that use the Russell 1000 as a benchmark are
the Vanguard Russell 1000 Index Fund (VRNIX) and the BNY Mellon Large Cap Stock
Fund (MPLCX), while the Vanguard Russell 2000 Index Fund (VRTIX) and DFA U.S.
Small Cap Fund (DFSTX) are two funds that use the Russell 2000 as a benchmark.
To account for changes in stocks’ ranking by market cap, the Russell indexes are
reconstituted each year at the end of June.

On the last Friday of June, Russell

Investments determines which stocks will be included in the two indexes for the
following twelve months using market capitalization as of the last trading day in May of
that year.24 In other words, the 1000 largest stocks at the end of the last trading day in
May will be included in the Russell 1000, while the next 2000 largest stocks will be
included in the Russell 2000.25

Each stock’s weight in the index is then determined

24

However, when the last Friday of June falls on the 29th or 30th, the two indexes are reconstituted on the
preceding Friday. During the following twelve months, stocks are only deleted from the indexes due to
Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings, delistings, and corporate actions (takeovers), while IPOs are added quarterly
to the indexes on the basis of the market capitalization breaks established during the most recent
reconstitution. For more details regarding the reconstitution process and eligibility for inclusion in the
Russell indexes, see Russell Investments (2013).
25
Beginning in 2007, Russell implemented a “banding” policy where firms within a certain range of the
cutoff would not switch indexes. For example, a firm that was in the Russell 2000 index last year but was
among the 1000 largest firms this year would only move to the Russell 1000 index if its market
capitalization exceeded a certain threshold. Since our identification strategy relies on controlling for the
factors that determine a firm’s index assignment each year, we restrict our attention to years prior to the
implementation of this banding policy where only the end-of-May market capitalization calculated by
Russell is used to determine firms’ index assignment. For a press release regarding the implementation of
this banding policy by Russell, see https://www.russell.com/us/news/press-release.aspx?link=press-
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using its end-of-June float-adjusted market cap. The float-adjusted market capitalization
is different than the market capitalization used to determine index membership in that it
only includes the value of shares that are available to the public. For example, shares held
by another company or individual that exceed 10% of shares outstanding, by another
member of a Russell index, by an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), or by a
government will be removed when calculating a firm’s float-adjusted market
capitalization, as will unlisted share classes. Therefore, a stock that was the 1,000th
largest stock in total market capitalization need not be the stock with the smallest
portfolio weight in the Russell 1000 index.
A stock’s index assignment can have a significant impact on its portfolio weight
within its index. Because stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000 pale in size compared
to the largest stocks in that index, the 1000th largest stock at the end of May will be
included in the Russell 1000 and be given a very small portfolio weight within its index,
while the 1001th largest stock will be included in the Russell 2000 and be given a much
larger weight in its index. For example, between 1998 and 2006, the average portfolio
weight of the bottom 250 stocks in the Russell 1000 was 0.012%, while the average
portfolio weight of the top 250 stocks in the Russell 2000 was an order of magnitude
larger at 0.127%. This difference in portfolio weights persists over a wide range around
the cutoff. This is seen in Figure 2, where we plot the end-of-June portfolio weights of
the 500 smallest float-adjusted stocks in the Russell 1000 and the 500 largest floatadjusted stocks in the Russell 2000 for the year 2006.
These differences in portfolio weights can have a significant impact on the extent

releases/2007/PR20070403.htm, and for more details on how the banding thresholds are determined each
year, see Russell Investments (2013).
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of a stock’s ownership by passive investors. Because index funds weight their holdings
based on the portfolio weights of the underlying index in an attempt to minimize tracking
error, it is more important that they match the weights of the stocks at the top of the index
than for stocks at the bottom of the index. Likewise, non-indexed passive investors will
pay more attention to deviations from benchmark weights for the largest stocks in their
portfolios because such deviations will have a greater impact on performance measured
relative to the benchmark. In other words, for each dollar invested in a passive fund
benchmarked to the Russell 1000, very little of it will be invested in stocks at the bottom
of that index, while for each dollar invested in a passive fund benchmarked to the Russell
2000, a large proportion of it will be invested in stocks at the top of the index. Because
there is a comparable amount of money benchmarked to both indexes (Chang, Hong and
Liskovich (2014)), the portfolio decisions of passive institutions can lead to a large
difference in ownership between stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 and stocks at the
bottom of the Russell 1000.26
The importance of index assignment for ownership by passive investors is shown
in Figure 3, where we sort the top 500 stocks of the Russell 2000 and bottom 500 stocks
of the Russell 1000, as determined using the end-of-June Russell-assigned portfolio
weights within each index, using their end-of-May CRSP market capitalization for each
year between 1998 and 2006 and plot the average market capitalization, share of firms in
the Russell 2000, and end-of-September percent ownership by quasi-index institutional

26

Even though the Russell 1000 is an order of magnitude larger in total market cap than the Russell 2000,
there is a similar amount of dollars tracking the Russell 2000 because it is the most widely used market
index for small cap stocks. The Russell 1000, which spans both large and midcap stocks, is less widely
used as a benchmark because it faces more competition from other large cap and midcap market indexes,
including the S&P 500 (which is the most popular market index), the CRSP U.S. midcap index, and the
S&P 400 midcap index.
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investors. By construction, the top-left panel of Figure 3 shows no break in size between
the 500th and 501st largest stocks in this sample. But, as shown in the middle-left panel,
there is a rather large jump in the probability of being assigned to the Russell 2000 index
around this break. Figure 3 also demonstrates that the end-of-May market capitalization
reported by CRSP does not perfectly predict a stock’s index assignment. This is because
Russell makes a number of adjustments when calculating its proprietary market
capitalization values such that these values, which are used to determine a stock’s index
membership, do not perfectly match market capitalizations reported in sources such as
CRSP. And consistent with index assignment having an important impact on ownership,
the bottom-left panel of Figure 3 demonstrates a distinct jump in the ownership of passive
investors around this midway point.

On average, quasi-index investors own 40.4% of

the top 500 firms of the Russell 2000, but only own 37.8% of the bottom 500 firms in the
Russell 1000 (p-value of difference < 0.001).27
We find no evidence that index assignment is related to ownership by actively
managed funds. This is shown in the remaining two panels of Figure 3 where we plot the
percent ownership for transient and dedicated institutional investors. As seen in those
panels, there is no corresponding difference in either transient or dedicated institutional
ownership; we formally test and demonstrate this lack of a difference in other types of
ownership in Section III.C. While some quasi-index institutions may also offer activelymanaged funds, the lack of a difference for other types of institutional holdings suggests

27

The difference of 2.6 percentage points corresponds well to estimates regarding the total amount of
passive assets tracking each of the two indexes. For example, taking the estimated dollar value of passive
assets benchmarked to each index from 1998 to 2006, as reported Table 1, Panel A of Chang, Hong, and
Liskovich (2014), one can calculate the percent of total holdings in both indexes that is held by passive
funds that track that specific index. Using this back-of-the-envelope calculation, the implied passive
holdings in the Russell 2000 index should be about 1.8 percentage points greater, on average, than that of
the of the Russell 1000 index during our sample period.
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the difference in quasi-index ownership shown in Figure 3 is driven by passive funds
rather than active funds.
The importance of index assignment for passive ownership is further highlighted
by looking at the ownership stake of the three biggest passive institutions classified as
quasi-index investors—Vanguard, State Street, and Barclays Bank (which owned iShares
during our sample). These three institutions account for half of the observed difference
in quasi-index ownership, and on average, the ownership stake of each of these three
institutions is a third higher among the 500 firms at the top of the Russell 2000 relative to
the bottom 500 firms of the Russell 1000. Moreover, their likelihood of owning more
than 5% of a firm’s shares, is higher, on average by two thirds for firms at the top of the
Russell 2000, while their likelihood of being a top 5 shareholder is higher, on average, by
15%.28

B. Identification strategy and empirical specification
The construction of the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes thus provides a source of
exogenous variation in ownership by passive investors. Stocks at the top of the Russell
2000 exhibit greater ownership by passive investors because of their inclusion at the top
of their index, while stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000 do not. Because index
assignment is determined by an arbitrary rule surrounding the market capitalization of the
1000th largest firm, this variation in ownership is plausibly exogenous after conditioning
on firms’ market capitalization.

28

The importance of index assignment can also be seen at the fund level. Using the Thomson Reuters S12
fund-level database, we find that among the 50 largest mutual fund holdings for each stock, there are 16.5%
more fund names that include the word “index” for the 250 stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 relative to
the 250 stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000.
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We use an instrumental variable strategy to identify the effect of ownership by
passive institutional investors on firms’ corporate governance and corporate policies; in
particular, we use inclusion in the Russell 2000 as an instrument for ownership by
passive investors. Because index assignment is determined by a stock’s market
capitalization, and because market capitalization may directly affect a stock’s
institutional ownership for reasons separate from index assignment, we also include a
robust set of controls for stocks’ end-of-May market capitalization in our estimation.
Specifically, we estimate the following:
N

n

Yit = α + β Quasi-index it + ∑ θ n ( Ln( Mktcapit )) + γ Ln(Float )it + δ t + ε it
n=1

where Yit is the outcome of interest for firm i in year t, Quasi-indexit is the percent of a
firm’s shares held by quasi-indexers in year t, Mktcapit is the end-of-May CRSP market
capitalization of stock i at in year t, and Floatit is the float-adjusted market capitalization
calculated by Russell. We control for float-adjusted market capitalization because it is
used by Russell to compute portfolio weights within each index and could be related to a
firm’s stock liquidity, which may affect firms’ governance and other corporate outcomes
(Back, Li, and Ljungqvist (2014); Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2013)). We also include year
fixed effects, δ t , to ensure that our estimates are identified using within-year variation in
ownership and are not driven by the aggregate upward trend in ownership by passive
investors (see Figure 1). Finally, we cluster the standard errors, ε , at the firm level.29
To account for the possibility that ownership by passive investors, as measured
29

We do not include firm fixed effects in our estimation since only a small fraction of our sample firms
switch indexes at some point during the sample and because many of the governance and corporate
outcomes we study are likely to be affected by sustained rather than transitory variation in passive
ownership. Since firm fixed effects will remove this sustained variation, they will likely not capture the
relevant variation and thus potentially provide misleading inferences (e.g., see McKinnish (2008); Gormley
and Matsa (2014)).
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(1)

using Quasi-index, might be correlated with the error term, ε , because of the omitted
variable and simultaneity issues discussed above, we instrument for ownership by passive
investors using index assignment. Specifically, we instrument Quasi-index in the above
estimation using R2000it, which is an indicator equal to one if stock i is part of the
Russell 2000 index in year t. As shown in Figure 3, being assigned to the Russell 2000 is
associated with a significant jump in ownership by passive investors for stocks at the top
of Russell 2000 relative to stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000.30
Our IV estimation relies on the assumption that, after conditioning on stocks’
market capitalization, inclusion in the Russell 2000 index is associated with an increase
in Quasi-index (relevance condition) but does not directly affect our outcomes of interest
except through its impact on ownership by passive investors (exclusion restriction). We
verify the relevance condition below in our first stage estimations, and the exclusion
restriction seems reasonable in that it is unclear why index inclusion would be directly
related to our outcomes of interest after robustly controlling for the factor that determines
index inclusion—firms’ end-of-May market capitalization, as calculated by Russell. To
control for firms’ market capitalization, we include a robust set of controls for firms’ log
market capitalization, Ln(Mktcap), as measured using CRSP data and restrict our sample
to stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000 and top of the Russell 2000.31 In particular,

30

The instrumental variable (IV) estimation is implemented using the standard two-stage least squares
(2SLS) estimation, and as further support of the need for our IV estimation, a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, as
proposed in Wooldridge (1995), rejects the exogeneity of Quasi-index in 10 of the 11 outcomes we analyze
in Sections IV-VI of the paper. The OLS estimates when using the 250 bandwidth and a second
polynomial order control for Ln(Mktcap) are reported in Appendix Table 2; the OLS estimates using
alternative bandwidths or controls for Ln(Mktcap) are qualitatively similar. The OLS estimates differ
considerably from the IV estimates reported in Sections IV-VI. For example, in an OLS estimation, Quasiindex is unrelated to takeover defenses, while in our later IV estimates, we demonstrate that Quasi-index is
associated with significantly fewer takeover defenses
31
At some level, our estimation can be viewed as one that makes use of a threshold event in a non-RD
estimation, as discussed in Bakke and Whited (2012).
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we also show the robustness of our findings to varying the number of firms we include
around the cutoff between the two indexes and to varying the polynomial order N we use
to control for end-of-May market capitalization.
The use of R2000it as an instrument allows us to isolate an exogenous source of
variation in passive ownership. While non-index funds that passively seek to deliver the
performance of a benchmark portfolio have discretion over which stocks to hold within
the benchmark, the instrumental variable never uses such endogenous variation in passive
ownership; the IV estimation only uses variation in ownership that is driven by a stock’s
index assignment and the reshuffling of holdings by institutions that seek to minimize the
tracking errors of their passive funds. For this reason, our IV strategy is also not sensitive
to the specific measure of institutional ownership we use in the first stage of the 2SLS
estimation. In particular, one could use total institutional ownership in the first stage of
the estimation without affecting the interpretation of the local average treatment effect
being identified in the IV estimation. We use Quasi-index as our main measurement of
ownership since it eliminates noise from non-passive holdings and improves the precision
of our first stage estimates (see below).

However, as shown in Section VII, our

subsequent findings are robust to using both wider and narrower definitions of
ownership.

C. First stage estimation
In this section, we report estimates of our first-stage regression of quasi-index
holdings on membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional controls. Specifically,
we estimate
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N

n

Quasi -index it = η + λ R2000it + ∑ χ n ( Ln( Mktcapit )) + σ Ln( Float )it + δ t + u it
n =1

where Quasi-indexit is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by quasi-indexers and
R2000it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if stock i is in the Russell 2000 Index at end of
June in year t. In our initial tests, we also analyze other outcome measures, including the
percentage of shares outstanding owned by all institutional investors; the percentage of
shares outstanding owned by “dedicated” institutions; and the percentage of shares
outstanding owned by “transient” institutions. The model is estimated over the 19982006 period, and uses a bandwidth of 500 firms and a third-order polynomial.
The results, reported in Table 2, confirm that institutional ownership is related to
membership in the Russell, particularly for passive institutions. The first column shows
that aggregate institutional percentage ownership is significantly higher (at the 10%
level) for the 500 stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 than for 500 stocks at the bottom
of the Russell 1000. As expected, this relation appears to be driven entirely by passive
institutions: the estimated coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level for the
quasi-indexers (column 2), but insignificant for the more active institutional investors, as
defined by Bushee’s dedicated and transient institutions (columns 3 and 4). The lack of a
difference for other institutional investors suggests that the increase in ownership by
passive institutional investors coincides with a decline in ownership not reported in the
13F filings, i.e. retail investors.32
In Table 3 we demonstrate that the estimated relation between quasi-index
ownership and Russell 2000 membership is robust to using lower order polynomials and

32

The differences in ownership for the three types of investors do not perfectly sum to the overall
difference in institutional ownership because of the small number of institutions that are unclassified in
Bushee’s database.
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(2)

smaller bandwidths. Using a bandwidth of 500 firms and varying the polynomial order
of controls for market cap, we consistently find an increase in ownership by passive
investors of 3 to 4 percentage points, which corresponds to about a 10% increase relative
to the sample average (Table 3, columns 1–3). The increase is also robust to restricting
our sample to the bottom 250 stocks of the Russell 1000 and top 250 stocks of the Russell
2000 (columns 4–6). In all cases, the increase is statistically significant at the 1% level.33
The lack of a difference in ownership for non-passive institutional investors is
also robust to varying the sample bandwidth and the polynomial order of controls for
Mktcap. This can be seen in Appendix Tables 3 and 4. Consistent with activelymanaged funds being unaffected by a stock’s index assignment, we find no evidence of a
difference in ownership by more active institutional investors, as captured by Bushee’s
dedicated and transient institutions. Combined, these findings confirm that assignment to
the Russell 2000 increases a stock’s relative mix of passive institutions.
We also do not find evidence that membership in the Russell 2000 is associated
with an increase in the visibility of a stock and subsequent analyst coverage, which is
another mechanism by which index assignment might improve firms’ governance. In
particular, if we re-estimate Equation (2) instead using the number of analysts as the
dependent variable, we find no evidence that assignment to the top of the Russell 2000 is
associated with greater analyst coverage; if anything, we find evidence that inclusion in
the Russell 2000 is associated with less analyst coverage but the estimates are not robust
to wider bandwidths. Likewise, Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2014) find no evidence
33
Because our IV model is just-identified, the IV estimation is median-unbiased and weak instruments are
unlikely to be a concern in our setting, especially given the strong first stage estimates (Angrist and
Pischke, 2009). Additionally, the Kleibergen-Paap F stat on the excluded instrument exceeds 10, providing
further confidence that a weak instrument is unlikely to be a concern (see Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002)
and Angrist and Pischke (2009)).
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of an increase in media coverage among firms at the top of the Russell 2000. The lack of
an increase in either analyst or media coverage among firms at the top of the Russell
2000 bolsters our assumption that index assignment in our setting will only affects firms’
governance structure through its effect on passive ownership.

D. Why index assignment may matter
A question that naturally arises is why index assignment might matter at all for
firms’ passive ownership. If the increased ownership stake that comes with a stock being
assigned to the Russell 2000 index allows passive investors to exert additional influence
and correct a governance structure they deem suboptimal (as shown below), why would
passive investors not also increase their ownership stake among stocks at the bottom of
the Russell 1000 so as to exert more influence among those companies as well? In other
words, what would prevent passive institutions from being more active, and hence,
undoing the potential importance of index assignment?
There are two likely explanations for why index assignment may matter for firms’
governance structures. First, passive institutions are simply more focused on minimizing
expenses and tracking errors than on affecting governance. While increasing an
ownership stake for one stock at the bottom of the Russell 1000 might not significantly
affect a fund’s tracking errors relative to a Russell 1000 benchmark, a similar increase for
a number of other stocks would. Moreover, such targeted activism would likely increase
fund expenses since the passive investor would need to research which stocks to target.
Combined these two effects would likely result in lost market share to competitors with
lower costs and lower tracking errors. Second, index assignment may create a
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coordinated increase in ownership by passive institutions that might otherwise be hard to
replicate. An ownership stake increase of about 3 percentage points, the average increase
in our setting, may be prohibitively large for any one passive institution to achieve, and
coordinating a combined ownership increase among multiple passive institutions may
either be too costly or impose additional regulatory disclosure requirements these
institutions wish to avoid.
Overall, our finding that index assignment corresponds with a shift in passive
ownership confirms that passive institutions are not active in the traditional sense of
trying to accumulate or exit positions since such actions would undo the importance of
index assignment. We now turn to analyzing whether passive ownership and index
assignment affect firms’ governance structures and the potential mechanisms by which
passive investors may exert influence.

IV. How passive investors affect firms’ corporate governance
Many of the largest passive investors, like Vanguard and State Street, express
strong views regarding what constitutes effective governance. In particular, they support
greater board independence and oppose takeover defenses, like poison pills, restrictions
on shareholders’ ability to call special meetings, and dual class shares (see Appendix).
But, do passive investors, whose impact is limited to “voice,” have an effect on corporate
governance? In this section, we investigate these questions using the identification
strategy and instrumental variable estimation described in Section III.
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A. Independent directors
We first assess whether passive institutions exert influence on board composition,
as measured by the percentage of independent directors.

Increasing the percent of

independent directors is a specific concern of many passive investors (see Appendix) and
is one dimension of governance where passive investors have a direct say via their proxy
votes in director elections. Passive investors support for independent director likely stems
from the belief that independent directors are more likely to be effective monitors (Fama
and Jensen (1983), Weisbach (1988)). Table 4 reports results for our IV estimation using
percentage of independent director as the dependent variable.
We find that passive investors do indeed have a significant impact on this key
dimension of corporate governance. We find a statistically significant positive relation
(in most cases at the 1% level) between Quasi-index and the percentage of independent
directors that is robust to various bandwidths and polynomial order controls for market
capitalization. The economic magnitude of the relation is sizable. In the bandwidth of
250 stocks, a 1 percentage point increase in ownership by passive investors is associated
with a 1.42 to 1.58 percentage point increase in number of independent directors on a
firm’s board (Table 4, columns 4–6). Relative to the sample average, this corresponds to
a 9% increase in the share of directors that are independent for a 10% increase in shares
outstanding held by Quasi-index institutions.

In unreported analysis, we find this

increase in director independence is not driven by an increase in board size; to the
contrary, greater ownership by passive institutions is associated with smaller boards. The
magnitudes for board independence are smaller, but still large and statistically significant,
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in the wider bandwidth of 500 stocks (columns 1–3).34
The impact of passive investors on board independence is even larger prior to
changes regarding board independence requirements at the NYSE and Nasdaq exchanges.
In late 2002, both exchanges proposed changes to require that all firms listed on the
exchange have a majority of independent directors, and the SEC approved the proposed
changes in 2003. Consistent with passive investors having more of an influence on board
independence prior to 2003, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in ownership by
passive investors is associated with a 2.27 to 2.72 percentage point increase in number of
independent directors on a firm’s board prior to 2003 in the smaller bandwidth of 250
stocks (Table 5, columns 1–3) but only a 0.74 to 0.78 percentage point increase after
2002 (columns 4–6). The differences in the estimates across time period are statistically
significant at the 5 percent confidence level.35

B. Takeover defenses
We now consider the association between passive investors and two additional
dimensions of corporate governance related to takeover defenses – poison pills and
restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call special meetings. Opposition to takeover

34

Because Riskmetrics only covers firms in the S&P 1500, the sample size in Table 4 is about a third
smaller than the first stage estimates reported in Table 3. However, this reduced sample size does not pose
a problem for our estimation. There is a similar coverage of observations by Riskmetrics across the two
indexes; in our sample that includes the bottom 500 firms of the Russell 1000 and the top 500 firms of the
Russell 2000, 58.3% of the Russell 2000 observations are in the S&P 1500 while 59.7% of the Russell
1000 observations that are in the S&P 1500. The balance is also similar in each of the separate Riskmetrics
databases we use. More importantly, the first stage estimates in the smaller sample of observations with
non-missing data on director independence remain large and statistically significant. This can be seen in
Appendix Table 5A. The first stage estimates for our later estimates in Tables 6, 7, 8, and 11 can be found
in Appendix Tables 5B-5D, respectively. We do not separately report first stage estimates for Tables 9, 10,
and 12 since their samples are comparable to that used in Table 3.
35
While the proposed exchange listing requirements did not become effective until 2004, many firms began
complying in 2003. Given this, we follow Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and use the year 2003 as the
potential breaking point; see Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) for more details.
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defenses are common themes of passive investors’ proxy voting guidelines (see
Appendix). Table 6 reports the results of our IV estimation for each of these variables,
and for brevity, we only report findings using the smaller bandwidth of 250 firms.
Findings when using the wider bandwidth of 500 firms are qualitatively similar.
While poison pills may be in shareholders’ interests under some circumstances,
they are often seen as a mechanism used to shelter managers from the disciplining effects
of hostile takeovers. Specifically, poison pills (formally known as “shareholder rights
plans”) effectively bar any single shareholder from acquiring more than a pre-defined
percentage of shares (often between 10% and 15%) without significantly diluting their
holdings (Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell (2009)). While Coates (2000) notes that essentially
every firm has a “shadow pill” in place because a pill may be implemented by a board at
any time without shareholder approval, having a poison pill in place is still thought to
provide managers with advantages in fighting off hostile bids and unwanted activists.36
Moreover, institutional investors widely call for the redemption of poison pills and
support efforts to subject them to shareholder votes in order to improve the accountability
of managers and boards.37
We find evidence that ownership by passive investors is associated with an
increase in the removal of poison pills. To determine the influence of passive institutions
on the removal of poison pills, we estimate equation (1) with an indicator variable equal
to one if the firm’s poison pill is either withdrawn or allowed to expire and zero
36

As noted by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), “having a pill in place saves the need to install it in ‘the
heat of battle’… [and] signals to hostile bidders that the board ‘will not go easy’.”
37
For example, Dimensional Fund Advisors has a policy to vote against or withhold votes for directors of
corporations that have poison pills with a “dead hand” provision (i.e., those that cannot be redeemed by
new directors) or that are not approved by shareholders.
See the Appendix in
http://us.dimensional.com/media/documents/downloads/pub/pdf/sai/idg_equity_i_sai.pdf. The views of
other large passive institutions, such as Vanguard, regarding poison pills can be found in the Appendix.
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otherwise. These estimates are reported in Table 6. The estimated coefficient when
using a first- or second-order polynomial control for Ln(Mktcap) is positive and
statistically significant (at the 10% level). A one percentage point increase in Quasiindex is associated with a 0.5–0.6 percentage point increase in the likelihood of a poison
pill being removed (Table 6, columns 1–2). We find a similar magnitude when adding a
third-order polynomial control for market cap, but the estimate is not statistically
significant at conventional levels (column 3). The estimate is economically sizable given
that, on average, only 4% of firms remove a poison pill each year.
We next analyze whether ownership by passive investors is associated with a
greater ability for shareholders to call a special meeting, another important aspect of
governance (Daines and Klausner (2001); Cremers and Nair (2005)). Similar to poison
pills, restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call special meetings can represent a potential
impediment to effective governance by delaying dissident shareholders’ ability to remove
directors, and such restrictions, especially if combined with a poison pill, are also seen as
an effective takeover defense for entrenched managers (Daines and Klausner (2001)). To
assess the ability of passive institutions to reduce restrictions on shareholders’ ability to
call special meetings, we estimate equation (1) with an indicator variable equal to one if
the firm eliminates such restrictions, and zero otherwise. These estimates are reported in
columns 4–6 of Table 6.
We find evidence that ownership by passive investors is associated with the
removal of restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call special meetings. The estimated
coefficient is positive and statistically significant in all of the estimations; in particular, a
one percentage point increase in Quasi-index ownership is associated with about a 0.5
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percentage point increase in the likelihood that a firm eliminates restrictions on
shareholders’ ability to call special meetings. Relative to the average share of firms that
lift restrictions each year in our sample, which is about 0.7%, the magnitude is sizable.38

C. Equal voting rights and dual class shares
Finally, we consider whether ownership by passive investors is associated with
whether or not a firm has dual class shares, as determined by Riskmetrics. Passive
institutions uniformly support equal voting rights and oppose dual class shares and other
forms of unequal voting rights (see the Appendix for examples).

Moreover, by

concentrating voting power among insiders, Klausner (2012) argues that dual class shares
are one of the most powerful takeover defenses, and Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010)
find evidence that dual class shares can significantly impact firm value. To assess
whether ownership by passive institutions is associated with fewer dual class share
structures, we construct an indicator that equals one if the firm has dual class shares, and
zero otherwise.

These estimates are reported in Table 7.

We find evidence that

ownership by passive investors is associated with firms being less likely to have dual
class shares. The estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant (at the 5%
level) in all of the estimations; a one percentage point increase in Quasi-index ownership
is associated with about a 5 percentage point decrease in the likelihood that a firm has

38

In unreported analysis, we also analyzed the impact of passive ownership on whether firms have a
classified board, another type of takeover defense that passive institutions typically oppose (see Appendix).
We find suggestive evidence that passive ownership is also associated with firms being less likely to have a
classified board, but the estimates are not statistically significant at conventional levels. The statistically
weaker results for classified boards may partially be an artifact of the time period of our sample; Guo,
Kruse, and Nohel (2008) note that shareholder efforts to de-classify boards intensified significantly in 2003
following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. However, we have only two years of observations for
governance provisions after 2003.
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dual class shares.39

V. Possible mechanisms by which passive investors influence governance
There are many possible mechanisms by which passive investors might influence
a firm’s governance structure. First, relative to retail investors they displace at the top of
the Russell 2000, passive investors may have stronger, more uniform views on what
constitutes an effective governance structure and may be more effective at using their
ownership stake and “voice” to monitor firms and ensure conformity with their views.
Second, relative to the dispersed retail investors they replace, passive investors’
concentrated ownership may facilitate activism by others, such as hedge funds, by
lowering the costs for activists attempting to coordinate votes against management (Brav
et al. (2008), Bradley et al. (2010)).

In this section, we investigate these possible

channels.

A. The power of passive investors’ “voice”
To address whether passive investors’ influence firms’ governance through their
large voting blocs and the power of voice such blocs can wield, we analyze whether
passive ownership is associated with a difference in the amount of shareholder support
for management proposals and support for governance-related shareholder proposals.
We also analyze whether passive ownership is associated with a shift in the types of

39

Unlike poison pills and restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call special meetings, we do not find
evidence that passive ownership is associated with firms being more likely to remove dual class shares.
We only find an association between passive ownership and the indicator for whether a firm has dual class
shares. While the estimates for the removal of dual class shares are suggestive, they are not statistically
significant. This is likely attributed to the relatively small number of companies that make such changes
following their initial public offering; on average, only about 0.9 percent of firms remove a dual class share
structure each year in our sample (and, about 0.8 percent of firms add dual class shares each year).
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proposals being voted on.
We first analyze the amount of support for management proposals. Shareholder
voting at annual meetings is a fundamental duty of shareholders, and votes against
management proposals can be a proxy for increased monitoring by shareholders
(Easterbrook and Fischel (1983)). It is also argued that institutional passive investors may
be more attentive and active in voting than retail investors that directly hold stocks but
lack the time or experience to evaluate management proposals.

To assess whether

passive institutions influence voting outcomes, we estimate equation (1) with the
dependent variable defined as the average percentage of shares that vote in support of
management proposals.
Consistent with increased monitoring of managers, we find that greater ownership
by passive investors is associated with less support for management proposals. The
estimated coefficients are negative and statistically significant (in two cases at the 1%
level), indicating that the greater is the percentage of passive institutional ownership, the
lower is the shareholder support for proposals initiated by management (Table 8, columns
1–3). Again, the economic magnitudes are sizable. On average, a one percentage point
increase in ownership by passive investors is associated, on average, with a 0.85 to 1.07
percentage point decline in support for management proposals. Relative to the sample
average, this corresponds to about a 4% decline in support for a 10% increase in
ownership by Quasi-index institutions. Consistent with institutional investors being more
attentive than individual retail investors, management appears to be confronted with a
more contentious shareholder base when passive investors, who are less able to vote with
their feet, make up a larger percentage of the ownership.
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The decline in support for management proposals does not originate from a shift
in the number or type of management proposals put to a vote. In unreported analysis, we
find that greater ownership by passive investors is not associated with the total number of
management proposals, and we find little evidence of an association with the composition
of proposals. Specifically, we consider the prevalence of the 25 most common types of
management proposals (which account for about 85% of management proposals), and
with the exception of fewer proposals related to adoption of equity incentive plans and
the approval of bonus plans, we detect no systematic difference in the types of proposals
voted on. The lack of difference in the composition of proposals suggests the lower
support for management proposals is not driven by managers submitting a greater number
of less-shareholder-friendly proposals.40
We next analyze support for shareholder proposals and find evidence that
ownership by passive investors is associated with an overall increase in support for
governance-related shareholder proposals. While these proposals are non-binding, they
potentially increase pressure on boards to make changes to firms’ governance. On
average, a one percentage point increase in ownership by passive investors is associated
with a 0.87–1.25 percentage point increase in support for governance proposals (Table 8,
columns 4–6). While the increase in support is not statistically significant at conventional
levels when adding second- or third-order polynomial controls (p-values 0.102 and 0.100,
respectively), the implied magnitudes are economically large. Relative to the sample
average, a 10% increase in ownership by passive investors is associated with a 9%–13%

40

We also only find weak evidence that the lower support for management proposals translates into fewer
management proposals being passed; the point estimates are negative, but not statistically significant at
conventional levels. The lack of difference in the total number of proposals passed is likely attributable to
many management proposals being related to routine business matters.
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increase in support for shareholder proposals. The lower statistical significance likely
reflects the relatively small number of such proposals. Finally, with the exception of
fewer proposals related to corporate social responsibility (CSR), we find no relation
between ownership by passive investors and differences in the types of shareholder
proposals voted on.
Overall, our findings regarding shareholder votes support the possibility that the
voice of passive investors has a significant impact on corporate governance of firms.

B. Increased activism by others
Another possible mechanism by which passive ownership might influence firms’
governance structure is by facilitating activisms by others. In particular, the size and
concentration of passive investors’ ownership stakes may increase activist investors’
ability to rally support for their demands (Brav et al. (2008), Bradley et al. (2010)).
Bringing just a few of these large investors on board can lend creditability to an activist
campaign, and activists are known to gauge the support of firms’ largest passive
institutional investors before pursuing demands from management. Such added pressure
from activist investors might also explain a number of the governance differences we
observe.
We find no evidence, however, that greater ownership by passive investors is
associated with more hedge fund activism; if anything, we find suggestive evidence of
less activism among firms with greater passive ownership. To determine the influence of
passive institutions on hedge fund activism, we estimate equation (1) with an indicator
variable equal to one if the firm experiences a hedge fund activism event, as defined in
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Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) and Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010), and zero
otherwise.41 These estimates are reported in Table 9. The point estimates are always
negative, and while not statistically significant at conventional levels, the estimates are
economically large. In the 250 bandwidth, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in
quasi-index ownership is associated with at 0.26 to 0.44 percentage point decline in the
likelihood of hedge fund activism (p-values = 0.11, 0.11, and 0.12 when including
polynomial controls of order N = 1, 2, and 3, respectively). This magnitude is large given
that a firm’s likelihood of an activism event in a given year in our sample is, on average,
only 1.3%.
The absence of increased activism, however, does not negate the possibility that
the concentration of passive investors’ ownership stakes increases the threat of activism
by others, or that this threat increases the influence of passive investors “voice”.
Concerned about an increased threat of activism, managers may be responding to the
views of passive investors and be taking actions even on issues not necessarily subject to
shareholder votes, such as poison pills, to preempt an actual activist campaign.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that informal discussions between passive institutions and
managers, backed up with the threat of voice, are often used to exert influence.42 Such
preemptive actions would reduce the need for activism and could explain the suggestive
41

We thank Alon Brav for making these data on hedge fund activism events available to us. The database
is an updated sample [1994-2011] using the same data collection procedure and estimation methods as in
Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) and Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010). For more information on how
the
database
is
constructed,
please
see
https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~brav/HFactivism_SEPTEMBER_2013.pdf.
42
Glenn Booraem, controller of Vanguard funds, notes that engagement with directors and management of
companies is a key component of Vanguard’s governance program, and that Vanguard has “found through
hundreds of discussion every year” that it is “frequently able to accomplish as much—or more—through
dialogue” as through voting (see Booream (2013)). And in a speech from October 2014, the CEO and
Chairman of the Vanguard group, F. William McNabb, noted that Vanguard sent out 923 letters to firms in
2013, 358 of which requested specific changes in governance, and that 80 of these companies had adopted
substantive changes without having to go through a shareholder proposal (see McNabb (2014)).
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decline in actual activism events.

VI. Do passive investors affect firm performance or corporate policies?
Ownership by passive investors might also be associated with differences in firm
performance, managerial compensation, or corporate policies. Overall performance or
corporate policies might differ if the observed differences in governance associated with
passive investors help mitigate managerial agency conflicts or if managers adjust
corporate policies so as to preempt hedge fund activism campaigns that rely on the
support of passive investors. We now explore this possibility.

A. Overall performance
There is considerable debate about the value implications of various governance
structures or whether the potential influence of passive investors will necessarily improve
firm performance. Because greater board independence, fewer antitakeover defenses,
and the absence of dual class shares arguably increase shareholder rights, one might
expect that passive ownership mitigates agency conflicts and is associated with improved
performance. However, theory suggests that board independence might be a result rather
than a cause of performance (Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)), and the empirical
evidence regarding the performance implications of board independence is mixed (e.g.,
Bhagat and Black (2002); Hermalin and Weisbach (2003)).

Likewise, the value

implication of removing poison pills and other takeover defenses is debatable (e.g., Stein
(1988), Coates (2000)). More broadly, one might also argue that the optimal governance
structure may vary considerably across firms (e.g., Coles, Daniel, Naveen (2008);
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Duchin, Matsusaka, Ozbas (2010)), and hence, the potential “one-size-fits-all”
governance view of passive investors may not always represent an improvement for
individual firms.
Consistent with the governance structure promoted by passive investors having a
positive impact on performance for the average firm, we find evidence that ownership by
passive investors is related to an overall improvement in firms’ future performance, as
measured using firms’ return on assets (ROA). Although passive ownership is not
associated with significant differences in firms’ overall ROA in our main specification
(Table 10, columns 1-3), it is positively associated with firms’ ROA after adding controls
for whether a firm switched indexes that particular year (columns 4-6). This is because
improvements in performance may take time to manifest, and one would not expect to
find a relation between changes in passive ownership and performance for firms that just
switched indexes. Consistent with this, we find that adding controls for such recent
movers reveals a positive and statistically significant association between passive
ownership and ROA.

On average, a 10 percent increase in passive ownership is

associated with about a fifth of a standard deviation increase in ROA. In unreported
estimates, we also find that passive ownership is positively associated with Tobin’s Q,
another commonly used measure of firm performance.43

B. Executive compensation
There has been much debate regarding managerial pay and whether its growth

43

Similar to ROA, we find a positive association between passive ownership and Tobin’s Q only after
controlling for whether a firm switched indexes that year. Importantly, our earlier estimates for governance
and vote outcomes are unaffected by the inclusion of the additional controls for whether a firm switched
indexes that year. These robustness tests are discussed in Section VII.A.
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reflects an efficient market outcome or an agency conflict and passive investors
commonly discuss the importance of using compensation to properly reward and
incentivize managers (see proxy-voting guidelines in the Appendix).

It is unclear,

however, whether or how passive investors might weigh into this debate regarding
compensation.

To assess whether passive ownership affects CEO compensation

structure, we examine total CEO pay, its composition, and the sensitivity of CEO pay to
stock price movements.
We find less evidence that ownership by passive investors is associated with a
difference in overall managerial pay. When using the wider bandwidth of 500 firms, a
one percentage point increase in Quasi-index is associated with a decline in total pay
(Table 11, columns 1-3), and the estimate is statistically significant when using either a
first- or second-order polynomial control for Ln(Mktcap). However, the point estimates
tend to decrease and are not statistically significant when using the 250-stock bandwidth
(columns 4-6). In unreported analysis, we find no evidence that passive ownership is
associated with differences in the composition of managerial pay (salary, bonuses, and
grants of restricted stock, each scaled by total pay) or the sensitivity of total CEO pay to
stock price movements (as measured using the delta or vega of the manager’s stock
portfolio; see Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013) for variable definitions). Thus, for
our sample at least, passive institutions appear to have a relatively small impact on
decisions regarding executive compensation. However, it is important to note that our
sample predates the implementation of “Say on Pay” by the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.
This provision, which requires nonbinding votes on executive pay packages, potentially
provides an added mechanism for passive investors to influence compensation
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decisions.44

C. Cash, dividend, financing, and investment policies
There is an extensive literature addressing the relation between corporate
ownership structure and payout policy; for example, agency theories suggest that better
monitoring by shareholders might lead to lower cash levels and higher payouts in the
form of dividends (Jensen (1986), La Porta et al. (2000)).

To examine whether

ownership by passive investors is associated with differences in cash and dividends, we
estimate equation (1) with the log of cash holdings in year t and the ratio of common
dividends paid during year t to market value of equity at the end of year t. The results are
reported in Table 12.
Consistent with either improved governance or managers responding to an
increased threat of activism, we find evidence of both a decrease in cash holdings and an
increase in the dividend yield. The estimated coefficient on Ln(Cash) is negative and
statistically significant (Table 12, columns 1-3). The implied magnitudes are large;
relative to the sample average, a 10% increase in Quasi-index is associated with about an
8% decline in cash holdings. The decline in cash holdings corresponds with an increase
in dividend payouts. The estimated coefficient on Dividend yield is positive in all three
estimations and significant (at the 10% level) when using a first- or second-order control
for Ln(Mktcap) (columns 4–5). Relative to the sample average, a 10% increase in Quasi44

These findings might also support anecdotal evidence that passive investors focus more attention on
overall governance of the firm than on issues related to managerial pay. For example, while Vanguard
provides clear guidance on how it views specific governance-related votes, such as those related to
independent directors and board declassification, it is more deferent to managers and directors regarding
issues of pay. For example, Vanguard states, “While we do not want to determine the policies of the
companies in which we invest–that is appropriately left to their boards and management, we believe that
the following principles are critical in linking compensation and shareowner value.” See
https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard-proxy-voting/executive-compensation/.
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index is associated with about a 2% increase in firms’ dividend yield. These findings are
consistent with the earlier findings of Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2014), which finds
an association between total institutional ownership and both dividends and cash
holdings, using a similar estimation involving the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff.45
We find relatively little evidence that ownership by passive investors is associated
with corporate policies related to investment or capital structure. We do find some
evidence of fewer equity issuances, but this does not appear to translate into a significant
difference in firms’ overall leverage.

The estimated coefficient on Leverage is

insignificant and economically small. In unreported results, we also find little evidence
of a difference in firms’ debt issuances, capital expenditures, R&D expenses, or
acquisitions. These findings are consistent with anecdotal evidence that passive investors
lack the resources necessary to research and influence corporate policies that are
inherently more firm-specific.

VII. Additional robustness checks and choice of specification
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our IV estimates. In particular, we
demonstrate that our findings are not sensitive to how we measure end-of-May market
caps, to adding additional controls, or to instead using alternative definitions of passive
institutional ownership as our key explanatory variable. We also discuss our choice of
specification with respect to other recent papers that have used the construction of the
Russell indexes to analyze other questions.
45
The findings are qualitatively similar if we instead use a payout ratio and scale firms’ annual dividends
by their net income. On average, a one standard deviation increase in Quasi-index is associated with a
quarter of a standard deviation increase in firms’ payout ratio, though the estimates are not statistically
significant at conventional levels (p-values of 0.16, 0.15, and 0.35 when using polynomial controls of order
N = 1, 2, and 3, respectively).
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A. Robustness to choice of controls, choice of bandwidth, and placebo tests
The assumption of our identification strategy is that after limiting the sample to
stocks close to the threshold and controlling for the one factor that determines index
membership (i.e., end-of-May market cap), index membership does not directly affect our
outcomes of interest except through its effect on ownership by passive investors. This is
the exclusion restriction of the IV estimation. However, because Russell Investments uses
a proprietary method to calculate firms’ total market caps, we are only able to imperfectly
control for the underlying market cap used to determine index assignment.46
Our findings, however, are robust to using alternative ways to measure firms’
end-of-May market cap. In particular, using the noisy end-of-May market caps obtained
directly from Russell to measure Mktcap does not affect our findings. This is shown in
Appendix Table 6, where we re-estimate our main IV regressions for the period 19982006 using the 250 bandwidth with second-order polynomial controls for Ln(Mktcap)
after replacing the CRSP market cap with the Russell-provided market cap for the years
2002-2006. The estimates are nearly the same as before; in particular, we still find a
strong association between higher ownership by passive investors and more independent
directors, fewer restrictions on special meetings, fewer dual class share structures, less
support for managerial proposals, less cash, and greater payouts. In fact, the drop in
hedge fund activism becomes statistically significant at the 10% confidence level when
46

According to Russell’s documentation, their proprietary calculation of market capitalization includes
some ownership stakes, like common stock, non-restricted exchangeable shares, and partnership units, but
excludes other forms of shares, such as preferred stock or redeemable shares (Russell 2013). The share
price chosen by Russell to compute market capitalization can also vary for firms that have multiple share
classes or did not trade on the last day of May. Similar to Mullins (2014), we contacted Russell
Investments and were only able to obtain a noisy measure their proprietary measure of market
capitalizations for the years 2002 through 2006. Russell does not have the data prior to 2002. See Mullins
(2014) for more details regarding the likely sources for this noise.
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using Russell, rather than CRSP, to calculate end-of-May market capitalization. We also
continue to find a positive association between ROA and passive ownership after
controlling for recent movers.

Our findings are also robust to instead using the

Compustat security monthly file to determine end-of-May market cap. These findings are
reported in Appendix Table 7.
Our findings are also robust to controlling for firms’ industry, to controlling for
whether a firm switched indexes that year, and to controlling for a stock’s liquidity. If we
add 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects to the specification, we still find that passive
ownership is associated with more independent directors, more poison pill removals,
fewer restrictions on special meetings, fewer dual class share structures, and less support
for managerial proposals. These findings are reported in Appendix Table 8. Our findings
are also largely unaffected if we add two additional controls to account for firms that
moved from the Russell 1000 to the Russell 2000 that year, and vice versa. These
findings are reported in Appendix Table 9. If such switchers differ in other dimensions
and represent a disproportionate share of either index, this could affect our earlier
estimates. However, with the exception of the point estimate for dividend yield, which is
no longer statistically significant, all of the findings are robust to the inclusion of these
controls. And, as already shown in Section VI.A, the association between ROA and
passive ownership is positive and statistically significant when we control for recent
moves. Finally, in unreported tests, we find that our estimates are unaffected by the
inclusion of additional controls for a stock’s liquidity, such as the Amihud measure of
illiquidity or a stock’s average bid-ask spread.
Our estimates are also robust to our choice of bandwidth around the Russell
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1000/2000 threshold. This is shown in Appendix Figure 1, where we plot the point
estimates and 95th percentile confidence intervals when varying the bandwidth between
100 and 500 firms and using a first-order polynomial control for Ln(Mktcap); estimates
are reported for both the first stage and IV specifications of Tables 3-12. While the IV
estimates are noisier at smaller thresholds, which is when the first stage estimates are also
noisier and statistically insignificant, the estimates are relatively similar across the
various bandwidths, and there is no evidence to indicate that our findings are sensitive to
the choice of bandwidth.
Finally, in further support that our findings are not driven by omitted variables
that may be correlated with firms’ end-of-May market cap, we do not find an association
between passive ownership and our outcomes of interest in placebo IV tests that use
alternative thresholds. For example, if we restrict the sample to the top 500 firms of the
Russell 2000, and replace our R2000 indicator with an indicator for the bottom 250 firms
of this subsample, our IV estimation does not detect an effect of passive ownership on
any of our outcomes. Likewise, we do not find an effect of passive ownership in a
similar placebo test that uses the bottom 500 firms of the Russell 1000.

B. Robustness to alternative definitions of passive ownership
An advantage of our identification strategy is that it does not depend on our
ability to classify institutional investors. Because the IV estimation only uses variation in
institutional ownership that is driven by passive funds attempting to minimize their
tracking errors across the two Russell indexes, the exclusion restriction is satisfied when
using either total institutional ownership as the key explanatory variable to be
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instrumented or a narrower measure of passive institutional ownership, as we use in this
paper. The interpretation of the local average treatment effect we estimate will remain the
same with either measure.

We confirm this in unreported tests in which we find

qualitatively similar results when using total institutional ownership (rather than quasiindex ownership) as the main explanatory variable.
For our main analysis, we measure the ownership stake of passive investors by
summing up the ownership of institutions classified as quasi-indexers by Bushee (2001).
Bushee defines quasi-indexers as institutions with low turnover and highly diversified
portfolios, and this categorization likely captures most passive institutions. Consistent
with this, we find that three of the largest institutions most commonly associated with
passive investing, Barclays Bank (which owned iShares during our sample period), State
Street, and Vanguard, are classified as quasi-indexers.
Our findings are also robust to using alternative definitions of passive investors.
In particular, if we instead measure passive ownership as just the sum of holdings by
Barclays Bank, State Street, and Vanguard, we get similar findings. In unreported first
stage estimates, we find that being assigned to the Russell 2000 is associated with a very
large and statistically significant increase in the combined holdings of these three passive
institutions; they account for about half of the 2-4 percentage point increase in Quasiindex ownership shown in Table 3. Moreover, our IV estimations become larger and
more statistically significant when we use the combined ownership of these three firms as
the explanatory variable instead of all quasi-index ownership. This can be seen in
Appendix Table 10.47 In unreported estimates, the findings are also similar if we do not

47

For our main analysis, however, we prefer to use the broader classification of passive investors that
includes all quasi-indexers. Because some passive investors are excluded in the narrower definition, the
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use Bushee’s “permanent” classification and instead use the time-varying classifications
provided by Bushee or restrict the measure of passive ownership to institutions that are
classified as a quasi-indexer in every year of our sample period. These findings provide
additional confidence that our earlier estimates are capturing the influence of passive
investors and that the IV estimation is not sensitive to how we measure passive
ownership.

C. Alternative specification choices
A seemingly attractive alternative approach to estimating the effect of passive
investors in our setting would be to make use of regression discontinuity estimation. This
approach would make use of the discontinuity in ownership by passive investors imposed
between the 1000th and 1001st largest firms at the end of May each year to identify their
effect on corporate outcomes. An advantage of this approach would be the ability to
focus on a subset of firms very close to cutoff, thus reducing concerns that the estimation
is not adequately controlling for the one variable that determines index assignment—the
end-of-May market caps calculated by Russell—or other possible differences among
firms that might be correlated with a firm’s index assignment even after conditioning on
market capitalization and other controls.
If the variable used to determine index assignment, end-of-May market
capitalization, was perfectly observable, then researchers interested in determining the
effect of the being assigned to the Russell 2000 could estimate the following sharp
regression discontinuity estimation:

R2000 instrumental variable may also affect the outcomes of interest through its effect on the ownership
stake of other passive investors.
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N

Yit = α + γ R 2000it + ∑ φn ( Rankit − 1000) n + ε it
n =1

where Y is the outcome of interest for firm i in year t, Rank is the ranking of firm i in year
t in terms of end-of-May market capitalization (e.g., the 995th largest firm would have a
rank of 995), and R2000 is, as in the specification above, an indicator that equals one for
firms assigned to the Russell 2000. The sample could then be restricted to firms very
close to the cutoff threshold of Rank = 1000, and the polynomial order of controls, N,
could also be varied.48 The above estimation of γ would identify the effect of being
assigned to Russell 2000 on outcome Y by testing for a discontinuity in Y between the
1000th and 1001st largest firms, as determined using end-of-May market capitalization.
It is not possible to estimate the above equation, however, since the market
capitalization used by Russell to determine firms’ index assignment at the end of May is
not observable to the econometrician. Specifically, Russell calculates firms’ market
capitalization using a proprietary calculation that does not perfectly match up to market
capitalizations reported elsewhere, such as in CRSP, and because of this, econometricians
can only imperfectly predict firms’ index assignments.
Some have proposed switching to a fuzzy regression discontinuity to overcome
this problem (see e.g., Mullins (2014)). In particular, fuzzy regression estimation could
be achieved by estimating Equation (3) and using Treatment as an instrument for R2000,
where Treatment is an indicator that equals one for firms with a Rank greater than 1000,
where Rank is determined using end-of-May market capitalizations.

48

N

One could also add an additional set of controls, R 2000it × ∑ n =1 ( Rankit − 1000) n , to allow the functional

form of the relation between Rank and outcome Y to vary above and below the cutoff. See Angrist and
Pischke (2009), Lee and Lemieux (2010), and Roberts and Whited (2013) for more details regarding
regression discontinuity estimations.
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(3)

We do not use the end-of-May market capitalization as an instrument in a fuzzy
regression discontinuity, however, because even the market caps provided by Russell
(and used in Mullins (2014)), are a weak predictor of index assignment near the cutoff.
As can be seen in the top panel of Appendix Figure 2, having a ranking above or below
1000 is a poor predictor of being in the Russell 2000 for firms near threshold between the
1000th and 1001st largest firms. In fact, firms with a ranking of 995-1000 are equally
likely to be in the Russell 2000 as firms ranked 1001-1005. While the predictive power
of end-of-May market caps is better further from this threshold, this is not helpful in that
fuzzy regression discontinuity estimations rely on a discontinuity in probability of
treatment at the threshold, not at points further away from the threshold (Angrist and
Pischke (2009), Lee and Lemieux (2010), Roberts and Whited (2013)). Absent such a
discontinuity, the estimation will suffer from a weak instrument problem.
The weakness of using fuzzy regression discontinuity estimation in this setting
can be further seen in a graph of average quasi-index ownership by firms’ ranking in the
vicinity of the threshold. This is shown in the bottom panel of Appendix Figure 2, which
provides a graphical representation of the reduced form version of the fuzzy regression
discontinuity estimation. As shown in Appendix Figure 2, there is no meaningful jump in
passive investors close to the 1000/2000 threshold using this approach. The reason is that
each missed index assignment is introducing considerable noise in the estimation. For
example, every firm ranked between 950 and 1000 that is actually in the Russell 2000
will likely be at the top of their index (and hence receive a large jump in ownership by
passive investors), while every firm ranked between 1001 and 1050 that is actually in the
Russell 1000 will likely be at the bottom of their index. This correlation in the structure
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of noise near the threshold can also cause a fuzzy RD estimation to yield estimates that
are the opposite of the true effect, thus potentially explaining why Mullins (2014) finds a
counterintuitive decrease in institutional ownership for firms at the top of the Russell
2000.49
We also do not use the actual rankings assigned by Russell in a regression
discontinuity framework, as done in Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2014) and Lu
(2013). If actual Russell-assigned rankings, rather than end-of-May market cap rankings,
are instead used to calculate the forcing variable, Rank, then other variables will no
longer be continuous at the threshold, which violates the underlying identification
assumption of the regression discontinuity (Angrist and Pischke (2009), Lee and Lemieux
(2010), Roberts and Whited (2013)). In particular, there will be a discontinuity in firms’
float-adjusted market cap since Russell resorts firms within each index based on their
float-adjusted market cap after index assignments are made; firms at the bottom of the
Russell 1000 will have a smaller float-adjusted market cap than firms at the top of the
Russell 2000. This is seen in the top half of Appendix Figure 3, where we plot the
average Ln(float-adjusted market cap) by firms’ Russell-assigned ranking. On average,
the firm with a Russell-assigned ranking of 1000 (i.e., the bottom firm in the Russell
1000) has a float-adjusted market cap that is more than two log points smaller than the

49

See the appendix of Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2014) for more details. Chang, Hong, and
Liskovich (2014) also use a fuzzy regression discontinuity in this setting to analyze the price effects of
additions and deletions from a market index, but their RD estimation is considerably different. Because
they are interested in the immediate price effects of firms that switch indexes, their fuzzy regression
discontinuity makes use of stocks that move from one index to the other each year. Limiting the analysis to
such movers does not make sense in our setting because many of the governance and corporate outcomes
we study are unlikely to respond immediately to such moves or when such moves are transitory (i.e., the
stock switches back the following year).
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firm with a Russell-assigned ranking of 1001 (i.e., the top firm in the Russell 2000).50 To
avoid such concerns, we choose to use a broader IV estimation that makes use of stocks’
index assignment for variation in passive ownership.

VIII. Conclusion
While there is a large literature that studies the important governance role of
active investors, like hedge funds and pension funds, there is surprisingly little analysis of
passive institutions like Vanguard, State Street, and DFA, which represent an
increasingly important component of U.S. stock ownership. This lack of focus on passive
institutional investors likely stems from a common presumption that passive investors
lack both the motives and resources to monitor their large and diverse portfolios. Yet,
there are multiple reasons why passive investors may have a vested interest in affecting
firms’ governance structures and why their ownership stakes might play an important role
in firms’ policy choices. For example, the size and concentration of their ownership stake
can have a significant influence on the outcome of shareholder votes and increase the
threat of activism by facilitating activist investors’ ability to rally support for their
demands. Economies of scale may also allow passive institutional investors to be more
effective at monitoring managers than retail investors that directly hold stocks, and at
ensuring compliance with what they consider to be an effective governance structure for
the average firm.
50

Using May 31st CRSP market capitalization to determine rankings (within the actual assigned index), as
done in a robustness check by Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2014), will be problematic for a similar
reason. Because firms are resorted within an index using total end-of-May CRSP market caps in this
alternative approach, there will now exist a discontinuity in Ln(Mktcap) near the threshold. The firm with
the smallest end-of-May CRSP Mktcap within the Russell 1000 will be assigned a rank of 1000, while the
firm with the largest end-of-May CRSP Mktcap within the Russell 2000 will be assigned a rank of 1001.
This discontinuity occurs because the CRSP market caps are only a noisy predictor of the true, but
unobserved, forcing variable. This is shown in Appendix Figure 3.
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To examine whether passive institutions affect firms’ governance, and if so, by
which mechanisms, we exploit variation in passive institutional ownership that occurs
around the cutoff used to construct the Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 indexes.
Benchmarking to these indexes leads to a jump in ownership by passive institutions for
stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 relative to stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000.
Thus, we instrument passive institutional ownership with an indicator for being assigned
to the Russell 2000 in a given year and analyze the influence of passive investors in an
economically important sample of large U.S. publicly listed firms. Our instrumental
variable estimation relies on the assumption that after conditioning on firms’ market
capitalization, which determines index assignment, inclusion in the Russell 2000 index
does not directly affect our governance or corporate outcomes except through its impact
on ownership by passive investors.
Our findings suggest that while passive institutional investors are not “active” in
the traditional sense of accumulating or selling shares in a target company with the
express purpose of influencing management, they are not entirely “passive” either. In
particular, we find that ownership by passive institutions is associated with more
independent directors on a board, more poison pill removals, the elimination of
restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call special meetings, and fewer dual class share
structures. The observed differences in actual governance structures suggests that passive
institutions may be more attentive to firms’ governance structures than the retail investors
they displace, and that they use their large voting blocs to exert influence. For example,
we find that higher passive institutional ownership is associated with less support for
management proposals and a greater support for shareholder-initiated governance
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proposals. While we do not find direct evidence that the concentrated ownership of
passive investors facilitates activism by other, non-passive investors, it is possible that
managers and boards are particularly sensitive to the views of passive investors because
their presence (and potential dissatisfaction) increases the threat of activism by other
investors.
The growing influence of passive investors appears, on average, to have a positive
impact on long-term firm-level performance and value. If we add controls for firms that
switch indexes during reconstitution, so as to better isolate the longer-term impact of
passive ownership, we find evidence that, on average, greater passive ownership is
associated with an improvement in performance. We also find that passive ownership is
associated with a decrease in firms’ cash holdings, an increase in dividends, and a
suggestive decline in managerial compensation. These findings are consistent with the
observed differences in governance having a positive influence on firm value.
Our findings, however, do not resolve the ongoing debate regarding the value
implications of various governance structures, including board independence,
antitakeover defenses, and equal voting rights for shareholders, and whether the optimal
governance structure may vary across firms in ways that do not always conform to the
proxy-voting guidelines of the largest passive institutions. The findings also do not
address whether passive investors attempt to determine the individual governance needs
of each company in their large portfolios or instead follow a “check the box” approach to
governance. While some large passive investors do vary their voting strategies across
firms in ways that are not consistent with such a one-size-fits-all approach to governance
(e.g., see Davis and Han, (2007)), additional analysis regarding these questions would
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seem to be a promising direction for further research.
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Figure 1
Growth of passive investors, 1984-2010
This figure plots the percent ownership stake of quasi-index institutional investors, as
defined in Bushee (2001), between 1984 and 2010 for the total market, the Russell 1000
index, and the Russell 2000 index.
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Figure 2
Portfolio weights in the Russell 1000 and 2000 by within-index ranking for 2006
This figure plots the portfolio weights of the bottom 500 firms in the Russell 1000 index and the
top 500 firms in the Russell 2000 index for the end-of-June 2006. Observations are ordered by
their within-index ranking such that rankings of 1 and 1000 represent the firms with the largest
and 1000th largest portfolio weight in the index, respectively. The portfolio weights are given as
a percent.
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Figure 3
Market capitalization, index assignment, and ownership by market cap rankings for the
bottom 500 firms of Russell 1000 and top 500 firms of Russell 2000
This figure plots the average end-of-May Ln(market capitalization), fraction of firm-year
observations in the Russell 2000, and quasi-index, transient, and dedicated institutional ownership
(%) by ranking, where ranking is determined using end-of-May market capitalization, as reported
in CRSP. The sample includes the bottom 500 firms of the Russell 1000 and the top 500 firms of
the Russell 2000, as determined using end-of-June Russell-assigned portfolio weights for each
index. Institutional ownership is calculated as of September each year, and all averages are
calculated using bins of 25 firms and data from 1998-2006.
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Table 1
Summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics for our key variables. Summary statistics are reported separately for our two main
samples: firms in the 250 and 500 bandwidths around the cutoff between the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes. Definitions
for all variables are provided in Appendix Table 1. Accounting variables are winsorized at the 1% level, and we delete
observations where the ratio of institutional shares owned to shares outstanding is missing or greater than 1.

Institutional ownership %
Quasi-index %
Dedicated %
Transient %
Independent director %
Poison pill removal
Greater ability to call special meeting
Indicator for dual class shares
Mngt. proposal support %
Shareholder gov. proposal support %
Indicator for hedge fund activism
ROA
Ln(Cash)
Dividend yield
Ln(Total CEO pay)

Obs.

500 bandwidth
Mean Median

SD

8,268
8,268
8,268
8,268
5,604
5,472
3,552
3,552
2,485
408
8,268
8,061
8,019
8,011
5,633

64.5
39.1
9.2
16.1
65.3
0.04
0.006
0.12
84.9
39.2
0.014
0.03
4.53
0.149
7.85

22.2
15.3
9.1
10.7
17.9
0.19
0.07
0.32
12.0
23.7
0.12
0.11
1.51
0.03
0.87
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68.3
39.7
7.15
14.2
66.7
0
0
0
87.9
38.0
0
0.04
4.72
0.003
7.88

Obs.

250 bandwidth
Mean Median

SD

4,105
4,105
4,105
4,105
2,685
2,708
1,740
1,740
1,219
190
4,105
3,998
3,983
3,976
2,657

63.6
38.3
9.2
16.0
64.9
0.04
0.007
0.12
85.0
35.9
0.014
0.03
4.51
0.144
7.83

23.2
16.1
9.7
10.7
18.2
0.18
0.08
0.33
11.8
22.5
0.12
0.11
1.49
0.03
0.84

67.8
39.3
6.9
14.2
66.7
0
0
0
87.5
31.5
0
0.04
4.72
0.002
7.85

Table 2
First-stage estimation, impact of index assignment on institutional ownership
This table reports estimates of our first-stage regression of institutional holdings on an
indicator for membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional controls. Specifically, we
N

n

IOit = η + λ R2000it + ∑ χ n ( Ln( Mktcapit ) ) + σ Ln( Float )it + δ t + u it
n =1

where R2000 it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if stock i is in the Russell 2000 Index at end
of June in year t , Mktcap it is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i measured at
May 31 in year t , Float it is the float-adjusted market value of equity (provided by Russell)
at June 30 in year t , and δ t are year fixed effects. IO it measures institutional ownership
for stock i at the end of September in year t . In this table we use four different definitions
for IO for stock i : (1) the percentage of shares outstanding owned by all institutional
investors (from 13F filings); (2) the percentage of shares outstanding owned by "quasiindexers" as classified by Bushee (2001); (3) the percentage of shares outstanding owned
by “dedicated” institutions as classified by Bushee; and (4) the percentage of shares
outstanding owned by “transient” institutional as classified by Bushee. The Bushee
classifications are defined in the text. The sample consists of the top 500 firms in the
Russell 2000 index and bottom 500 firms of the Russell 1000 index (i.e., bandwidth = 500)
for which we obtain 13F holdings data from Thomson/IDC and which we match with data
from the monthly CRSP file. The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 period. The
symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Percent of firm's common shares held by:
Dependent variable =

R2000

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects
# of firms
Observations
R-squared

All
institutions

Quasiindex

Dedicated

Transient

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

1.974*
(1.068)

2.756***
(0.661)

-0.742
(0.609)

0.013
(0.501)

500
3
yes
yes

500
3
yes
yes

500
3
yes
yes

500
3
yes
yes

2,318
8,268
0.18

2,318
8,268
0.21

2,318
8,268
0.02

2,318
8,268
0.05
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Table 3
Robustness of first stage estimation for quasi-index ownership
This table reports estimates of our first-stage regression of quasi-index ownership onto an
indicator for membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional controls. Specifically, we
estimate
N
n

Quasi -index it = η + λ R2000it + ∑ χ n ( Ln( Mktcapit ) ) + σ Ln( Float )it + δ t + u it
n =1

where R2000 it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if stock i is in the Russell 2000 Index at end of
June in year t , Mktcap it is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i measured at May 31
in year t , Float it is the float-adjusted market value of equity (provided by Russell) at June 30
in year t , and δ t are year fixed effects. Quasi-index it is the percentage of shares
outstanding owned by quasi-index institutions, as classified by Bushee (2001), for stock i at the
end of September in year t . The Bushee classifications are defined in the text. The data
consist of firms in the two Russell indexes for which we obtain 13F holdings data from
Thomson/IDC and which we match with data from the monthly CRSP file. The model is
estimated over the 1998-2006 period using bandwidths of 500 firms (columns 1-3) and 250
firms (columns 4-6) around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold, and polynomial order controls for
Ln(Mktcap ) of N = 1, 2, and 3. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Quasi-index %

Dependent variable =
(1)
R2000

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects
# of firms
Observations
R-squared

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

3.820*** 3.974*** 2.756*** 3.006*** 2.999*** 2.041***
(0.637) (0.630) (0.661)
(0.715) (0.701)
(0.763)
500
1
yes
yes

500
2
yes
yes

500
3
yes
yes

250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

2,318
8,268
0.20

2,318
8,268
0.20

2,318
8,268
0.21

1,566
4,105
0.25

1,566
4,105
0.25

1,566
4,105
0.25
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Table 4
Ownership by passive investors and the percentage of independent directors
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable
estimation used to identify the effect of institutional ownership by passive investors on the
percentage of independent board directors. Specifically, we estimate
N

n

Yit = α + β Quasi -index it + ∑ θn ( Ln( Mktcapit )) + γ Ln( Float )it + δ t + ε it
n =1

where Y it is the percentage of independent directors on the board of firm i in year t (from
Riskmetrics), Quasi-index it is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by quasi-index
institutions (as classified by Bushee (2001)) for stock i at the end of September in year t ,
Mktcap it is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i measured at May 31 in year t ,
and Float it is the float-adjusted market value of equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in
year t , and δ t are year fixed effects. We instrument Quasi-index in the above estimation
using R2000 it , an indicator equal to one if firm i is part of the Russell 2000 index in year t.
The Bushee classifications are defined in the text. The data consist of firms in the two
Russell indexes for which we obtain 13F holdings data from Thomson/IDC and which we
match with data from the monthly CRSP file. The model is estimated over the 1998-2006
period using bandwidths of 500 firms (columns 1-3) and 250 firms (columns 4-6) around the
Russell 1000/2000 threshold, and polynomial order controls for Ln(Mktcap ) of N = 1, 2,
and 3. Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level. The symbols ** and *** indicate
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Independent director %

Dependent variable =
(1)
Quasi-index %

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects
# of firms
Observations

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.885** 0.941*** 0.771** 1.415*** 1.579*** 1.407***
(0.347) (0.360) (0.381) (0.416) (0.459) (0.490)
500
1
yes
yes

500
2
yes
yes

500
3
yes
yes

250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

1,570
5,604

1,570
5,604

1,570
5,604

1,037
2,685

1,037
2,685

1,037
2,685
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Table 5
Passive ownership and independent directors, pre- versus post-2002
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable
estimation used to identify the effect of institutional ownership by passive investors on the
percentage of independent board directors both before and after the 2002 change in
exchange-listing requirements regarding board independence. The estimation is the same
as in Table 4, except we now separately estimate the model over the 1998-2002 and 20032006 time periods using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold,
and polynomial order controls for Ln(Mktcap ) of N = 1, 2, and 3. Standard errors, ε, are
clustered at the firm level. The symbols ** and *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
Independent director %

Dependent variable =

Sample years = 1998-2002
(1)
Quasi-index %

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects
# of firms
Observations

(2)

(3)

2.270** 2.720** 2.484**
(0.887) (1.162) (1.262)

Sample years = 2003-2006
(4)

(5)

(6)

0.778** 0.774** 0.738
(0.333) (0.384) (0.491)

250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

858
1,616

858
1,616

858
1,616

502
1,069

502
1,069

502
1,069
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Table 6
Ownership by passive investors and takeover defenses
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable
estimation used to identify the effect of institutional ownership by passive investors on
takeover defense outcomes. Specifically, we estimate
N

n

Yit = α + β Quasi -index it + ∑ θn ( Ln( Mktcapit )) + γ Ln( Float )it + δ t + ε it
n =1

where Y it is the governance variable for firm i in year t , Quasi-index it is the percentage
of shares outstanding owned by quasi-index institutions (as classified by Bushee (2001))
for stock i at the end of September in year t , Mktcap it is the CRSP market value of
equity of stock i measured at May 31 in year t , and Float it is the float-adjusted market
value of equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t , and δ t are year fixed effects.
The governance variables investigated in this table, from Shark Repellent (Factset) and
Riskmetrics, are: an indicator for either the withdrawal or expiration (without renewal) of
a poison pill in year t , and an indicator for there being fewer restrictions on shareholders'
ability to call a special meeting in year t. We instrument Quasi-index in the above
estimation using R2000 it , an indicator equal to one if firm i is part of the Russell 2000
index in year t. The Bushee classifications are defined in the text. The data consist of
firms in the two Russell indexes for which we obtain 13F holdings data from
Thomson/IDC and which we match with data from the monthly CRSP file. The model is
estimated over the 1998-2006 period using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell
1000/2000 threshold and first, second, and third polynomial order controls for
Ln(Mktcap ). Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level. The symbols *, **, and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable =

Poison pill removal
(1)

Quasi-index %

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects
# of firms
Observations

0.005*
(0.003)

(2)

(3)

0.006* 0.011
(0.003) (0.008)

Greater ability to
call special meeting
(4)

(5)

(6)

0.005**
(0.002)

0.005*
(0.003)

0.006*
(0.003)

250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

1,087
2,708

1,087
2,708

1,087
2,708

1,000
1,740

1,000
1,740

1,000
1,740
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Table 7
Ownership by passive investors and dual class shares
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental
variable estimation used to identify the effect of institutional ownership by passive
investors on the likelihood of dual class shares. Specifically, we estimate
N

n

Yit = α + β Quasi -index it + ∑ θ n ( Ln( Mktcapit ) ) + γ Ln( Float )it + δ t + ε it
n =1

where Y it is an indicator equal to 1 if firm i has dual class shares in year t according
to Riskmetrics, Quasi-index it is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by
quasi-index institutions (as classified by Bushee (2001)) for stock i at the end of
September in year t , Mktcap it is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i
measured at May 31 in year t , and Float it is the float-adjusted market value of
equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t , and δ t are year fixed effects. We
instrument Quasi-index in the above estimation using R2000 it , an indicator equal to
one if firm i is part of the Russell 2000 index in year t. The Bushee classifications
are defined in the text. The data consist of firms in the two Russell indexes for
which we obtain 13F holdings data from Thomson/IDC and which we match with
data from the monthly CRSP file. The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 period
using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold, and
polynomial order controls for Ln(Mktcap ) of N = 1, 2, and 3. Standard errors, ε, are
clustered at the firm level. The symbol ** indicates significance at the 5% level.
Dependent variable =

Quasi-index %

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects
# of firms
Observations

Indicator for dual class shares
(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.047**
(0.019)

-0.064**
(0.027)

-0.066**
(0.031)

250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

1,000
1,740

1,000
1,740

1,000
1,740
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Table 8
Ownership by passive investors and shareholder support for proposals
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental
variable estimation to identify the effect of institutional ownership by passive investors
on shareholder support for management proposals and shareholder-initiated
governance proposals. Specifically,
we estimate
N
n
Yit = α + β Quasi -index it + ∑ θ n ( Ln( Mktcapit )) + γ Ln( Float )it + δ t + ε it
n =1

where Y it is either the average percentage of shareholders that vote along with
management proposals at annual meetings for i in year t (from Riskmetrics) or the
average percentage of shareholders that vote in support of a shareholder-initiated
governance proposal for firm i in year t (from Riskmetrics), Quasi-index it is the
percentage of shares outstanding owned by quasi-index institutions (as classified by
Bushee (2001)) for stock i at the end of September in year t , Mktcap it is the CRSP
market value of equity of stock i measured at May 31 in year t , and Float it is the
float-adjusted market value of equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t , and
δ t are year fixed effects. We instrument Quasi-index in the above estimation using
R2000 it , an indicator equal to one if firm i is part of the Russell 2000 index in year t.
The Bushee classifications are defined in the text. The data consist of firms in the
two Russell indexes for which we obtain 13F holdings data from Thomson/IDC and
which we match with data from the monthly CRSP file. The model is estimated over
the 1998-2006 period using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000
threshold, and polynomial order controls for Ln(Mktcap ) of N = 1, 2, and 3.
Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable =

Quasi-index %

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects
# of firms
Observations

Management
proposal support %

Governance
proposal support %

(1)

(4)

(2)

(3)

-0.871***-0.862***-1.002*
(0.296) (0.296) (0.513)

(5)

(6)

0.872** 1.111 1.253
(0.443) (0.679) (0.763)

250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

751
1,219

751
1,219

751
1,219

122
190

122
190

122
190
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Table 9
Ownership by passive investors and hedge fund activism
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable
estimation used to identify the effect of institutional ownership by passive investors on the
likelihood of hedge fund activism. Specifically, we estimate
N

n

Yit = α + β Quasi -index it + ∑ θn ( Ln( Mktcapit )) + γ Ln( Float )it + δ t + ε it
n =1

where Y it is an indicator equal to 1 if firm i experiences a hedge fund activism event in year
t , as defined in Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) and Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010),
Quasi-index it is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by quasi-index institutions (as
classified by Bushee (2001)) for stock i at the end of September in year t , Mktcap it is the
CRSP market value of equity of stock i measured at May 31 in year t , and Float it is the floatadjusted market value of equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t , and δ t are year
fixed effects. We instrument Quasi-index in the above estimation using R2000 it , an
indicator equal to one if firm i is part of the Russell 2000 index in year t. The Bushee
classifications are defined in the text. The data consist of firms in the two Russell indexes for
which we obtain 13F holdings data from Thomson/IDC and which we match with data from
the monthly CRSP file. The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 period using a bandwidth
of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold, and polynomial order controls for
Ln(Mktcap ) of N = 1, 2, and 3. Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level.
Dependent variable =

Indicator for hedge fund activism event

Quasi-index %

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects
# of firms
Observations
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(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.0026
(0.0016)

-0.0026
(0.0016)

-0.0044
(0.0029)

250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

1,566
4,105

1,566
4,105

1,566
4,105

Table 10
Ownership by passive investors and firms' return on assets
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable
estimation used to identify the effect of institutional ownership by passive investors on firms'
performance, as measured using firms' return on assets (ROA). Specifically, we estimate
N

n

Yit = α + β Quasi -index it + ∑ θn ( Ln( Mktcapit )) + γ Ln( Float )it + δ t + ε it
n =1

where Y it is the ROA for firm i in year t , Quasi-index it is the percentage of shares
outstanding owned by quasi-index institutions (as classified by Bushee (2001)) for stock i at
the end of September in year t , Mktcap it is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i
measured at May 31 in year t , and Float it is the float-adjusted market value of equity
(provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t , and δ t are year fixed effects. We instrument
Quasi-index in the above estimation using R2000 it , an indicator equal to one if firm i is part
of the Russell 2000 index in year t. The specification in columns (1)-(3) are the same as in
earlier tables, but in columns (4)-(6), we add two additional controls to the specification: an
indicator that equals one for firms that are in the Russell 2000 index in year t but were in the
Russell 1000 in year t-1 , and an indicator that equals one for firms that are in the Russell
1000 index in year t but were in the Russell 2000 index in year t-1 . The Bushee
classifications are defined in the text. The data consist of firms in the two Russell indexes for
which we obtain 13F holdings data from Thomson/IDC and which we match with data from
the monthly CRSP file. The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 period using a bandwidth
of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and first, second, and third polynomial
order controls for Ln(Mktcap ). Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level. The
symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
ROA

Dependent variable =
(1)
Quasi-index %

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects
Controls for movers
# of firms
Observations

(2)

(3)

-0.0007 -0.0003 0.0006
(0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0027)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.0058** 0.0061** 0.0121*
(0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0064)

250
1
yes
yes
no

250
2
yes
yes
no

250
3
yes
yes
no

250
1
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes
yes

1,520
3,998

1,520
3,998

1,520
3,998

1,520
3,998

1,520
3,998

1,520
3,998
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Table 11
Ownership by passive investors and CEO compensation
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental
variable estimation used to identify the effect of institutional ownership by passive
investors on the total CEO compensation. Specifically, we estimate
N

n

Yit = α + β Quasi -index it + ∑ θ n ( Ln( Mktcapit )) + γ Ln( Float )it + δ t + ε it
n =1

where Y it is the log of total CEO compensation for firm i in year t (from
Execucomp), Quasi-index it is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by quasiindex institutions (as classified by Bushee (2001)) for stock i at the end of
September in year t , MktCap it is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i
measured at May 31 in year t , and Float it is the float-adjusted market value of
equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t , and δ t are year fixed effects. We
instrument Quasi-index in the above estimation using R2000 it , an indicator equal to
one if firm i is part of the Russell 2000 index in year t . The Bushee classifications
are defined in the text. The data consist of firms in the two Russell indexes for
which we obtain 13F holdings data from Thomson/IDC and which we match with
data from the monthly CRSP file. The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 period
using bandwidths of 500 firms (columns 1-3) and 250 firms (columns 4-6) around the
Russell 1000/2000 threshold, and polynomial order controls for Ln(Mktcap ) of N =
1, 2, and 3. Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level. * and ** indicate
statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
Ln(CEO total pay)

Dependent variable =
(1)
Quasi-index %

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects
# of firms
Observations

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

-0.046* -0.042** -0.051 -0.025 -0.022 -0.062
(0.024) (0.021) (0.031) (0.037) (0.033) (0.075)
500
1
yes
yes

500
2
yes
yes

500
3
yes
yes

250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

1,501
5,633

1,501
5,633

1,501
5,633

996
2,657

996
2,657

996
2,657
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Table 12
Ownership by passive investors, cash holdings, and dividend policy
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable estimation
used to identify the effect of institutional ownership by passive investors on corporate decisions
regarding cash holdings and payout policy. Specifically, we estimate
N

n

Yit = α + β Quasi -index it + ∑ θ n ( Ln( Mktcapit )) + γ Ln( Float )it + δ t + ε it
n =1

where: Y it is cash it , defined as the log of cash holdings for firm i in year t , or Payout it , defined as
the ratio of common dividends to net income for firm i in year t (data from Compustat); Quasiindex it is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by quasi-index institutions (as classified by
Bushee (2001)) for stock i at the end of September in year t ; MktCap it is the CRSP market value of
equity of stock i measured at May 31 in year t ; and Float it is the float-adjusted market value of
equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t , and δ t are year fixed effects. We instrument Quasiindex in the above estimation using R2000 it , an indicator equal to one if firm i is part of the Russell
2000 index in year t. The Bushee classifications are defined in the text. The data consist of firms in
the two Russell indexes for which we obtain 13F holdings data from Thomson/IDC and which we
match with data from the monthly CRSP file. The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 period using
a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and polynomial controls for
Ln(Mktcap ) of order N = 1, 2, and 3. Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level. The symbols
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Ln(cash)

Dependent variable =
(1)
Quasi-index %

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects
# of firms
Observations

Dividend yield

(2)

(3)

-0.101*** -0.100*** -0.100*
(0.028)
(0.027)
(0.046)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.0008*
(0.0004)

0.0008*
(0.0004)

0.0010
(0.0008)

250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

1,516
3,983

1,516
3,983

1,516
3,983

1,514
3,976

1,514
3,976

1,514
3,976
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Appendix
Excerpts from Fund Governance/Voting Policies
In this appendix, we provide excerpts regarding the voting policies of various
institutional investors that offer index-related investment products. A common theme of
these governance/voting policies is (1) to either withhold support or vote against boards
that are not sufficiently independent, and (2) broadly oppose takeover defenses, like
poison pills, restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call a special meeting, dual class
shares, and classified boards. Some institutions also provide guidance regarding their
views related to equity issuances, executive pay, and corporate social responsibility
initiatives, which we also provide some excerpts of here.

A. Blackrock: Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Securities51
•

We expect that a board should be majority independent. We believe that
an independent board faces fewer conflicts and is best prepared to protect
shareholder interests.

•

Where a poison pill is put to a shareholder vote, our policy is to examine
these plans individually. Although we oppose most plans, we may support
plans that include a reasonable ‘qualifying offer clause.’ Such clauses
typically require shareholder ratification of the pill, and stipulate a sunset
provision whereby the pill expires unless it is renewed.

•

We believe that classification of the board dilutes shareholders’ right to
evaluate promptly a board’s performance and limits shareholder selection
of their representatives. By not having the mechanism to immediately
address concerns we may have with any specific director, we may be
required to register our concerns through our vote on the directors who are
subject to election that year. Furthermore, where boards are classified,
director entrenchment is more likely, because review of board service
generally only occurs every three years. Therefore, we typically vote
against classification and for proposals to eliminate board classification.

51

http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-guidelinesus.pdf
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•

In exceptional circumstances and with sufficiently broad support,
shareholders should have the opportunity to raise issues of substantial
importance without having to wait for management to schedule a meeting.
We therefore believe that shareholders should have the right to call a
special meeting in cases where a reasonably high proportion of
shareholders (typically a minimum of 15% but no higher than 25%) are
required to agree to such a meeting before it is called.

•

BlackRock supports the concept of equal voting rights for all shareholders.
Some management proposals request authorization to allow a class of
common stock to have superior voting rights over the existing common or
to allow a class of common to elect a majority of the board. We oppose
such differential voting power as it may have the effect of denying
shareholders the opportunity to vote on matters of critical economic
importance to them.

B. Dimensional Fund Advisors: Prospectus (Statement of Additional Information)52

52

•

Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from Inside Directors and Affiliated
Outside directors when:
 Independent directors make up less than a majority of
directors.

•

Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from the entire board of directors
(except new nominees, who should be considered CASE-BY-CASE) for
the following:



The board adopts a poison pill with a term of more than 12
months (“long-term pill”), or renews any existing pill,
including any “short-term” pill (12 months or less), without
shareholder approval.



The board is classified, and a continuing director
responsible for a problematic governance issue at the
board/committee
level
that
would
warrant
a
withhold/against vote recommendation is not up for
election. All appropriate nominees (except new) may be
held accountable.

http://us.dimensional.com/media/documents/downloads/pub/pdf/sai/idg_equity_i_sai.pdf
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•

Generally vote AGAINST proposals to create a new class of common
stock unless:



•

The new class is not designed to preserve or increase the
voting power of an insider or significant shareholder.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on all other proposals to increase the number of
shares of common stock authorized for issuance. Take into account
company-specific factors that include, at a minimum, the following:



The company's use of authorized shares during the last
three years



The dilutive impact of the request as determined by an
allowable increase calculated by ISS (typically 100 percent
of existing authorized shares) that reflects the company's
need for shares and total shareholder returns.

C. State Street Global Advisors: Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines – US53
•

In principle, SSgA believes independent directors are crucial to good
corporate governance and help management establish sound corporate
governance policies and practices. A sufficiently independent board will
most effectively monitor management and perform oversight functions
necessary to protect shareholder interests.

•

SSgA will support mandates requiring shareholder approval of a
shareholder rights plans (“poison pill”) and repeals of various antitakeover related provisions. In general, SSgA will vote against the
adoption or renewal of a US issuer’s shareholder rights plan (“poison
pill”).
SSgA generally supports annual elections for the board of directors. In
certain cases, SSgA will support a classified board structure; if the board
is composed of 80 percent independent directors, the board’s key
committees (auditing, nominating and compensation) are composed of
independent directors, and consideration of other governance factors,
including, but not limited to, shareholder rights and antitakeover devices.

53

http://www.ssga.com/library/capb/713689_Proxy_Voting_and_Engagement_Guidelines_US_1_CCRI139659505
4 .pdf
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•

SSgA will vote for shareholder proposals related to special meetings at
companies that give shareholders (with a minimum 10% ownership
threshold) the right to call for a special meeting in their bylaws if:



The current ownership threshold to call for a special
meeting is above 25% of outstanding shares.

SSgA will vote for management proposals related to special meetings.

•

SSgA will not support proposals authorizing the creation of new classes of
common stock with superior voting rights and will vote against new
classes of preferred stock with unspecified voting, conversion, dividend
distribution, and other rights. In addition, SSgA will not support
capitalization changes that add “blank check” classes of stock (i.e. classes
of stock with undefined voting rights) or classes that dilute the voting
interests of existing shareholders.
However, SSgA will support capitalization changes that eliminate other
classes of stock and/or unequal voting rights.

•

SSgA considers numerous criteria when examining equity award
proposals. Generally, SSgA does not vote against plans for lack of
performance or vesting criteria … There are numerous factors that we
view as negative, and together, may result in a vote against a proposal.

D. Vanguard: Proxy Voting Guidelines54

54

•

Good governance starts with a majority-independent board, whose key
committees are comprised entirely of independent directors. As such,
companies should attest to the independence of directors who serve on the
Compensation, Nominating, and Audit committees.

•

A company's adoption of a so-called poison pill effectively limits a
potential acquirer's ability to buy a controlling interest without the
approval of the target's board of directors. Such a plan, in conjunction with
other takeover defenses, may serve to entrench incumbent management
and directors. However, in other cases, a poison pill may force a suitor to
negotiate with the board and result in the payment of a higher acquisition
premium. In general, shareholders should be afforded the opportunity to
approve shareholder rights plans within a year of their adoption.

https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard-proxy-voting/voting-guidelines/
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•

The funds will generally support proposals to declassify existing boards
(whether proposed by management or shareholders), and will block efforts
by companies to adopt classified board structures in which only part of the
board is elected each year.

•

The funds support shareholders’ right to call special meetings of the board
(for good cause and with ample representation) and to act by written
consent. The funds will generally vote for proposals to grant these rights
to shareholders and against proposals to abridge them.

•

We are opposed to dual-class capitalization structures that provide
disparate voting rights to different groups of shareholders with similar
economic investments. We will oppose the creation of separate classes
with different voting rights and will support the dissolution of such
classes.

•

Bonus plans, which must be periodically submitted for shareholder
approval to qualify for deductibility under Section 162(m) of the Internal
Revenue Code, should have clearly defined performance criteria and
maximum awards expressed in dollars. Bonus plans with awards that are
excessive in both absolute terms and relative to a comparative group
generally will not be supported.

•

Often, proposals [related to corporate social policy] may address concerns
with which the Board philosophically agrees, but absent a compelling
economic impact on shareholder value (e.g., proposals to require
expensing of stock options), the funds will typically abstain from voting
on these proposals. This reflects the belief that regardless of our
philosophical perspective on the issue, these decisions should be the
province of company management unless they have a significant, tangible
impact on the value of a fund's investment and management is not
responsive to the matter.
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Ind. Directors

First Stage

Poison Pill

5.5

4.5

0.01

3.5

2.5

0.005

0.5

0

-1.5

-0.005

1.5
-0.5

0.01

0.01

Mngt. Prop. Support

Dual Class Ind.

Special Meeting

0

-0.04
-1.25

0.0025
-0.09
-0.005

-0.14

Gov. Prop. Support
2

-2.5

HF Activism Ind.
0.0015

1.25

ROA
0.020

-0.001

0.5

0.005

-0.25

-0.0035

-1

-0.006

-0.010

Ln(Cash)

Ln(CEO pay)

Dividend Yield

0.04

0.0035

0.000
0.002

-0.07

-0.060

0.0005
-0.18

-0.120
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-0.001
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Appendix Figure 1
Point estimates in the 100 through 500 bandwidths around the threshold
This figure plots the point estimate and 95th percentile confidence intervals by bandwidth choice
for the outcomes reported in Tables 3-12. The first stage and IV estimations are the same as in
Tables 3-9, 11, 12 and columns 4-6 of Table 10 except the bandwidth is varied between 100 and
500 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. A first-order polynomial control for
Ln(Mktcap) is also included in all estimations.
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Fraction of firms in Russell 2000

1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
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1050
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1000

1025

1050

Quasi-index ownerhip %

50
48
46
44
42
40
38
36

Ranking using Russell-provided end-of-May market capitalization

Appendix Figure 2
Probability of treatment and quasi-index ownership by ranking near the Russell
1000/2000 threshold using Russell-provided market capitalizations
This figure plots the average fraction of firm-year observations in the Russell 2000 and percent
quasi-index ownership by size ranking for the 950th to 1050th largest firms, where ranking is
determined using end-of-May market capitalization numbers provided directly by Russell
Investments for firms in the Russell 1000/2000 indices between 2002 and 2006. Averages are
calculated using bins of five rankings and data from 2002-2006.
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Ln(Float-adjusted market cap)
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Within-index ranking using end-of-May market capitalization

Appendix Figure 3
Average Ln(Float) and Ln(Mktcap) by ranking, where ranking is calculated using
either float-adjusted portfolio weights assigned by Russell or within-index rankings
based on end-of-May market capitalizations
The top panel of this figure plots the average Ln(float-adjusted market cap) by Russell
Determined rankings for the bottom 50 firms in the Russell 1000 index and the top 50 firms in the
Russell 2000 index for the years 1998-2006. A ranking of 1000 reflects the firm with the lowest
portfolio weight in the Russell 1000 index, while a ranking of 1001 reflects the firm with the
highest portfolio weight in the Russell 2000 index. The bottom panel of this figure plots the
average Ln(end-of-May CRSP market cap) by size ranking for firms ranked between 950 and
1050, where ranking is determined using within-index end-of-May CRSP market caps. A
ranking of 1000 reflects the firm with the lowest end-of-May market cap in the Russell 1000
index, while a ranking of 1001 reflects the firm with the highest end-of-May market cap in the
Russell 2000 index. Averages are calculated using bins of five rankings for the years 1998-2006.
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Appendix Table 1
Variable definitions
Variable Name

Source

R2000
Russell Investments
Institutional ownership %
Thomson/CDA 13F files
Quasi-index %
Brian Bushee website
Dedicated %
Brian Bushee website
Transient %
Brian Bushee website
Independent director %
Riskmetrics (Directors)
Poison pill removal
Shark Repellent (FactSet)
Greater ability to call spec. meet. Riskmetrics (Governance)
Indicator for dual class shares
Riskmetrics (Governance)
Mngt. proposal support %
Riskmetrics (Voting Results)
Shareholder gov. prop. support % Riskmetrics (Voting Results)
Indicator for hedge fund activism Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010)
ROA
Compustat
Ln(Cash)
Compustat
Dividend yield
Compustat
Ln(Total CEO pay)
Execucomp

Definition
Indicator equal to 1 if firm is in the Russell 2000
% of shares outstanding held by institutional investors in September of year t
% of shares outstanding held by quasi-indexer institutions in September of year t
% of shares outstanding held by dedicated insitutions in September of year t
% of shares outstanding held by transient insitutions in September of year t
% of board seats held by directors classified as independent by Riskmetrics
Indicator equal to 1 if poison pill is withdrawn or allowed to expire at time t
Indicator equal to 1 if shareholders better able to call a special meeting at time t
Indicator equal to 1 if a firm has dual class shares at time t
Percentage of 'Yes" votes for management proposals
Percentage of 'Yes" votes for sharehold governance proposals
Indicator equal to 1 if a firm has an activism event at time t
Net income (ni ) / total assets (at )
Ln(Cash and short term securities (che ))
Common dividends (dvc ) normalized by market value of equity (prcc_f *csho )
Ln(Total CEO compensation (tdc1 ))
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Appendix Table 3
First stage estimation for transient institutional ownership
This table reports estimates of our first-stage regression of transient institutional ownership
onto an indicator for membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional controls. The
specification is the same as in Table 3, except that the dependent variable is now Transient it ,
which is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by transient institutions, as classified by
Bushee (2001), for stock i at the end of September in year t .
Transient %

Dependent variable =

R2000

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects
# of firms
Observations
R-squared

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.421
(0.495)

0.363
(0.493)

0.013
(0.501)

0.475
(0.572)

0.257
(0.570)

0.259
(0.573)

500
1
yes
yes

500
2
yes
yes

500
3
yes
yes

250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

2,318
8,268
0.05

2,318
8,268
0.05

2,318
8,268
0.05

1,566
4,105
0.08

1,566
4,105
0.08

1,566
4,105
0.08
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Appendix Table 4
First stage estimation for dedicated institutional ownership
This table reports estimates of our first-stage regression of dedicated institutional ownership
onto an indicator for membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional controls. The
specification is the same as in Table 3, except that the dependent variable is now
Dedicated it , which is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by dedicated institutions,
as classified by Bushee (2001), for stock i at the end of September in year t .
Dedicated %

Dependent variable =

R2000

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects
# of firms
Observations
R-squared

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

-0.757
(0.602)

-0.837
(0.570)

-0.742
(0.609)

-0.750
(0.768)

-0.851
(0.700)

-0.743
(0.831)

500
1
yes
yes

500
2
yes
yes

500
3
yes
yes

250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

2,318
8,268
0.02

2,318
8,268
0.02

2,318
8,268
0.02

1,566
4,105
0.01

1,566
4,105
0.01

1,566
4,105
0.01
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Appendix Table 5A
First-stage estimations for Table 4
This table reports estimates of our first-stage regression of quasi-index ownership onto an indicator
for membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional controls. The specification is the same as in
Table 3, but we now restrict our sample to the smaller subsample of observations with non-missing
Riskmetrics (Directors) data on board independence. Specifically, these are the first-stage estimates
for the IV estimates reported in Table 4. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Quasi-index %

Dependent variable =
(1)
R2000

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects

1st stage estimate for…

# of firms
Observations
R-squared

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

3.668*** 3.552*** 3.279*** 3.892*** 3.663*** 3.380***
(0.752) (0.762) (0.758) (0.888) (0.930) (0.905)
500
1
yes
yes

500
2
yes
yes

500
3
yes
yes

250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

Table 4,
Col (1)

Table 4,
Col (2)

Table 4,
Col (3)

Table 4,
Col (4)

Table 4,
Col (5)

Table 4,
Col (6)

1,570
5,604
0.21

1,570
5,604
0.21

1,570
5,604
0.21

1,037
2,685
0.22

1,037
2,685
0.22

1,037
2,685
0.22

159

Appendix Table 5B
First-stage estimation for Tables 6 & 7
This table reports estimates of our first-stage regression of quasi-index ownership onto an
indicator for membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional controls. The specification is
the same as in Table 3, but we now restrict our sample to the smaller subsample of observations
with non-missing Shark Repellent (FactSet) data on poison pills or non-missing Riskmetrics
(Governance) data on shareholders' ability to call special meetings and dual class share
structures. Specifically, these are the first-stage estimates for the IV estimates reported in
Tables 6 and 7. *** indicates significance at the 1% level; ** indicates significance at the 5%
level; * indicates significance at the 10% level.
Quasi-index %

Dependent variable =
(1)
R2000

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects

1st stage estimate for…

# of firms
Observations
R-squared

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

3.207*** 3.160*** 1.735* 3.262*** 2.824** 2.556**
(0.892) (0.843) (0.967) (1.094) (1.124) (1.108)
250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

Table 6, Table 6, Table 6, Table 6, Table 6, Table 6,
Col (1) Col (2) Col (3) Col (4) Col (5) Col (6)
1,087
2,708
0.251

1,087
2,708
0.251

160

1,087
2,708
0.257

1,000
1,740
0.18

1,000
1,740
0.18

1,000
1,740
0.18

Appendix Table 5C
First-stage estimation for Table 8
This table reports estimates of our first-stage regression of quasi-index ownership onto an indicator
for membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional controls. The specification is the same as
in Table 3, but we now restrict our sample to the smaller subsample of observations with nonmissing Riskmetrics (Voting Results) data on % support for management proposals and shareholderintitiated governance proposals. Specifically, these are the first-stage estimates for the IV estimates
reported in Table 8. *** indicates significance at the 1% level; ** indicates significance at the 5%
level.
Quasi-index %

Dependent variable =
(1)
R2000

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects

1st stage estimate for…

# of firms
Observations
R-squared

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

4.242*** 4.209*** 3.111** 8.554*** 6.894** 6.537**
(1.138) (1.136) (1.297) (2.787) (3.174) (3.154)
250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

Table 8, Table 8, Table 8, Table 8, Table 8, Table 8,
Col (1) Col (2) Col (3) Col (4) Col (5) Col (6)
758
1,219
0.20

758
1,219
0.20

161

758
1,219
0.21

122
190
0.20

122
190
0.21

122
190
0.21

Appendix Table 5D
First-stage estimation for Table 11
This table reports estimates of our first-stage regression of quasi-index ownership onto an indicator for
membership in the Russell 2000 index plus additional controls. The specification is the same as in Table
3, but we now restrict our sample to the smaller subsample of observations with non-missing Execucomp
data on total CEO pay. Specifically, these are the first-stage estimates for the IV estimates reported in
Table 11. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Quasi-index %

Dependent variable =
(1)
R2000

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects

1st stage estimate for…

# of firms
Observations
R-squared

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

2.443*** 2.682*** 2.062*** 1.732* 1.912** 1.221
(0.740) (0.725) (0.776) (1.004) (0.944) (1.083)
500
1
yes
yes

500
2
yes
yes

500
3
yes
yes

250
1
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
3
yes
yes

Table 11, Table 11, Table 11, Table 11, Table Table 11,
Col (1)
Col (2) Col (3) Col (4) 11, Col Col (6)
1,501
5,633
0.16

1,501
5,633
0.16

162

1,501
5,633
0.17

996
2,657
0.17

996
2,657
0.17

996
2,657
0.17

Appendix Table 6
Robustness of findings to using Russell-provided market capitalization
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable estimation to identify the effect of institutional ownership by
passive indexers on our governance and corporate outcome variables when we instead measure end-of-May market caps using Russell-provided
market caps for the years 2002-2006. The estimation and outcomes are the same as in Tables 4-12, except Mktcap it is the Russell-provided end-ofMay market cap of stock i in year t , except when it is missing (i.e., years 1998-2001), in which case, we use the CRSP market value of equity of stock
i measured at May 31 in year t. We instrument Quasi-index using R2000 it , an indicator equal to one if firm i is part of the Russell 2000 index in
year t . The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 period using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and a second
polynomial order control for Ln(Mktcap ). To demonstrate the robustness of the association between passive ownership and longer-term performance,
we include the additional controls for recent movers, used in columns 4-6 of Table 10, when analyzing ROA (column 8). Standard errors, ε, are
clustered at the firm level. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Poison
Ind.
pill
Dep. variable = directors
%
removal
(1)
Quasi-index %

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects
# of firms
Observations

(2)

1.329*** 0.005
(0.391) (0.003)

Ability to
Mngt.
Gov.
Ind. for
HF
call
proposal proposal
dual class
activism
special
support support
shares
event
meeting
%
%
(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.005** -0.027** -0.825*** 0.724
(0.002) (0.012) (0.288) (0.776)

(7)

ROA

Ln(cash)

(8)

(9)

Dividend Ln(total
yield CEO pay)
(10)

-0.003* 0.007*** -0.088*** 0.001*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.028) (0.0004)

(11)

-0.008
(0.024)

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

1,037
2,685

1087
2,708

1000
1,740

1,000
1,740

758
1219

122
190

1,566
4,105

1,520
3,998

1,516
3,983

1,514
3,976

996
2,657

163

Appendix Table 7
Robustness of findings to using Compustat market capitalization
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable estimation to identify the effect of institutional ownership by
passive indexers on our governance and corporate outcome variables when we instead measure end-of-May market caps using Compustat The
estimation and outcomes are the same as in Tables 4-12, except that Mktcap it is the the Compustat market value of equity of stock i measured at May
31 in year t . We instrument Quasi-Index in the above estimation using R2000 it , an indicator equal to one if firm i is part of the Russell 2000 index in
year t . The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 period using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and a second
polynomial order control for Ln(Mktcap ). To demonstrate the robustness of the association between passive ownership and longer-term performance,
we include the additional controls for recent movers, used in columns 4-6 of Table 10, when analyzing ROA (column 8). Standard errors, ε, are clustered
at the firm level. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Poison
Ind.
pill
Dependent variable = directors
%
removal
(1)

Quasi-index %

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects
# of firms

Observations

(2)

1.765*** 0.005**
(0.457) (0.002)

Ability to
Mngt.
Gov.
Ind. for
HF
call
proposal proposal
dual class
activism
special
support support
shares
event
meeting
%
%
(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.004** -0.064*** -0.898*** 1.139*
(0.002) (0.0209) (0.295) (0.610)

(7)

ROA

Ln(cash)

(8)

(9)

Dividend Ln(CEO
yield
pay)
(10)

-0.0022 0.005** -0.090*** 0.0008**
(0.0014) (0.002) (0.027) (0.000)

(11)

-0.012
(0.030)

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

983
2,562

1,016
2,536

943
1,652

943
1,652

711
1,159

115
181

1,470
3,887

1,425
3,785

1,422
3,773

1,419
3,763

939
2,523

164

Appendix Table 8
Robustness of findings to including industry fixed effects
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable estimation to identify the effect of institutional ownership by
passive indexers on our governance and corporate outcome variables when we add 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects. The data, outcome variables, and
specification are the same as in Tables 4-12 except that we now also include 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects in the specification. The model is
estimated over the 1998-2006 period using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and a second polynomial order control for
Ln(Mktcap ). To demonstrate the robustness of the association between passive ownership and longer-term performance, we include the additional
controls for recent movers, used in columns 4-6 of Table 10, when analyzing ROA (column 8). Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level. The
symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Ind.
Poison
pill
Dependent variable = directors
%
removal
(1)
Quasi-index %

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects
2-digit industry FE
# of firms
Observations

(2)

1.182*** 0.005*
(0.333) (0.003)

Ability to
Mngt.
Gov.
Ind. for
HF
call
proposal proposal
dual class
activism
special
support support
shares
event
meeting
%
%
(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.005** -0.044** -0.858*** 0.734
(0.002) (0.018) (0.312) (0.607)

(7)

-0.0026
(0.0016)

ROA

Ln(cash)

(8)

(9)

Divide nd Ln(Total
yie ld CEO pay)
(10)

-0.001 -0.099*** 0.0002
(0.002) (0.028) (0.0002)

(11)

-0.001
(0.024)

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

1,037
2,685

1,087
2,708

1,000
1,740

1,000
1,740

758
1,219

122
190

1,566
4,105

1,520
3,998

1,516
3,983

1,514
3,976

996
2,657

165

Appendix Table 9
Robustness of findings to including controls for firms that recently switched indexes
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable estimation to identify the effect of institutional ownership by
passive indexers on our governance and corporate outcome variables when we add controls to account for firms that recently switched indexes.
Specifically, the data, outcome variables, and specification are the same as in Tables 4-12 except that we now two additional controls to the specification:
an indicator that equals one for firms that are in the Russell 2000 index in year t but were in the Russell 1000 in year t-1 , and an indicator that equals one
for firms that are in the Russell 1000 index in year t but were in the Russell 2000 index in year t-1 . The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 period
using a bandwidth of 250 firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and a second polynomial order control for Ln(Mktcap ). Standard errors, ε, are
clustered at the firm level. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Ind.
Poison
pill
Dependent variable = directors
%
removal
(1)
Quasi-index %

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects
Controls for recent movers
# of firms
Observations

(2)

1.315*** 0.005*
(0.445) (0.003)

Gov.
Ability to Ind. for Mngt.
HF
call
dual
proposal proposal
activism
special
class
support support
event
meeting shares
%
%
(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

ROA

Ln(cash)

Dividend
yield

Ln(Total
CEO
pay)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

0.003** -0.052*** -1.319** 1.306** -0.0047** 0.006** -0.149*** 0.0004 -0.037
(0.002) (0.016) (0.548) (0.651) (0.0023) (0.003) (0.0486) (0.0005) (0.052)

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes
yes

1,037
2,685

1087
2,708

1000
1,740

1,000
1,740

751
1,219

122
190

1,566
4,105

1,520
3,998

1,516
3,983

1,514
3,976

996
2,657

166

Appendix Table 10
Robustness of findings to using only ownership of Barclays Bank, State Street, and Vanguard
This table reports estimates of the second-stage regression of our instrumental variable estimation to identify the effect of aggregate institutional ownership
by Vanguard, State Street, and Barclays Bank on our governance and corporate outcome variables. Specifically, we estimate
N

n

Yit = α + β Passive it + ∑ θ n ( Ln( Mktcapit )) + γ Ln( Float )it + δ t + ε it
n=1

where: Y it is the outcome variable for firm i in year t ; Passive it is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by Barclays Bank, State Street, and
Vanguard of stock i at the end of September in year t ; Mktcap it is the CRSP market value of equity of stock i measured at May 31 in year t ; and
Float it is the float-adjusted market value of equity (provided by Russell) at June 30 in year t , and δ t are year fixed effects. The outcome variables
investigated in this table are the same as in earlier tables, and we instrument Passive in the above estimation using R2000 it , an indicator equal to one if
firm i is part of the Russell 2000 index in year t. The data consist of firms in the two Russell indexes for which we obtain 13F holdings data from
Thomson/IDC and which we match with data from the monthly CRSP file. The model is estimated over the 1998-2006 period using a bandwidth of 250
firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold and a second polynomial order control for Ln(Mktcap ). To demonstrate the robustness of the association
between passive ownership and longer-term performance, we include the additional controls for recent movers, used in columns 4-6 of Table 10, when
analyzing ROA (column 8). Standard errors, ε, are clustered at the firm level. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Ind.
Dependent variable = directors
%
(1)
Passive %

Bandwidth
Polynomial order, N
Float control
Year fixed effects
# of firms
Observations

Poison
pill
removal
(2)

Ability to
Mngt.
Gov.
Ind. for
call
proposal proposal
dual class
special
support support
shares
meeting
%
%
(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

4.371*** 0.009** 0.011*** -0.130*** -3.064*** 1.110
(0.954)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.025)
(0.794)
(3.162)

HF
activism
event

ROA

Ln(cash)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Dividend Ln(Total
yield
CEO pay)
(10)

-0.006* 0.014*** -0.224*** 0.002**
(0.0031) (0.005)
(0.065)
(0.001)

(11)

-0.037
(0.053)

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

250
2
yes
yes

1,037
2,685

1,087
2,708

1,000
1,740

1,000
1,740

758
1,219

122
190

1,566
4,105

1,520
3,998

1,516
3,983

1,514
3,976

996
2,657
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